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KEY POINTS 
The financing of the Australian health care system faces significant challenges. Foremost 
amongst these include the following: 
 Rising health care costs due to the ageing population, rising incomes and expectations, 
and more expensive technologies and services. In addition, more complex and chronic 
health needs will shift service demands from episodic treatment to integrated care 
between service providers and over time. 
 A tax base which favours individual income taxes, and which will shrink as the 
dependency ratio (of elderly to working-age individuals) grows. This shifting tax burden 
introduces significant issues of inter-generational equity. 
 Growth rates in health care expenditure thereby continuing to outstrip that of revenues, 
and increasing reliance on OOP and PHI financing. 
There is a need for a public debate on how Australia’s health care financing and funding can 
play a constructive role in delivering more efficient and equitable care, and in ensuring equity 
in the financial contributions made towards that care. Any reforms need to be underpinned by 
the recognition that no single entity is currently accountable for the delivery of a patient’s 
health care needs and that the incentives facing the agents of health delivery do not reward 
them for providing better patient outcomes and improved system efficiency. 
The current debate (principally the GST debate) is framed in terms of the States and 
Territories’ need to support growth in public hospital costs, in the context of falling 
Commonwealth contributions.  However, higher GST revenue will not provide incentives for 
integrated care, rather reinforcing existing structures and the separation of funding for public 
hospitals separately from primary care. An argument about whether this is a State or 
Commonwealth responsibility is futile when what is needed is a new approach to integrating 
care. For this reason, decisions about how to best raise revenues and how to allocate these to 
different parts of the health care system should be considered separately from whether they 
lie within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth or the States and Territories. 
There are a range of public revenue instruments (beyond the GST) which can be considered.  
Some of these are already being implemented.  For example, increases in the age of pension 
eligibility may lift workforce participation among the elderly, reducing pension expenditure 
as well increasing income tax revenues.  Other taxation instruments are also worth 
consideration, particularly those that directly address the intergenerational tax issues that 
arise from rising dependency ratios. Such measures include the (re)introduction of 
superannuation benefit taxes, or tapping into accumulated wealth. In addition, there are 
instruments that allow for greater revenues to be collected during the working years such as 
the accumulation of sovereign medical savings accounts. Importantly, the impact of the 
efficiency of and equity of access to health services must be considered alongside the 
efficiency and equity of revenue-raising.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation (CHERE) has been 
commissioned by the Australian Healthcare and Hospitals Association (AHHA) to write two 
papers as part of the Association’s series on Pathways to Reform. The series will contribute to 
public debate during the development of the Australian Government’s White Papers on 
Reform of the Federation, and Reform of Australia’s tax system. This is one of two papers 
produced by CHERE – the other considers policy options for the new Primary Health 
Networks (PHNs). 
This paper examines the financing of Australia’s health care system. It describes the sources 
of revenue that pay for health care services and products. In doing so, the paper discusses the 
extent to which Australia’s health care funding arrangements support the efficient and 
equitable delivery of health care services. In particular, we examine these issues in light of 
the changing demographic nature of the Australian population which will have substantive 
implications for the financing, demand and delivery of health care services in the future. The 
paper seeks to address the question of how (rather than how much) we raise our health care 
revenue and whether the sourcing of revenue has an impact on the performance of the health 
system. 
Australians have one of the highest life expectancies in the world and can expect to live about 
25 years longer, on average, than a century ago. Life expectancy at birth is currently 79.9 and 
84.3 years for males and females, respectively. Importantly, we are not just living longer, but 
have more years living free of disability. A boy born in 2012 can expect to live 62.4 years 
free of disability but in 1998 this figure stood at 58.0. A girl born in 2012 could expect to live 
64.5 years free of disability compared to 62.1 in 1998. In 2011-12, more than half (55%) of 
all Australians aged 15 and over considered themselves to be in 'excellent' or 'very good' 
health. Another 30 percent said they were in 'good' health. Just over 1 in 10 (11%) rated their 
health as 'fair', and only 4 percent as 'poor' (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 
2014a). 
Improved treatments and health outcomes have been accompanied by ever increasing health 
care costs. The ratio of current health expenditure to gross domestic product (GDP) increased 
from 6.8 percent in 1982 to 8.8 percent in 2012-13 (OECD, 2015a). This trend is set to 
continue. The Intergenerational Report, for example, forecasts that the Commonwealth 
Government’s contribution to health will rise by around $260 billion over the next 40 years. 
This would increase the per capita health contribution of the Federal Government from 
$2,800 in 2014-15 to reach $6,600 in 2054-55 (Australian Treasury, 2015a)1. 
A frequently asked question is whether these rising health care costs will remain affordable in 
the future. This question is particularly pertinent because governments are the primary 
funding source of health care. At the same time, governments face increasing fiscal pressures. 
                                                          
1 This is based on the “Currently legislated” scenario as presented in Australian Treasury (2015a, page 60). Under the 
“proposed policy” fiscal projection, this real per capita growth in spending would be considerably less, though this is not 
quantified in the Australian Treasury (2015a). However, a sense of the difference between these two fiscal projections is 
provided in Chart 2 of the Australian Treasury (2015a, page xiv) 
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They are constrained in the revenue they can raise as well as by competing spending 
priorities. 
The paper is structured as follows. First, it compares Australia’s health expenditure to similar 
OECD countries including how we pay for this care through public funding, direct patient 
payments and private health insurance. Second, given the focus of current federation debate, 
we examine the contributions of the Commonwealth and States and Territories Governments 
to public health care funding in more detail. Third, we examine funding and financing 
policies in other countries, focusing on reforms that followed on from the immediate 
aftermath of the global financial crisis. Finally, this paper summarises key findings and draws 
out the main policy implications to inform the current debate on health care financing in 
Australia. 
HEALTH CARE SPENDING AND SOURCES OF FINANCE 
Health care is an important economic sector in its own right. Across all 34 OECD countries, 
it accounts for around 8.9 percent of gross domestic product (Figure 1) and equates to around 
AU$6,400 per capita. As a proportion of GDP, Australia’s current health care spending is 
very much in line with the OECD average. Though the majority of OECD countries spend 
between 8 and 10 percent of GDP on health care, there are some countries that are 
considerably outside of this range. Mexico and Poland, for instance, devote substantially 
fewer resources (6.2% and 6.4%, respectively) to health whereas countries such as the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Germany spend in excess of 11 percent of GDP. The United States 
has been a consistent outlier in this measure, with health care spending accounting for more 
than 16 percent of its total economy. 
There are a number of important drivers of health care expenditure: rising incomes, 
expectations, new technologies and an ageing population. Across countries, there is a 
longstanding association between income and health spending, with higher income countries 
devoting a greater share of their economy to health care. While, in part, this is a consequence 
of greater disposable income being directed to the consumption of health care, it also reflects 
the adoption and diffusion of more expensive technologies. In the United States, for example, 
new technologies account for anywhere between 27 and 48 percent of health spending growth 
(Smith, Newhouse, & Freeland, 2009).  In Australia, the role of new technologies as a cost 
driver can be demonstrated in cancer-related pharmaceutical expenditure. Between 2001 and 
2009, overall costs of cancer-related care increased by 56 percent but cancer-related 
pharmaceutical spending increased by 220 percent over the same period. This high growth is 
explained by not only having more people having treatments over longer periods of time, but 
also by the higher prices society is paying for such treatments (Australian Institute of Health 
and Welfare, 2013). 
Older age is also aligned with higher health care spending. As the proportion of elderly 
people in the population rises, so too does overall health care spending. This is a salient point 
for Australia, because it still has a relatively young population compared to many other 
OECD countries. For example, in 2014 the percentage of the population aged 65 and over in 
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Australia was 14.7 percent, compared to the OECD average of 16.2 percent and in countries 
such as Japan and Germany this percentage is now in excess of 20 percent. These 
demographic differences need to be taken into account when making international 
comparisons of health spending. 
The proportion of the Australian population aged 65 and over is projected to reach 22.4 
percent by 2054, representing an additional 5.3 million people over this age.  Currently, for 
every one person over the age of 65, there are 4.4 people in the prime working and income 
tax paying age group of 15 to 64.  By 2054 this dependency ratio is set to decline to 2.7.  
Whilst our health care spending currently appears benign by international standards, our 
relatively young population may help explain this. As the Australian age profile catches up to 
that of other countries, health expenditure growth may accelerate, and there will be 
proportionally fewer income tax payers to help fund the public health costs. 
Figure 1. Current health expenditure as a percentage of GDP (OECD selected countries, 2013 or nearest year) 
 
Source: OECD (2015a) 
 
In all OECD countries, health care is funded through both public and private sources.  Public 
sources comprise taxes and social insurance, whereas private sources consist of contributions 
through (a) private health insurance (PHI); (b) out-of-pocket (OOP) costs; and (c) other 
private sources such as injury compensation. Though all countries use a mix of all these 
sources of finance, what differs is their reliance on one source of revenue over another. In 
Australia, for example, public funding accounts for 5.9 percent of GDP and private funds 
account for a further 2.8 percent of GDP. 
The funding and financing system has an enormous bearing on the efficiency, equity and 
sustainability of the health-care system. Table 1 summarises some of the main implications of 
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towards more insurance is often regarded as way of reducing uncertainty, potentially 
improving equity (particularly if it is public insurance) but creating more inefficiency due to 
potential overconsumption. The impacts of financing shifts on health care supply and 
sustainability have become a more recent topic of research. For example, Finkelstein (2007) 
found that the introduction of Medicare in the United States had a significant impact on 
increasing the medical workforce, capital expenditure and technology diffusion. Table 1 
provides a general outline of the expected impacts associated with changing funding sources. 
Many countries, including Australia, have put in place additional policies that seek to 
safeguard against some of the unwanted effects. For example, concession cards provide 
additional financial protection from high OOP costs for pharmaceuticals and medical services 
for many pensioners and low income households. In addition, the Pharmaceutical Benefits 
Scheme (PBS) and Medicare Safety Nets provide additional protection for those patients who 
face high OOP costs. The Government has also put in place mechanisms to evaluate which 
services are covered to reduce the risk of paying prices that are unwarranted (e.g. economic 
evaluations to help decide which drugs and health care services are listed on the PBS and 
Medicare Benefits Schedule), as well as restrictions on the number of services paid. 
The system of financing also has implications for the distribution of income. Systems that are 
predominantly financed through insurance typically redistribute resources from the healthy to 
the sick. Health systems that are financed through progressive taxes will raise a higher 
proportion of revenue from wealthier sections of the population, and thereby redistribute 
resources from the wealthy to the sick. 
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Table 1. Health system implications of funding sources  
  OOP costs Private insurance Public funding 
Efficiency Reduces demand, 
including over -
consumption. 
May increase over-
consumption and 
prices charged. 
May increase over-
consumption and 
prices charged. 
Uncertainty Increases risk of 
financial loss in case 
of illness. 
Reduces risk of 
financial loss in case 
of illness. 
Reduces risk of 
financial loss in case 
of illness. 
Supply of health Sends price signals to 
health care providers 
to deliver care to 
those able and willing 
to pay. 
Sends price signals 
to health care 
providers to deliver 
care to those who 
are insured, and 
what 
products/services 
are covered. 
Sends price signals to 
health care providers 
to deliver 
products/services that 
are covered. 
Equity of access Leads to inequity 
between those able to 
afford health care and 
those who can’t. 
Leads to inequity 
between those who 
are and are not 
insured. 
Reduces inequities to 
health care access. 
Equity of 
financing 
Likely to be 
regressive. 
Likely to be 
regressive. 
Likely to be 
progressive. 
Sustainability Provides a source of 
revenue from 
patients, and reduces 
use in the short-term. 
May increase costs 
over the longer term 
if patients do not seek 
preventive care. 
Provides a source of 
revenue from 
insured. May 
increase costs if 
health funds have 
insufficient 
negotiation power 
over price, volume 
and benefits. 
Greater reliance on tax 
revenues that may 
require higher taxes or 
cuts to other (non-
health) programs. 
 
Figure 2 reveals that across OECD countries 72.7 percent of total current health care 
spending is financed through public sources. In Australia, only 68 percent of health 
expenditure is financed through public sources, one of the lowest percentages in the OECD. 
In many countries with comprehensive public health insurance arrangements such as the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and New Zealand this percentage exceeds 80 percent 
(OECD, 2015). There is a relatively strong reliance on private sources of finance in Australia, 
with OOP costs accounting for around 20 percent of total health expenditure compared to an 
OECD average of 17 percent. The percentage contribution of private health insurance in 
Australia is in line with the OECD average (9%). 
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Figure 2. Sources of current health care expenditure (Selected OECD countries, 2013 or nearest year) 
 
Source: OECD (2015a) 
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that any health reforms at the government level are likely to have repercussions on the 
broader financing of health care, in terms of OOP costs and PHI which, in turn, will have 
consequences on the functioning of the system. 
Figure 3. Rate of health care expenditure growth by source of funds (current prices, 2003-04 = 100) 
 
Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2014b) 
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PUBLIC FINANCING OF HEALTH IN AUSTRALIA 
Australia is a low taxing nation, with a tax base mix which differs significantly from the 
OECD average. In particular, Australia relies more heavily on individual income taxes 
(which comprise 39% of the tax base compared to an OECD average of about 24%), and less 
on consumption taxes (about 28% of the tax base versus an OECD average of 33%) (OECD, 
2015b). Overall however, Australia’s taxation revenue is equal to a relatively low 27.3 
percent of GDP (Figure 4). That is, while the composition of the tax base differs significantly 
from the OECD average, the overall tax burden is relatively low. Only three out of 34 OECD 
member countries have lower tax revenue percentages (Mexico, Korea and the United States) 
than Australia. Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP is in excess of 40 percent in traditionally 
high-taxing countries such as Denmark, France and Finland. However, even in countries such 
as New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom, tax revenues exceed those collected in 
Australia. The difference between the OECD tax revenue average of 34.1 percent and 
Australia’s 27.3 percent is equal to 6.8 percentage points. In dollar terms, this gap represents 
around $110 billion dollars – which is more than Australia’s total publicly funded health care 
expenditure. 
Figure 4. Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP (OECD selected countries, 2013 or nearest year) 
 
Source: OECD (2015b) 
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2 percent of taxable incomes, although there are reductions for those who earn less than 
$26,000 and exemptions for some including those on incomes below $21,000.  In 2011–12, 
the levy raised around $9 billion in revenue, only partially offsetting the cost of Medicare 
services, which totalled around $17.6 billion. 
The funds raised by the levy are not dedicated to any one purpose, although there is 
widespread belief in the community that the levy pays for health care services.  When 
Medicare was introduced in February 1984, the Medicare levy was set at 1 percent of 
personal taxable income and was justified on the basis that it would pay for the additional 
costs of implementing Medicare, in particular to compensate the states and territories for the 
costs of providing free hospital care. 
Over time the levy has increased and has been used as an instrument to temporarily raise 
funds for specific purposes.  Several increases between 1986 and 1995 were justified on the 
basis of rising medical costs.  Collectively these increments raised the levy to 1.5 percent. In 
July 1996, a one-year surcharge of 0.2 percent was introduced to fund the gun buy-back 
scheme.  In July 2014, the levy was increased to 2 percent to contribute to the National 
Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS). 
 
COMMONWEALTH, STATE AND TERRITORY REVENUE AND 
HEALTH EXPENDITURE 
Overall, Australia collects around $416 billion in taxes every year, or around $19,000 per 
capita. The Commonwealth Government collects around 81.3 percent of this revenue, State 
and Territory governments collect 15.3 percent and local governments raise 3.4 percent of 
total tax revenue. It should be noted that these figures are calculated on the basis of where 
these revenues are collected, rather than where they are used. The GST represents somewhat 
of an anomaly because it is collected by the Commonwealth Government but it is passed on 
entirely to State and Territory Governments for their spending purposes. Even after adjusting 
for GST, Australia’s tax system has a degree of vertical fiscal imbalance, and the 
Commonwealth Government reallocates some of its revenue to the states and territories 
through a variety of mechanisms – many of which impose policy obligations on the states. 
Figure 5 shows the proportion of tax revenue spent on health care by both the 
Commonwealth and State and Territory Governments. These data have been adjusted to 
account for where the tax revenue is spent rather than where is it collected (e.g. the GST is 
classified as a state and territory revenue). Over time, federal own-purpose health care 
spending as a percentage of tax revenue has increased slightly from 22 percent in 2002 to 25 
percent in 2012, but there were considerable fluctuations over the decade. Between 2002 and 
2007 the Commonwealth Government’s health spending to revenue proportion held steady, 
but then increased substantially between 2007 and 2009; a time when tax revenues collapsed. 
The proportion of federal tax revenues spent on health care has fallen sharply since 2009 as 
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tax revenues recovered. In the most recently available data relating to financial year 2012-13, 
federal health expenditure actually fell in real terms by 2.4 percent. 
For the State and Territory Governments, health care spending is consistently taking up 
greater proportions of their total revenue. In 2002, health spending absorbed 18 percent of 
state and territory total revenues but by 2012 this percentage had increased to 28 percent. 
Unlike the Commonwealth Government’s expenditure to tax ratio, this steady rise is largely 
due to increasing health expenditures rather than fluctuations in tax revenues. 
Figure 5. Health expenditure as a percentage of revenue collected, Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments  
  
Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2014b). Note that GST revenue is counted in the State and 
Territory Government’s denominator 
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State and Territory Governments. Between 2002 and 2012, health expenditure for the State 
and Territory Governments increased by 137 percent (in current prices) whereas tax revenues 
increased by 52 percent. The state and territory revenue includes the GST. For the 
Commonwealth Government, health expenditure increased by a 103 percent but its revenues 
increased by 75 percent (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2014b). The period 
between 2007 and 2009 witnessed a substantial decline in the Commonwealth Government’s 
tax revenue which coincided with substantial tax cuts as well as the global financial crisis. 
Following 2009, the rate of growth for federal tax revenues accelerated again. Even with the 
GST, state and territory revenue did not keep pace with the Commonwealth Government’s 
revenue growth. 
The ageing population has a dual impact on health care funding and financing. On the one 
hand, health care expenditures are set to rise when a higher proportion of the population are 
elderly. On the other hand, growth in tax revenues may fall as the elderly pay fewer taxes, 
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particularly income tax. Figure 6 demonstrates this phenomenon. It shows the amount of 
weekly taxes paid by households as well as government health benefits received across 
different stages of the life course. For example, total government health benefits for a couple 
aged 35 and under is $95, but their average tax contribution is $584 per week. Two-thirds of 
this tax is derived from income. By contrast, the government’s weekly health benefits for 
couples aged 65 and over amounts to $381 but their tax contribution is only $168. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, 82 percent of an elderly couple’s tax contribution is through the Goods and 
Services Tax (GST). This shows that as the population ages, taxes on consumption become a 
more consistent and important source of revenue for governments. 
Figure 6. Weekly government health benefits and taxes by household type
2
 (2009-10) 
 
Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2012) 
 
 
Figure 6 also illustrates the generational cross-subsidies that occur as people of working age 
contribute to health care of the elderly. The falling dependency ratio will mean that the 
Australian population will have relatively fewer households of working age and relatively 
more retirees. This will have repercussions on the composition of taxes collected, and the 
amount of tax collected in relation to health expenditures. As noted previously, consumption-
based taxes redistribute the taxation burden, as the elderly pay relatively more GST than 
                                                          
2 Dependent children are all those under the age of 15 or full-time students aged 15-24, who have a parent in the 
household and do not have a partner or child of their own in the household.  
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income tax as a proportion of their total income. Reconsidering the structure of 
superannuation tax concessions is another alternative. 
  
FUNDING AND FINANCING RESPONSIBILITIES IN AUSTRALIA 
Since the time of Federation, the Commonwealth Government has been granted greater 
revenue raising powers but State and Territory Governments have, by and large, maintained 
their funding responsibilities in areas such as community services, education and health. 
Around 55 percent of State and Territory Government expenditure is raised through their own 
revenue measures, and the remaining 45 percent is provided by transfers such as the GST and 
the specific purpose grants (Australian Government, 2015). The draft Reform of the 
Federation Discussion Paper notes that this high degree of vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI) is a 
problem because “it can create a situation where the states and territories blame the 
Commonwealth for not passing on enough funds to deliver their services, or where the 
Commonwealth can blame the states and territories for not using taxpayers’ funds properly” 
(Australian Government, 2015, p. 10). 
While the Commonwealth Constitution lies at the heart of the fragmentation of the health 
system, it has been exacerbated by the Commonwealth using its fiscal capacity to influence 
policies and fund programs that are the responsibility of the States (and Territories). Figure 7 
details health expenditure by sources of funds. Almost 50 percent of the Commonwealth 
Government’s $61 billion health care expenditure is used to pay for medical services funded 
through the Medicare Benefit Schedule (MBS) and pharmaceuticals listed on the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Schedule (PBS); $19.7 billion and $8.4 billion, respectively. Other 
programs include dental ($0.8 billion), community health ($1.2 billion), public health 
services ($1.2 billion), and veterans’ health ($0.9bn). Grants to the states and territories 
account for 26 percent of the Commonwealth Government’s health expenditure ($15.9 
billion). The majority of this funding constitutes the Commonwealth Government’s direct 
contribution to the funding of the States’ and Territories’ public hospitals. In 2012-13, this 
consisted primarily of National Health Reform Grants. The private health insurance rebate 
costs around $5.1 billion and is attributed to the Commonwealth Government’s contribution 
towards private hospitals and medical inpatient services (in addition to the MBS benefits it 
pays for these services) (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2014b). 
The state, territory and local government allocation of health expenditure is also shown in 
Figure 7. Collectively, these levels of government expenditure contribute $31.6 billion per 
year, with the vast majority of this funding flowing towards the provision of public hospital 
services (75% or $23.7 billion). The non-government sector contributes a further $41.5 
billion. Non-government contributions are primarily payments made by patients directly for 
products and services as well as through private health insurance premiums. Noteworthy is 
that the biggest non-government health expenditure is in the “other” category, which consists 
of pharmaceuticals that are not listed on the PBS as well as aids and appliances. Dentistry and 
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other health practitioners is the next biggest non-government expenditure item ($10 billion) 
and reflects the lack of public provision and/or insurance coverage (both public and private) 
for these types of services. 
 
Figure 7. Health expenditure by area and source of funds, 2012–13 ($ bn) 
 
Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2014b) 
* Aids, appliances, non-listed pharmaceuticals 
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also creates incentives on the part of some health sectors to try and shift financial 
responsibility to another funding source (often referred to as cost-shifting). 
Cost-shifting is not an economic problem by itself, unless it leads to the inefficient use of 
health care resources (e.g. duplication of services, higher transaction costs). However, it is 
symptomatic of a system where no single entity is accountable for the delivery of a patient’s 
health care needs which, in turn, can create substantial barriers to the efficient delivery of 
health care. The incentives facing the agents of health delivery (predominantly the various 
health care professionals) do not reward them for providing the best or most efficient 
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providing greater volumes of care (e.g. MBS), rather than most appropriate care. 
0.9
5.9
0.5
0.7
23.7
1.2
1.2
8.4
3.6
1.2
3.2
19.7
16.2
0.1
0.4
1.5
8.0
12.0
10.0
5.6
4.0
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0
Public health
Community health
PBS
Private hospitals
Other*
Dental and other practitioners
Medical services
Public hospital services
Non-government Federal government State/territory & local
al Report 2008 
 
18 
 
It is also becoming increasingly clear that as part of its vision to return the budget to surplus, 
the Commonwealth Government has foreshadowed major cuts to the expected growth in its 
health contribution to the states and territories. Figure 8 brings together information from four 
consecutive Commonwealth budgets handed down between 2012 and 2015. The solid lines 
show the forward estimates of each of the four budgets, alongside the dashed lines which 
represent simple linear trajectories going beyond the four year period over which budgets 
routinely report. The 2012-13 Budget foreshadowed a substantial increase in the 
Commonwealth Government’s contribution to public hospital funding through the National 
Health Reform Funding agreements between the States, Territories and Commonwealth 
Governments. The first and second Abbott Government budgets substantially reduced this 
growth trajectory, directly conflicting with the principle of durability laid out in the Reform of 
the Federation terms of reference. Consecutive budget adjustments have meant that in 
2016-17, the states and territories will receive $32 per capita less from the Commonwealth 
Government than anticipated in the 2012-13 budget.  This equates to around $800 million for 
that year. Furthermore, the 2015-16 budget forecasts constant levels of Commonwealth 
Government spending from 2017 after accounting for CPI and population growth. 
If recent growth trends in hospital expenditure persist, the Commonwealth Government’s 
proportional contribution to public hospital funding will diminish quickly.  Under these 
circumstances, State and Territory Governments have to find additional revenues to make up 
future shortfalls.  It is in this context that recent calls for a higher GST rate have been made. 
Figure 8. Australian Government funding to states and territories for public hospitals (per capita, constant dollars) 
 
Source: (Australian Treasury, 2012, 2014a, 2014b, 2015). 
Population data based on ABS projections. Constant dollars adjusted for CPI published by the Reserve Bank of Australia. 
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The Institute of Actuaries released a Green Paper that considered a range of alternatives for 
raising revenues that can meet the needs of the ageing population (Armstrong & Dyson, 
2014).  The options considered are: 
 Working longer to minimise the fall in the dependency ratio and retain income tax 
revenue. 
 Incentives (such as tax incentives) for personal medical savings accounts to save 
during working age years to help pay for care when needed. 
 Sovereign Wealth Funds that add national savings to fund potential future health care 
liabilities. 
 Prefunding private health insurance premiums by requiring insurance funds to build 
up reserves to hold against the future rises in the cost of premiums. 
 Tapping into the wealth, rather than incomes, of the elderly to pay for health care. 
Recent aged-care reforms have introduced measures where residential care payments 
are dependent upon a person’s income and wealth. 
This list illustrates that there are a range of options. Greater contributions can be income 
based or asset based; they can involve individual accounts or pooled savings. Increasing 
labour force participation rates, through longer working lives or increasing participation of 
women, is part of a much wider economic debate. Several countries have established 
individualised medical savings accounts but these only contribute a proportion of total health 
expenditure. Savings accounts allow spreading the financing of health care over a lifetime, 
but they contradict many aspects of universal health insurance. They do not pool risks across 
populations which is an essential function of health insurance. Approaches that rely on 
generating new savings are too late for funding the health care of the ‘baby boomer’ 
generation who are already moving into retirement. Further, any approach which relies on 
greater user charges or personalised savings risks widening gaps in access to health care. 
The current Federation debate has moved on from which level of government should do what 
in health care, as posed in the initial Health Issues Paper. The Commonwealth’s decision to 
reduce its contribution to public hospital funding has left the States and Territories faced with 
the challenge of finding that revenue and into consideration of broadening and raising the 
level of the GST. This will tie funding to the current structure of service delivery, that is, 
States remain responsible for public hospitals and the Commonwealth for primary care. This 
is short term thinking. Australia has often been at the forefront of innovative social measures 
including the Higher Education Contribution Scheme (and the associated income-contingent 
loans) and compulsory superannuation. The challenges in funding and financing health care 
require equally innovative thinking that goes beyond the current GST debate. 
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CHANGING HEALTH NEEDS ENTAILS SHIFTING FUNDING 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
The changing age profile of the Australian population and the changing burden of disease 
will have not only significant implications for health expenditure and revenue, but also for 
the type of health care that is required. As the Federation Health Issues paper notes, current 
arrangements are largely structured around providers and funding streams rather than 
patients. 
Australia’s fragmented health funding and delivery system is likely to become an even bigger 
obstacle to efficient care in the future. Alongside the ageing population, the demand for 
health care will not only intensify but health care needs will also change. More people will 
have multiple chronic conditions that are complex and require frequent care from a 
multidisciplinary team of health providers. In addition, these services should be well 
integrated to ensure that patients receive optimum and efficient care, and that they benefit 
from greater continuity of care relationships with their major providers. This type of care is 
still a long way from the fragmented episodic care that the Australian health system (as well 
as many others) tends to provide at present. These pressures require changes to the current 
structure of service delivery, rather than cementing funding arrangements that assume 
hospitals will remain as hospitals function today, and primary care as the range of services 
currently provided. 
A central aim of a well-coordinated and integrated care system is to manage complex chronic 
diseases at the earliest possible point and prevent patients from escalating down a path of 
ill-health and higher costs. The problem is that the incentives inherent in the current funding 
and financing arrangements are not aligned to such provision of care. The Commonwealth 
Government is concerned with containing its own expenditure (e.g. the various editions of the 
Intergenerational Report are written from the Commonwealth point of view) with little regard 
to broader health system implications. State and Territory Governments, on the other hand, 
are very concerned because they are becoming increasingly responsible for providing care for 
complex patients who need to be treated in hospitals. State and Territory Governments are 
acutely interested in reducing the overall demand on hospitals. However, they have limited 
resources and policy instruments to effectively reduce that demand. In a large part they are 
beholden to the effectiveness and efficiencies of the primary health care system, over which 
they have negligible control. The incentives in the current system offer few financial rewards 
for any one funding source (or provider) to take a more comprehensive perspective of a 
patient’s health needs over their lifetime and intervene at the most appropriate time. 
Figure 9 illustrates the problem of escalating health care costs and changing health sector 
responsibilities. It shows that annual health care costs almost double when patients are 
identified3 as having diabetes compared to overall population costs (average annual health 
care costs of $10,774 and $5,848, respectively). Annual health care costs more than double 
again if patients go on to develop end-stage renal failure (ESRF); a potential complication of 
                                                          
3 Patients were identified as being diabetic through their use of MBS items related to HBA1C testing and use of diabetic 
medications claimed through the PBS 
al Report 2008 
 
21 
 
diabetes. These figures are based on the Sax Institute’s, NSW-based, 45 and Up Study, using 
linked administrative data. Importantly, the increase in health care costs is accompanied by a 
shift in health care responsibilities. For patients with ESRF the annual public hospital cost is 
around $18,000, compared to an annual cost of $2,875 for the overall 45 and Up population 
and $5,120 for patients with diabetes. These figures show that as patients escalate down the 
path of chronic diseases and complications, health care costs tend to fall more heavily on 
public hospitals. This also signifies a change in funding responsibility towards the states and 
territories. 
Figure 9. Annual per capita health care costs by sector for the population aged 45 and over, patients with diabetes 
and end-stage renal failure, 2011 
 
Source: Sax Institute (2015) 
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SUSTAINABLE HEALTH CARE FUNDING: RECENT 
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES 
The challenges facing Australia are not unique. Many countries are facing a similar dual 
challenge of rising health expenditure and constrained revenue growth. For some, this issue 
came to a head following the onset of the global financial crisis (GFC) when public revenues 
fell sharply. In response, many European countries (and some non-European) introduced 
health and fiscal reforms which impacted on the health system and services. Even when 
proposed changes are not specifically related to a recession (as was the case in Australia), the 
range of responses to an economic downturn and, more importantly, the impact of changes in 
funding and financing arrangements on health, access to services, and overall efficiency and 
sustainability of the health system, can provide important lessons for policy and decision 
makers generally. 
Health care became a target for large-scale austerity measures during the time of the GFC, 
particularly in those countries where health care spending growth prior to the crisis had been 
high. An important lesson from the GFC is that countries whose fiscal position was more 
robust and whose health systems were well prepared were able to cope more easily with 
economic crisis. These types of countries were able to continue implementing changes 
planned prior to 2008 and were not forced to make radical changes to either statutory benefits 
packages or the breadth of population coverage (van Gool and Pearson, 2014). 
Estonia is good case study of preparedness to manage risks. Two-thirds of the country’s 
health expenditure is financed through the Estonian Health Insurance Fund (EHIF) which is 
primarily financed through dedicated pay-roll taxes. To ensure the EHIF’s solvency, it has 
three reserves including the mandatory reserve, to manage risk from macroeconomic 
changes. This reserve is created by transferring at least 2 percent of the budget to the reserve 
every year and is set at 6 percent of total EHIF budget. It can only be used after a government 
order upon the recommendation of the relevant Minister (Lai et al, 2013). The recession hit 
Estonia hard, with a contraction in GDP of more than 15 percent in 2009-10. The EHIF 
reserves were called upon to countenance the 10 to 15 percent fall in revenues.  Whilst health 
care austerity measures were still introduced in Estonia, these were in line with broader pre-
crisis objectives to fulfil Eurozone criteria.  The ability to draw on reserves prevented the 
need for more severe austerity measures in health. 
Increases in taxes are one way in which health system revenue may be increased. The 
Australian Medicare levy is an example of a specific income tax intended to help finance the 
health system. France introduced a tax on some sources of income specifically to finance 
social security (including health) expenditure (2% in 2009, increased to 4% in 2010 and 6% 
in 2011). Although governments’ capacities to raise additional revenue are limited, 
particularly during an economic downturn, several countries introduced new financing 
arrangements to broaden revenue bases and create greater flexibility and equity in financing 
health care (van Gool & Pearson, 2014). Ireland introduced the universal social charge (USC) 
in 2011, a progressive tax ranging between 2 and 7 percent of annual earnings. The USC is 
payable for those with incomes over €10,036 and the rate levied depends on income level and 
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age. The USC replaces the proportional health levy which was an earmarked health tax set at 
4 percent of income (2% prior to 2009) (Briggs, 2013). In Portugal, pensioners’ contribution 
to the public sector’s insurance fund was increased and in Greece, civil servants now 
contribute 5.1 percent of their salary towards social health insurance, which was previously 
met through the state budget. Some countries increased the tax rate on goods and services, 
and some increased the rate on some health care products. Greece, for example, increased 
their goods and services tax on medicines from 9 to 11 percent, before reducing them to 6.5 
percent in 2011. The UK increased the tax on over-the-counter medication to 20 percent 
(from a reduced rate of 15%) (Vogler, Zimmermann, Leopold, & de Joncheere, 2011). 
A number of countries have also imposed higher taxes on goods such as alcohol and tobacco. 
The emphasis of these measures has been placed on their potential health benefits. For 
example, Estonia increased tobacco and alcohol levies, although this continued a previous 
trend to raise prices for these goods. Several OECD governments increased existing taxes or 
introduced new taxes on foods high in salt, sugar or fat in the past few years. Hungary 
introduced a tax on such products in 2011. Not all these measures are GFC specific and may, 
in fact, be part of on-going health promotion reforms; nevertheless in countries such as 
France and Hungary, they provide additional revenues for health and social services (Sassi, 
Belloni, & Capobianco, 2013). 
Increases in taxes on specific goods are regularly mandated in Australian budgets. Demand 
for many of these products is relatively inelastic, implying that a fall in the quantity 
consumed is relatively small compared to scale of the tax revenue. Such taxes can therefore 
be a substantial source of fiscal revenues. It is important to note that taxation policies 
intended to change demand are unlikely to result in immediate or short-term impacts on the 
health system; changes in behaviour such as smoking, eating, drinking and exercising are 
more likely to have long-term impacts on the demand for and cost of healthcare. 
Another means of reducing demand for health services may be via the promotion of better 
health or the use of preventive health services. While this has immediate ‘common sense’ 
appeal, evidence has shown that the cost-effectiveness of preventive strategies is as mixed as 
treatment interventions, and any return on investment may not be realised except over a long 
time frame (Hall, 2011). However, only a few countries responded to the GFC by providing 
enhanced funding for policies intended to increase healthy behaviours (healthy eating, 
increased exercise, higher rates of participation in screening). 
A common policy response to the GFC was to cut costs by reducing the salaries of the health 
workforce, freezing them or lowering their rate of increase or reducing staff numbers. 
Australia has also implemented similar policies. For example, during the mid-1990s the 
government changed indexation arrangements for many MBS rebates, including those for 
General Practitioners (GPs). In the Australian health system, where there is little government 
control over doctors’ fees, such actions can lead to an increase in co-payments for patients.  
Research has established that such increases in OOP costs impact inequitably on those least 
able to afford them (e.g. the poor, disadvantaged and chronically ill) resulting in their using 
fewer necessary services and thus increasing the potential that they will present with more 
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advanced illness, necessitating the use of more costly services, including admission to 
hospital (Tamblyn, Laprise, & Hanley, 2001). 
It has become popular in Australia, as in some European countries, to finance capital 
investment (particularly new hospitals or specialist treatment centres) through a form of 
market competition termed Public-Private Partnerships. This type of arrangement may reduce 
published government debt but does not necessarily reduce health system costs or increase 
efficiency in the long term. More immediately, the use of different administration and other 
systems in public and private facilities may act as a barrier to collaboration between facilities 
offering complementary services. 
In common with many countries, Australia’s health system entitles all citizens and residents 
to receive subsidised care (some of which is free at the point of its delivery). In response to 
the GFC, some countries reduced the proportion of the population entitled to be covered for 
statutory benefits or postponed the expansion of population coverage. Still others expanded 
the level of coverage at this time, usually as a result of ongoing policies in this respect, rather 
than as a response to the crisis. 
Over time, there have been discussions in Australia about whether to “means test” eligibility 
to Medicare or allow wealthy individuals or households to “opt-out” of Medicare, not pay the 
Medicare levy and rely instead on their private health insurance. Evidence from countries 
such as The Netherlands and Germany where such measures have been implemented suggests 
that the combination of loss of revenue from wealthier households and the increase in the 
proportion of older, poorer and sicker people requiring public health care (due to adverse 
selection) does not alleviate fiscal pressures and may add to them. Also, private health 
insurance in Australia does not cover every aspect of health care - such as emergency care 
and primary care, both of which are important in terms of ensuring equitable access to care. 
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CONCLUSIONS  
Australia is neither a highly taxed country, nor a high health care spending country, relative 
to its OECD peers. Within this context, the financing of the Australian health care system 
now faces significant challenges. Foremost amongst these include the following: 
 Rising health care costs due to the ageing population, rising incomes and expectations, 
and more expensive technologies and services. In addition, more complex and chronic 
health needs will shift service demands from episodic treatment to integrated care 
between service providers and over time. 
 A tax base which favours individual income taxes, and which will shrink as the 
dependency ratio (of elderly to working-age individuals) grows. This shifting tax burden 
introduces significant issues of inter-generational equity. 
 Growth rates in health care expenditure thereby continuing to outstrip that of revenues, 
and increasing reliance on OOP and PHI financing. 
Given these significant challenges there is a need for a public debate on how Australia’s 
health care financing and funding can play a constructive role in delivering more efficient and 
equitable care, and in ensuring equity in the financial contributions made towards that care. 
Underpinning the debate must also remain the principles of Medicare: of sharing the cost of 
health care according to one’s means, and accessing health care according to need. Given the 
distribution of health and ill-health throughout the population, pooling of risks must also 
remain an inherent feature of managing revenues and expenditures. This requires a broader 
debate about financing that goes beyond the standard Commonwealth, state and territory 
arguments, including (i) the potential impact of any Commonwealth/State reforms on OOP 
costs; and (ii) the role of PHI. 
The context of the current GST debate is that the 2014-15 Federal Budget substantially 
reduced the Commonwealth’s expected contribution to public hospital funding over the 
period of the forward estimates.  As a result of this change, State and Territory Governments 
have started to examine alternative sources of revenue to meet their expected short-fall in 
health funding; particularly in the area of public hospitals.  As the revenues of the GST goes 
directly to the states and territories, a rise in the GST rate is widely seen as a mechanism to 
overcome the shortfall in public hospital funding. The current debate is thus framed in terms 
of the States and Territories’ need to support growth in public hospital costs.  This risks 
repeating mistakes of the past.  Whilst a rise in the GST will increase revenues, it will also 
reinforce existing structures and the separation of funding for public hospitals separately from 
primary care. It will not provide incentives for integrated care. 
An argument about whether this is a State responsibility – to provide an alternative to 
inpatient care – or a Commonwealth one – to encourage new types of primary care – is futile 
when what is needed is a new approach to integrating care. For this reason, decisions about 
how to best raise revenues and how to allocate these to different parts of the health care 
system should be considered separately from whether they lie within the jurisdiction of the 
Commonwealth or the States and Territories. 
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There are a range of public revenue instruments (beyond the GST) which can be considered. 
Some of these are already being implemented. For example, increases in the age of pension 
eligibility may lift workforce participation among the elderly and thereby reduce pension 
expenditure as well increase income tax revenues. However, there are other taxation 
instruments that are worth consideration; particularly those that directly address the 
intergenerational tax issues that arise from rising dependency ratios. Such measures as 
(re)introducing superannuation benefit taxes or tapping into accumulated wealth could lift the 
tax incidence among the elderly. In addition, there are instruments that allow for greater 
revenues to be collected during the working years such as the accumulation of sovereign 
medical savings accounts. The impact of the efficiency of and equity of access to health 
services must be considered alongside the efficiency and equity of revenue-raising. 
Funding and financing reforms cannot stop at the point of ensuring that the health system has 
sufficient revenue.  Funding and financing reform is also integral to developing a more 
coordinated and integrated health care system. Such reforms need to be underpinned by the 
recognition that no single entity is currently accountable for the delivery of a patient’s health 
care needs and that the incentives facing the agents of health delivery (predominantly the 
various health care professionals) do not reward them for providing better patient outcomes 
and improve system efficiency. Current institutional arrangements are a barrier to coordinated 
care. This is why the Reform of the Federation needs to open the debate about improving the 
alignment of interests of all stakeholders within the health sector to achieve better health 
outcomes at a reasonable cost, rather than take a narrow focus on Commonwealth and State 
responsibilities. 
 
 
  
al Report 2008 
 
27 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. (2012). Government benefits, taxes and household income, Australia, 
2009-10. 6537.0. Canberra: ABS. 
Australian Government. (2015). Reform of the Federation. Discussion Paper. Canberra: Australian 
Government. 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. (2013). Health system expenditure on cancer and other 
neoplasms in Australia: 2008–09. Cancer series no. 81. Cat. no. 78. Canberra: AIHW. 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. (2014a). Australia's Health 2014   Retrieved from 
http://www.aihw.gov.au/australias-health/2014/  
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare. (2014b). Health expenditure Australia 2012-13. Health 
and Welfare Expenditure Series No.52. Cat. no. HWE 61. Canberra: AIHW. 
Australian Treasury. (2012). Budget 2012-13.   Retrieved August 17, 2015, from 
http://budget.gov.au/2012-13/ 
Australian Treasury. (2014a). Budget 2013-14.   Retrieved August 17, 2015, from 
http://www.budget.gov.au/2013-14/content/fbo/html/index.htm 
Australian Treasury. (2014b). Final budget outcome 2013-14.   Retrieved August 17, 2015, from 
http://budget.gov.au/2013-14/ 
Australian Treasury. (2015). Budget 2015.   Retrieved August 17, 2015, from 
http://www.budget.gov.au/2015-16/ 
Australian Treasury. (2015a). 2015 Intergenerational report. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. 
Briggs, A. D. (2013). How changes to Irish healthcare financing are affecting universal health 
coverage. Health policy (Amsterdam, Netherlands), 113(1-2), 45-49. doi: 
10.1016/j.healthpol.2013.07.022 
Finkelstein, A. (2007). The Aggregate Effects of Health Insurance: Evidence from the Introduction of 
Medicare. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(1), 1-37. doi: 10.1162/qjec.122.1.1 
Hall, J. P. (2011). Disease prevention, health care, and economics. In S. Glied & P. C. SMith (Eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Health Economics (pp. 555-577). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
OECD. (2015a). OECD Health Statistics.   Retrieved August 15, 2015, from 
http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/health-data.htm 
OECD. (2015b). OECD Revenue Statistics.   Retrieved 22 September, 2015, from 
https://data.oecd.org/tax/tax-revenue.htm 
Sassi, F., Belloni, A., & Capobianco, C. (2013). The role of fiscal policies in health promotion. OECD 
Health Working Papers, No. 66. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k3twr94kvzx-en. Paris: 
OECD. 
Sax Institute. (2015). 45 and Up Study.   Retrieved August 3, 2015, from 
https://www.saxinstitute.org.au/our-work/45-up-study/ 
Smith, S., Newhouse, J. P., & Freeland, M. S. (2009). Income, insurance, and technology: why does 
health spending outpace economic growth? Health Affairs, 28(5), 1276-1284. doi: 
10.1377/hlthaff.28.5.1276 
Tamblyn, R., Laprise, R., & Hanley, J. A. (2001). Adverse events associated with prescription-drug 
cost sharing among poor and elderly persons. Journal of the American Medical Association, 
285(4), 421-429. 
van Gool, K., & Pearson, M. (2014). Health, austerity and economic crisis: Assessing the short-term 
impact in OECD countries. OECD Health Working Papers, No. 76. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jxx71lt1zg6-en. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
Vogler, S., Zimmermann, N., Leopold, C., & de Joncheere, K. (2011). Pharmaceutical policies in 
European countries in response to the global financial crisis. Southern med review, 4(2), 69-
79. doi: 10.5655/smr.v4i2.1004 
al Report 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
                                                                                                 
AHHA Pathways to Reform series 
 
Primary Health Networks as a disruptive force for 
positive change 
September 2015 
A report prepared for the Australian Healthcare and Hospitals Association 
by the Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation 
University of Technology, Sydney 
  
About CHERE 
CHERE is an independent research unit affiliated with the University of Technology, Sydney. 
It has been established since 1991, and in that time has developed a strong reputation for 
excellence in research and teaching in health economics and public health and for providing 
timely and high quality policy advice and support. Its research program is policy-relevant and 
concerned with issues at the forefront of the sub-discipline. 
CHERE has extensive experience in evaluating health services and programs, and in 
assessing the effectiveness of policy initiatives. The Centre provides policy support to all levels 
of the health care system, through both formal and informal involvement in working parties, 
committees, and by undertaking commissioned projects. 
This paper has been commissioned by the Australian Healthcare and Hospitals Association 
(AHHA), as part of the AHHA series, Pathways to Reform. 
For further details on our work, see www.chere.uts.edu.au. 
Project team 
Michael Woods, Kees van Gool, Jane Hall, Marion Haas, Serena Yu and Michael Wright 
 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
KEY POINTS ............................................................................................................................ 5 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 6 
CORE ELEMENTS OF STRONG PRIMARY HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS ........................ 7 
PRIMARY HEALTH CARE REGIONAL NETWORK REFORM ........................................ 9 
SYSTEM-LEVEL CHALLENGES FACING THE PHNS .................................................... 13 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR PHN-LED DISRUPTIVE CHANGE ............................................. 16 
PROPOSAL 1: Commissioning the delivery of care for vulnerable people with multiple 
chronic conditions................................................................................................................ 17 
PROPOSAL 2: Managing the coordination of hospital discharge and community-based 
care ....................................................................................................................................... 22 
PROPOSAL 3: Driving the utilisation of e-health to achieve greater effectiveness and 
efficiency in health care delivery. ........................................................................................ 27 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 32 
APPENDIX: MAP OF PRIMARY HEALTH NETWORKS ................................................. 34 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................ 35 
 
 
  
 4 
 
 
 
 
 5 
 
KEY POINTS 
From 1 July, 2015, 31 Primary Health Networks (PHNs) are being rolled out nationally. There 
have been more than two decades of regional health reform, commencing with the introduction 
of Divisions of General Practice in 1992, followed by their replacement by Medicare Locals in 
2011. Despite these changes, there is scant evidence that progress is being made towards an 
effective, efficient, accessible, comprehensive and coordinated primary health system. 
The latest set of reforms should be grasped as yet another opportunity to drive positive change. 
However, to be successful, PHNs will need to operate within the context of major system level 
challenges. These include the following: the complexities of Commonwealth and State/Territory 
responsibilities and funding models; increasing fiscal pressure; occupational and sectoral 
boundaries; the management of incentive structures; and a lack of data infrastructure. Mindful of 
such challenges, this paper identifies the following three significant opportunities for PHNs to 
become disruptive forces for positive change. 
Proposal 1: Commissioning the delivery of care for vulnerable people with multiple chronic 
conditions 
Chronic diseases are the leading cause of illness, disability and death in Australia. Appropriate 
care for people with multiple chronic conditions requires multidisciplinary teams of health and 
social care professionals to be embedded in the primary health system. It is proposed that PHNs 
be given the role of budget holders to fund the management of care for vulnerable people with 
multiple chronic conditions. PHNs would need to commission local agencies to contract the 
delivery of long-term coordinated care to preferred consortiums of providers, including relevant 
health and social care professionals. 
Proposal 2: Managing the coordination of hospital discharge and community-based care 
The interface between acute care and primary care is important for improving patient experience 
and reducing preventable hospital admissions, but remains one of the least well-managed 
transitions in the health system. It is proposed that PHNs be given the role of budget holder for 
those community-based health care services which deliver post-discharge care. PHNs would 
commission appropriate broad-based institutions (in most cases hospitals) for the delivery of that 
care, and the commissioned agents would then contract preferred providers across the full range 
of community-based medical and health care services, and be responsible for the care outcomes 
of the patients. 
Proposal 3: Driving the uptake and utilisation of e-health 
E-health systems are considered central to current efforts to optimise primary care, by targeting 
three closely linked areas of need: improving the management of chronic care; encouraging 
broad-based general practice or team-based care; and better care co-ordination, including across 
the hospital/community care transition. To support this, it is proposed that PHNs encourage a 
greater take up of e-health through initiatives such as patients registering with their regular GP 
for services including health monitoring, screening and care coordination, and that general 
practice accreditation standards be progressively strengthened.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Centre for Health Economics Research and Evaluation (CHERE) has been commissioned by 
the Australian Healthcare and Hospitals Association (AHHA) to write two papers as part of the 
Association’s series on Pathways to Reform. The series will contribute to public debate during 
the development of the Australian Government’s White Papers on Reform of the Federation, and 
Reform of Australia’s tax system. This is one of two papers produced by CHERE – the other 
addresses health system funding models.  
The purpose of this paper is to offer an agenda by which the Australian Government’s newly 
created Primary Health Networks (PHNs) can act as a disruptive force for positive change of the 
healthcare system. The paper has adopted, as a working definition of ‘disruptive force for 
positive change’, not only the ability of PHNs to cause major discontinuous changes in the core 
business processes of health care providers, but also to reframe the disruption as an opportunity 
to achieve significant gains for health care consumers, providers and the health system more 
generally.  
As a later section of this paper will demonstrate, the replacement of Divisions of General 
Practice by Medicare Locals, and they in turn by PHNs were disruptive changes, but there was 
little attempt at reframing or promoting the opportunities arising from the change while 
minimising the costs of transition. It bears noting that any changes, particularly those relating to 
the allocation of responsibilities, should be guided by the six principles set out in the Federation 
White Paper Terms of Reference: accountability; subsidiarity; national interest considerations; 
equity, efficiency and effectiveness; durability; and fiscal sustainability (Australian Government, 
2015, p. 14). 
As a basis for setting the agenda for PHN-led disruptive change, the paper: commences by 
summarising the core design features of strong primary health care systems; draws out the 
lessons learnt from regional primary health innovation in Australia over the past three decades; 
and considers the system level challenges facing PHNs in the delivery of equitable, efficient and 
affordable patient-centred healthcare.  
The paper then identifies major and expanding gaps in primary health care delivery. Australian 
and international experience is drawn on to develop a targeted agenda for PHN driven disruptive 
change which could achieve greater system effectiveness, efficiency, equity and sustainability. 
The following three areas have been targeted: 
 the delivery of care for vulnerable people who have multiple chronic conditions  
 the coordination of hospital discharge and post-discharge community-based care  
 the uptake and utilisation of e-health. 
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CORE ELEMENTS OF STRONG PRIMARY HEALTH CARE SYSTEMS 
 
Over the decades, the architects of health care reforms in Australia and internationally have 
proposed laudable objectives for their reforms and heralded new system designs as being in 
accord with best practice. 
The most recent instance in Australia was the Commonwealth’s 2014-15 Budget announcement 
that the 61 regional Medicare Locals were to be replaced by a smaller number of (ultimately 31) 
Primary Health Networks (PHNs). The key objectives of the new PHNs were described as being 
to (Australian Government Department of Health, 2015): 
 increase the efficiency and effectiveness of medical services for patients, particularly 
those at risk of poor health outcomes; and 
 improve the coordination of care to ensure patients receive the right care in the right 
place at the right time. 
Many other countries have also pursued reform agendas to improve the delivery of primary 
health care. As far back as 1978 the Declaration of Alma-Ata emphasised that primary health 
care is an essential and integral part of a country’s health system and of the overall social and 
economic development of the community (WHO, 1978). 
Evidence from researchers such as Barbara Starfield has demonstrated the positive impact that 
quality primary care has on a community’s health (Starfield, 1998). In analysing reasons for the 
relatively poor health of the United States population, Starfield concluded that, notwithstanding 
the complexity and multifactorial nature of those reasons, “From a health system viewpoint, it is 
possible that the historic failure to build a strong primary care infrastructure could play some 
role” (Starfield, 2000, p. 483). 
While there may not be a consensus on a single set of design features for a well performing 
primary health care system, the literature points to the following five elements as being core 
(Kringos, Boerma, van der Zee, & Groenewegen, 2013; Kringos, Boerma, Hutchinson, van der 
Zee, & Groenewegen, 2010; Wakerman et al., 2009):  
1. Accessibility: the ease of access to primary care services, with respect to geographic and 
financial accessibility. 
2. Comprehensiveness: the breadth of services available in primary care (including 
preventive care). 
3. Continuity: the set of conditions enabling enduring doctor-patient relationships.  
4. Co-ordination: the ability of primary health care providers to co-ordinate patients’ use of 
other parts of the health system. 
5. System structure effectiveness and efficiency: this umbrella category captures the range 
of policy settings and regulations that address funding, workforce development and 
training, incentive structures, and policies on the distribution of services and coverage. 
Across all five elements, regional level primary health networks can play valuable contributory 
roles according to their regions’ needs. For instance, while governments play a major role in 
determining the accessibility and comprehensiveness of services, regional networks may be 
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tasked to assess, monitor and report on the adequacy of those services within their own region. 
Additionally, they may be funded to commission services to meet regional needs.  
With regard to encouraging continuity of care and ongoing relationships between patients and 
providers, regional organisations could play a direct role, such as in facilitating patient 
registration, or could have an important supportive role in matters such as encouraging the 
uptake of electronic health records.  
Service coordination is another core element, and together with the development of health care 
teams, it plays an increasingly important role across the health system. While general 
practitioners provide much primary medical care, there is an increasing need for the coordinated 
and integrated involvement of allied and nursing health providers (and personal carers and social 
support as necessary) in health care teams. This is especially true for vulnerable patients, being 
those who have an increased susceptibility to health and health care disadvantage due to a 
combination of individual and environmental factors. (Grabovschi, Loignon, & Fortin, 2013). 
Regional primary health networks can play a variety of roles, particularly in terms of the 
coordination and integration of services into health care teams, depending on the powers and 
resources that they control. 
A design feature that underlies any system structure, and is essential to the overall performance 
of that system, is that of incentives. The incentives (professional, pecuniary and other) drive the 
behaviour of the multiplicity of participants in the system – consumers, GPs and other providers, 
administrators, funders, educators etc. The incentives need to be sufficiently aligned to prevent 
system failure; even where other design features may approach best practice. 
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PRIMARY HEALTH CARE REGIONAL NETWORK REFORM 
 
The Australian primary health care system has been subjected to government-initiated reform 
stretching over more than two decades. They have aimed, in part, to address complexity, 
fragmentation, poor coordination and misaligned incentives. The newly created Primary Health 
Networks (PHNs) are the third major initiative aimed at improving the performance of primary 
health networks at a regional level. This section draws out the lessons learnt from the key 
achievements and failures of reforms to date.  
Up until the 1980s the general practice sector was frequently described as a cottage industry, 
with many private solo practitioners providing stand-alone services. A common criticism was 
that general practices were not well connected to, or coordinated with, other sectors of the health 
care system, and that the general lack of innovation in the sector meant that it failed to keep up 
with the changing health care needs of the population (Weller & Dunbar, 2005). The sector also 
failed to adopt new information and communications technologies that would have potentially 
given providers a greater capacity to provide high quality evidence-based care and be part of a 
comprehensive and coordinated service.   
In part, the failure to innovate was seen to be symptomatic of the incentives underlying 
Australia’s reliance on a fee-for-service payment system, whereby providers are rewarded for the 
volume of direct, largely episodic, patient care, without needing to coordinate the patient’s 
overall care experience. 
1992 – Divisions of General Practice 
The mounting concern about GPs operating in isolation from each other and from the broader 
health system led to the National Health Strategy review (1992) and the General Practice 
Consultative Committee, both of which concluded there was a need for (Scotton, 1998): 
 the establishment of new general practice agencies through which general practices 
would be involved with each other and other health professionals in more comprehensive 
community-oriented functions; and 
 supplementation of fee income with practice-based payments to cover and incentivise the 
provision of services other than those delivered to individual patients. 
The establishment of the Divisions of General Practice (DGPs) in 1992 marked the first major 
structural reform in the provision of health care since the introduction of Medicare in 1984. The 
objective of the DGPs Program was to “improve health outcomes for patients by encouraging 
general practitioners to work together and link with other health professionals to upgrade the 
quality of health service delivery at the local level” (Department of Health and Aged Care, 2000, 
p. 210).  
There were around 120 geographically based Divisions across the nation, eight state-based 
organisations (SBOs) which were tasked with building the capacity of local Divisions and 
linking with state governments, and an overarching national leadership organisation, the 
Australian Division of General Practice (ADGP), which disseminated new innovations and their 
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evaluations. The DGPs supported general practitioners and promoted continuity, coordination 
and integration with the health system more broadly (Scott & Coote, 2007). 
While the rationales for the subsequent Medicare Locals (MLs) and PHNs have amended and 
extended, but not replaced, this original purpose, the organisational structures have replaced, 
rather than amended and extended, these original DGPs. This disruption has come at a cost, not 
only financial but also in terms of lost human and social capital. 
During this time the Australian Government introduced a Better Practice Program in an attempt 
to change the incentives inherent in the fee-for-service funding model. General practices 
received grants if they satisfied a number of operational criteria, including ensuring patient 
continuity. However, these grants were of low value and had little impact on the underlying 
business incentives. Following concerns about the low take-up of the program, it was replaced in 
1998 by the Practice Incentives Program (PIP) (Russell, 2013).   
The PIP has provided incentives to registered practices for: establishing electronic information 
management; providing after hours care; operating in rural areas; hosting undergraduate 
students; and the quality use of medicines. Subsequent expansions of the program have included 
incentives for: evidence-based care of diabetes and asthma; cervical screening; the employment 
of practice nurses; mental health; domestic violence; GP aged care access; e-health; and 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health incentives.  
A number of reports on these initial endeavours were not favourable (Russell, 2013). The 
Productivity Commission (2003) was critical of the high administrative and compliance costs 
associated with PIP and a report by the Australian National Audit Office concluded that the 
management of the PIP was complex due to the diverse range of incentives and the entry 
requirement to receive PIP incentives, particularly for Aboriginal Medical Services (AMSs) and 
smaller practices (Australian National Audit Office, 2010).  In an international comparison of 
payment systems, Cashin et al (2014) observed that there was only limited evidence that the 
Australian PIP program had impacts on quality of care and outcomes that justified the costs of 
the program. 
These programs represent attempts at re-organising some of the funding of primary care by 
targeting the sector with financial incentives around the way care is provided, the functions 
performed and the pathways developed. Many of the incentives are directed at practices, rather 
than practitioners, thus adding to the leverage of the practices over the care delivered by the 
practitioners. At the same time, there has been an increase in the average size of practices and a 
rise in corporatisation of medical practices. The engagement of practice managers, whose 
incentives, in general terms, could be characterised as being to maximise the profitability of the 
practice as a business, has encouraged a focus on maximising practice income, and to 
understanding the charging patterns of their GPs, with a view to encouraging the highest net 
returns for the practice.  
Separate from the question of program efficiency, an analysis of the role of the DGPs (funded by 
the Divisions) found that they were highly influential across a number of outcome measures 
(Scott & Coote, 2007). This included having a positive influence on the proportion of PIP 
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practices signed on for asthma, cervical screening, diabetes, and care planning. A Department of 
Health and Ageing review also reported the positive contribution of DGPs to improving the 
coordination of health service delivery to the community, and to health outcomes (Weller & 
Dunbar, 2005). At the same time, there was recognition that there was a diversity of roles and a 
variation in the performance of Divisions across the country and that this required a high level of 
scrutiny and accountability. 
2011 – Medicare Locals 
A 2009 review of Australia’s health system by the National Health and Hospitals Reform 
Commission sought to reduce its complexity by better delineating state and Commonwealth 
responsibilities and by centralising responsibility for primary health care at the national level 
(including dental and aged care) (National Health and Hospitals Reform Commission, 2009). 
The Commission recommended that: 
Service coordination and population health planning priorities should be enhanced at the 
local level through the establishment of Primary Health Care Organisations, evolving 
from or replacing the existing Divisions of General Practice. (Recommendation 21) 
Rather than facilitating an evolution of the DGPs, the Labor Government ceased funding them in 
2011 and replaced them with 61 primary health care regional organisations known as Medicare 
Locals. The priority objectives for MLs were not dissimilar to those of the DGPs. Medicare 
Locals were to: improve access and reduce inequity; better manage chronic conditions; increase 
the focus on disease prevention; and improve quality, safety, performance and accountability. 
MLs were tasked with improving integration between primary and hospital care and identifying 
local health needs, in part by coordinating with the Local Hospital Networks.  
MLs were also the key vehicle for the rollout of the government’s e-health initiative. Launched 
in July 2012, the Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record (PCEHR) system aims to 
provide an online summary of an individual’s health information (including diagnoses, allergies 
and medications) and be accessible to the patient, healthcare providers and hospitals (Department 
of Health, 2013). The current poor reach of the PCEHRs, and corrective Government initiatives 
announced in the 2015-16 Budget, are explored later in this paper. 
2015 – Primary Health Networks 
An implementation review of MLs, carried out in 2013-2014, concluded that “Most MLs were 
making good progress towards their five strategic objectives and are satisfied with their progress 
and achievements. These involved extending former Division activities (e.g. practice support) 
and taking on entirely new tasks (e.g. population health planning).” And, “They operated 
differently in different areas, especially in urban as compared to rural or remote areas.” 
(Department of Health, unpublished, pages 2 and 414). Significant issues and challenges which 
were identified in the review included the breadth of the objectives, the lack of a clearly defined 
                                                          
4 The report entitled “National Evaluation of Medicare Locals” is unpublished, but is available under the 
Department of Health’s Freedom of Information disclosure log here. 
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vision and changes in the environment which were leading to the expansion of primary health 
care beyond GPs and general practice.  
A subsequent 2014 review of Medicare Locals (Horvath, 2014) commissioned by the incoming 
Coalition Government concluded that the achievement of their intended objectives was mixed. 
This review highlighted the following needs: 
 To increase collaboration between health professionals and services in order to reduce the 
fragmentation of care. 
 To increase the engagement of GPs, particularly within the network’s governance and 
operational structures. 
The Government subsequently announced that Medicare Locals would be replaced and that there 
would be a tendering process for the establishment of PHNs. As noted earlier, the objectives of 
the PHNs are to: increase the efficiency and effectiveness of medical services for patients, 
particularly those at risk of poor health outcomes; and improve coordination of care to ensure 
patients receive the right care in the right place at the right time” (Department of Health, 2014). 
These objectives are, arguably, yet another variation on the theme initially developed for DGPs. 
PHNs were rolled out across 31 regions from 1 July, 2015. (A map of the PHN regions is at 
Appendix A.) According to Department of Health, they are expected to achieve their objectives 
by (Department of Health, 2014) :  
 understanding the health care needs of their communities through analysis and planning 
 providing practice support services so that GPs are better placed to provide care to 
patients and help avoid emergency department presentations and inappropriate hospital 
admissions 
 supporting general practices in attaining the highest standards in safety and quality 
through showcasing and disseminating research and evidence of best practice 
 assisting general practices to understand and make meaningful use of e-health  
 working with other funders of services and purchasing or commissioning health and 
medical/clinical services for local groups most in need. 
The Government cited, as factors likely to contribute to the achievement of these objectives, the 
alignment of PHN and Local Hospital Network boundaries and the consortium of stakeholders 
within many new PHNs (Ley, 2015). 
As set out in the grant programme guidelines, PHN funding will be provided through four 
streams (Department of Health, 2014): 
 operational funding for the operation and governance of the PHNs 
 flexible funding, to respond to national and region specific priorities by 
purchasing/commissioning required services 
 programme funding determined by the Government 
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 innovation funding to enable the Government to invest in new models of primary health 
care delivery that, if successful, can be rolled out in other regions, and incentive funding 
for high performing PHNs5. 
The extent to which PHNs will be able to undertake disruptive reform is as yet unknown across 
many dimensions, including the quantum of funding to be made available to invest in innovation; 
the criteria by which innovative projects will be assessed; the level of active and positive 
cooperation from the various stakeholders; and the extent of control exercised by the Department 
of Health and the Minister when reforms challenge vested interests. There is as yet scant public 
information on these matters.  
SYSTEM-LEVEL CHALLENGES FACING THE PHNS 
As was the case with the introduction of the Medicare Locals, the Government created the new 
PHNs on the basis that they would overcome the weaknesses of their predecessors. The historical 
legacies of the structure of, and incentives embedded in, the Australian health system pose 
significant challenges to PHNs, challenges which have dogged the Medicare Locals and the 
DGPs before them.  
These system-level challenges form an important context for identifying opportunities for the 
new PHNs to be a disruptive force for positive change. There is an extensive body of literature 
on each of the following, and the issues are only presented here in summary form to provide 
relevant context to the reform proposals detailed later in the paper.  
 As the Federation White Paper process is seeking to address, the complexities of state 
and Commonwealth responsibilities and funding models have created administrative 
barriers; unclear and poorly accountable funding flows and service delivery pathways; 
and incentives to cost-shift. The system as a whole (primary and acute care collectively) 
has no overarching governance structure which can ensure the following: accessibility to 
services; the comprehensiveness of the services; the continuity of doctor-patient (and 
other health professional) relationships; coordination of patients’ use of other parts of the 
health system; or an effective, efficient, equitable, transparent and durable system.  
 PHNs will need to operate in the context of increasing fiscal pressure. This is generated 
largely by rising service demands and associated contributory factors such as population 
ageing, income-related rising demand and expectations, and an ongoing shift in the 
burden of disease toward multiple chronic conditions. 
 The fee-for-service payment structures have unintended consequences such as over or 
under-used GP activities, and provide little incentive to improve linkages to acute care, 
allied health or social care.  
 There are highly entrenched boundaries between occupations. These are borne of 
longstanding differences in education and training models, licensing and registration and 
resourcing/funding. Equally, the associations which represent many of the practitioners 
can be strong advocates of existing privilege in the face of reform. Shifts towards more 
                                                          
5 The arrangements for innovation funding, including funding levels, have not yet been formalised and require 
clarification. 
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multidisciplinary team-based care requires careful system design to bridge these 
differences, including defining responsibilities, accountabilities, and referral and reward 
incentives.  
 Despite the progressive rollout of data infrastructure initiatives, there remains a lack of 
measurement and reporting of key performance metrics which would help providers and 
PHNs benchmark the quality of their services against others. These measures include 
indicators of patient experience and outcomes, uptake of good practice and administrative 
processes, and indicators of activities such as preventive care and chronic disease 
management. Without this broad range of data, it will remain difficult to adequately 
monitor or improve the quality of care.  
 Each of the policy shifts from Divisions of General Practice to Medicare Locals and then 
to PHNs has had a distinct political element. Policy stability and confidence in investing 
in the future is greatly diminished in the current environment of limited bipartisan 
support on health policy.  
These system-level challenges are both longstanding and of a whole-of-system nature, as are 
other issues such as the poorly defined role of private health insurance and the lack of policy and 
program coherence between physical health, mental health, disability and aged care. 
Opportunities to overcome some of these issues include PHN collaboration with Local Health 
Networks and engagement with the States and Territories. The particular ownership consortiums 
of some PHNs (such as LHNs and state health agencies) may facilitate this more in some cases 
than in others, but may also diminish the capacity of PHNs for independent innovation. 
The challenges set the context for an agenda of opportunities for the new PHNs (individually 
and, potentially, collectively) to undertake positive and meaningful change to the delivery of 
effective, efficient, equitable and sustainable primary health care.  
Lessons are also drawn from international case studies to inform the selection of reform 
proposals. The case studies illustrate how other countries have made use of various forms of 
regional networking to improve overall primary health care system performance. The paper 
references a series of reports from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) entitled the “OECD Reviews of Health Care Quality” as well as other 
academic literature. The countries have been chosen for the diversity of their policies, practices 
and institutional arrangements and for the benchmarks they set for a number of system design 
features that can assist regional networks to drive positive and meaningful change.  
The following table sets out, in summary, the main design features of selected countries in 
relation to whether there is a strong primary care system, local/regional primary care 
organisations, responsibility for coordination/integration and quality monitoring, funding and 
incentives and integration across the system.
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How care is integrated in selected countries 
Country Strong primary care system Local/ regional primary care 
organisation 
Responsible for  
co-ordination/integration 
quality monitoring 
Funding/incentives Extent of integration 
New Zealand Yes – GPs as gatekeepers PHOs: non-profit  Yes PHOs funded by District 
Health Boards 
GPs capitation 
Incentives not aligned 
90% enrolment with GPs 
Variation across PHOs in what 
is done 
Little evaluation of outcomes 
Denmark GPs play central role as 
gatekeepers but only 20% 
doctors are GPs 
Contracted to local government; 
regions then contract with 
municipalities 
Co-ordination – Not clear. expected 
to be GPs; principle supported by 
nationwide agreements between GPs 
and regions 
Monitoring – contracted to 
University, advanced collection and 
access and quality assessment 
focused on hospital care 
GPs paid by capitation + ffs 
Regions/municipalities  
fund multidisciplinary 
clinics 
 
System fragmented  
Major differences in activities 
and approaches across areas 
poorer outcomes compared to 
similar countries  
Israel Physician led clinics are central, 
gatekeepers 
No -  4 health funds in managed 
competition 
Co-ordination – yes 
Monitoring – yes 
Age/sex/residence based 
capitation to health funds 
which then use different 
payment methods for GPs 
Contracts focus on payment 
method rather than 
quality/appropriateness 
Reported fragmentation across 
different providers 
OECD assessment – needs 
improvement 
England Yes. GPs as gatekeepers and 
budget holders 
Clinical Commissioning Groups 
GP led 
GPs contract with NHS England 
Co-ordination: CCGs. Monitor and 
NHS England in 2012 Act 
Monitoring: through QOF 
GPs paid by mix of 
capitation, ffs and pay for 
performance (QOF) 
More emphasis on access 
than integration in QOF 
Recent reforms to align health 
and social care through local 
health and wellbeing boards 
New ‘Pioneer’ integration pilots 
Germany Traditionally regarded as weak 
Predominance of solo 
practitioners 
Some limited registration/gate 
keeper 
Provincial governments 
Regional associations of 
physicians 
Sickness funds 
Typified as ‘joint self-
government’ 
Sickness funds play major role by 
implementing DMPs (co-ordination 
of ambulatory care) and chronic 
disease management (primary and 
secondary care) 
Contracts with providers uniform 
across funds 
Funds receive risk adjusted 
capitation 
+ per capita costs for 
patients signed to these 
programs 
Participation is voluntary. 
DMPs agreed at national level 
based on evidence.  8% insured 
are enrolled – but not all insured 
are eligible  
Netherlands GPs as gatekeepers 
Registration 
Insurance funds are important but 
not regionally organised 
National approaches to monitoring 
quality 
Bundled payments for some 
chronic diseases 
From 2015 GPs paid by 
capitation + ffs set by the 
National Authority; chronic 
disease management 
program negotiated with 
insurers. 
Initial evaluation showed 
improved organisation and co-
ordination but no evidence of 
improved outcomes 
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OPPORTUNITIES FOR PHN-LED DISRUPTIVE CHANGE 
 
From the analysis of primary health system design, the lessons of past regional network 
innovation and  the system-level challenges facing health care, as set out in the preceding 
sections, the paper identifies three increasingly significant gaps in primary health care 
delivery that provide opportunities for PHNs to undertake disruptive change. They are: 
1. Commissioning the delivery of care for vulnerable people with multiple chronic 
conditions. 
2. Managing the coordination of hospital discharge and community-based care. 
3. Driving the uptake and utilisation of e-health to achieve greater effectiveness and 
efficiency in health care delivery. 
In addition to the need for, and merit of, each change, there are very strong interdependencies 
between them. Tackling all three in a very deliberative manner will produce significantly 
greater outcomes than tackling one or more individually.  
Prior to analysing each of the three individually, however, it is worth referring to a 
governance issue that will play an important role in whether the changes are successful. This 
is the issue of incentives. 
Incentives 
The Government has been very clear that it expects that PHNs will predominantly 
commission the delivery of services from others rather than directly deliver those services. As 
such, this sets up principal-agent relationships between a PHN and the entities it contracts 
with to be a service deliverer (with further such relationships if that agent is itself an 
intermediary between the PHN and the ultimate service delivery agent such as a GP, nurse 
practitioner or allied health practitioner). 
This paper assumes that the incentive structure driving PHNs is that they have a defined 
budget, they face a demand for services in their region that exceeds their funding capacity, 
they gain no benefit from favouring quantity of treatment over quality and they gain no 
benefit from generating a financial surplus. It is assumed that this will motivate them to fund 
a level of care to the greatest number of people in the greatest need with the least possible 
resources consistent with ensuring the safety and quality of that care. As the Australian 
Health Ministers’ Advisory Council made clear in 2005: 
... wherever possible, services should be delivered by staff with the most cost-effective 
training and qualification to provide safe, quality care  (Australian Health Ministers' 
Advisory Council, 2005, p. 9).   
However, it is not immediately clear that the incentives facing the PHNs are shared by their 
two subordinate bodies. On the one hand, GP-led Clinical Councils are delivery-oriented. 
They are to focus on developing “local strategies to improve the operation of the health care 
system for patients in the PHN, facilitating effective primary health care provision to reduce 
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avoidable hospital presentations and admissions” (Department of Health, 2014, p. 8). On the 
other hand, Community Advisory Committees have a cost-effectiveness remit. They are to be 
responsible for ensuring that “decisions, investments, and innovations are patient centred, 
cost-effective, locally relevant and aligned to local care experiences and expectations”. How 
the PHN boards integrate these differing perspectives remains to be seen. 
Another increasingly important actor in driving behaviour is the business manager of GP 
practices. Given the incentives inherent in fee-for-service payment arrangements, coupled 
with the rise of incentive payments to GP practices through PIP, it should not be assumed that 
practice managers will necessarily act as aligned agents on behalf of the PHNs. This 
compounds the complexity of incentive structures that already impact on the behaviours of 
consumers, providers, administrators, funders and others within the health system. 
 
PROPOSAL 1: COMMISSIONING THE DELIVERY OF CARE FOR 
VULNERABLE PEOPLE WITH MULTIPLE CHRONIC CONDITIONS 
 
The first proposal addresses the provision of care for those with chronic diseases. It is an 
appropriate candidate for disruptive change on many counts. 
Chronic diseases are the leading cause of illness, disability and death in Australia, accounting 
for 90 percent of all deaths in 2011 (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2014a). Apart 
from the effect of chronic disease on individual well-being and the well-being of partners and 
other informal carers, there are wider social and economic costs relating to the public funding 
of health services and the loss of workforce participation and productivity. 
Chronic disease management starts, in most case, with preventative care delivered at the 
community level. Current estimates suggest that up to 80 percent of heart disease, stroke and 
type 2 diabetes and more than one-third of cancers worldwide could be prevented by 
eliminating shared modifiable risk factors—mainly tobacco use, unhealthy diet, physical 
inactivity and the harmful use of alcohol (WHO 2008) (Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare, 2014a).  
Appropriate care for people who have established multiple chronic conditions needs to be 
delivered by multidisciplinary teams of health and social care professionals embedded in the 
primary health system, with acute care services being called upon when required. The 
National Health and Hospital Reform Commission (NHHRC) reflected on how the teams 
should be constituted. It recommended that “...  people with chronic and complex conditions 
(including people with a disability or a long-term mental illness) [should] have the option of 
enrolling with a single primary health care service to strengthen the continuity, coordination 
and range of multidisciplinary care available to meet their health needs” (Recommendation 
18). 
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Present arrangements fall short of this vision. GPs are able to complete a GP Management 
Plan (GPMP) for patients with chronic disease every two years. For those patients with added 
complexity, GPs can refer them for up to 5 Medicare-subsidised allied health professional 
attendances annually, in what is known as a Team Care Arrangement (TCA). GPMPs and 
TCAs provide higher rebates and can be reviewed every 6 months.  
Also, the Government’s Practice Incentives Program (PIP) provides additional funding to 
accredited practices to address the treatment of asthma and diabetes. The PIP Asthma 
Incentive aims to encourage GPs to better manage the clinical care of people with moderate 
to severe asthma. The PIP Diabetes Incentive aims to encourage GPs to provide earlier 
diagnosis and effective management of people with established diabetes mellitus (Department 
of Human Services, 2015). The chronic disease item numbers have been criticised for 
inflexibility and for not meeting needs of those with chronic diseases (Holden et al., 2012). In 
addition, the incentives program payments are small, their uptake is decreasing and there is 
suggestion that the administrative burden in claiming these incentives may not be worth the 
effort for some practices. (Kecmanovic & Hall, 2015) 
Longstanding cross-sectoral and cross-occupational boundaries add to the challenges of 
improving the coordination of care. A decade ago the Productivity Commission identified a 
myriad of impediments to the development of sustainable and responsive workforce 
arrangements. The Commission highlighted entrenched custom and practice amongst and 
between the health workforce professions as being able to ‘stifle necessary and justifiable 
innovation and change in workforce practices and the evolution of job design and education 
and training arrangements’ (Productivity Commission, 2005, page 29). Other impediments 
referred to included fragmented roles, responsibilities and regulatory arrangements, and 
perverse funding and payment incentives. These challenges are particularly problematic in 
primary health care, where the various medical, allied health, nursing and other providers do 
not operate in close physical or temporal proximity. 
In pursuit of cost effectiveness, this paper argues that PHNs should make it their priority to 
address the needs of the most vulnerable people in their local communities who are in 
greatest need of coordinated care from key professionals with whom they can develop 
trusting relationships. The criteria for vulnerability would in part be based on population 
profiles within local communities, but would likely include a rapid deterioration in physical 
and/or mental health, substance abuse, homelessness, social isolation, and deep and persistent 
disadvantage. 
A recently published report by Happell et al (2015) examined the policy support relating to 
physical health of people with mental illness. Their literature review confirmed that the poor 
physical health experienced by people with mental illness is a major and yet 
under-acknowledged public health inequity in Australia. For this group, lower life expectancy 
is commonly reported (Laursen, 2011)  and, just as for the wider population, chronic illnesses 
such as cardiovascular disease (CVD) are the major cause of death (Clarke & Currie, 2009; 
De Hert et al., 2011; Moussavi et al., 2007). A report from the US Centre for Healthcare 
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Strategies similarly found that mental illness is near universal among the highest-cost, most 
frequently hospitalised beneficiaries of the Medicaid program (Boyd et al, 2010). 
In Australia, the Productivity Commission’s Report on Deep and Persistent Disadvantage 
(McLachlan, Gilfillan, & Gordon, 2013) drew on evidence demonstrating the interaction of 
poor health and disadvantage. A study undertaken by NATSEM (Brown & Nepal, 2010) 
found that those who are most socioeconomically disadvantaged are twice as likely as those 
who are least disadvantaged to have a long term health condition. In another study, Azpitarte 
(2012) found that almost half of all Australians who have a long term health condition or 
disability experienced some form of social exclusion, and about 13 per cent experienced deep 
exclusion. 
The issue of developing successful models of multidisciplinary care has been addressed in 
related parts of the primary health care sector. For example, the approach developed in 
Australia for workplace injury rehabilitation includes a Nationally Consistent Approval 
Framework for rehabilitation providers (Heads of Workers' Compensation Authorities 
Australia and New Zealand, 2005). Workers’ Compensation Authorities and Compulsory 
Third Party insurers endorsed the World Health Organisation’s generic biopsychosocial 
model of health, illness and disability as being critical to improving clinical and occupational 
rehabilitation outcomes when managing injured workers. As such, workplace rehabilitation 
has deliberately moved away from a disease or injury based medical model and has adopted 
the following approach (The Australasian Faculty of Occupational and Environmental 
Medicine, 2010, page 8): 
The biopsychosocial model of illness and disease proposes that biomedical 
explanations are often insufficient in fully explaining ill health, or good health and 
wellbeing. Instead, biomedical, psychological and social factors all play a significant 
role in human responses to illness and disease. 
Emphasis is placed on early intervention and the ongoing engagement of the injured worker 
as well as the creation of strong links between the insurer, employer and all treatment 
providers. This is to ensure the integration of all injury management activities and a focus on 
return to work. Although employers, insurers or doctors may recommend an 
approved workplace rehabilitation provider to help in complex cases, the insurer retains 
responsibility for engaging the providers and paying for their services.  
Another approach to multidisciplinary care in Australia is that developed by Aboriginal 
Community Controlled Health Services (ACCHOs). They not only focus on clinical care and 
preventative health education, but recognise that good health is more than the physical 
well-being of individuals and involves the social, emotional and cultural well-being of the 
whole community and the life of the individual within that community. To the extent 
possible, ACCHOs seek to link the health system to, and be supported by, services that 
address wider social and economic disadvantage (National Aboriginal Community Controlled 
Health Organisation, 2013). 
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International practice 
International evidence suggests that the delivery of effective and efficient care to vulnerable 
people with multiple chronic conditions can be improved, even in the more advanced 
countries that have well developed primary health care systems. 
In Denmark, primary care is coordinated by a patient-nominated general practitioner who acts 
as a first point of contact for acute, chronic and preventive health care issues, providing 
longitudinal care and acting as a gate-keeper to non-acute access to other specialties. GPs are 
paid through a blended system of capitation payments (about 30% of GP income) and 
fee-for-service amounts (70% of GP income). These payments are negotiated between the 
regions and GP representative bodies. The GPs are required to code all activity relating to 
chronic disease management. Allied to this, a national chronic care model has emerged which 
features primary care in a central coordination role, disease registers which risk-stratify 
patients, and the assignment of case managers (Frohlich, Strandberg-Larsen, & Schiøtz, 
2008). 
However, while clinical guidelines and care pathways have been developed (with diagnostic 
and treatment standards aligned to pre-defined courses of appointments), these have been 
narrowly defined for single diseases, and do not address the complexity of care needed for 
patients with multiple conditions and increased vulnerability. 
In the United States, the concept of the patient care medical home (PCMH) has received 
attention as a strategy to improve access to quality health care for more Americans at lower 
cost. It is implied, but generally not explicitly stated, that the concept is most relevant to the 
care of people with chronic and/or complex medical conditions. The general understanding is 
that in the medical home, responsibility for care and care coordination resides with the 
patient’s personal medical provider working within a health care team. There are a number of 
characteristics that have been defined as components of this primary care model: provision of 
comprehensive care; a patient-centred approach; coordinated care across the broader health 
system; a focus on access; and a commitment to safety, data collection and quality 
improvement (Eperly, 2011). The PCMH model also provides blended payments: payers 
reward providers with a monthly bonus payment for quality primary care of the population.   
Since 2012, Accountable Care Organisations (ACOs) have become a feature of the US health 
system. ACOs are based around groups of providers (GPs, specialists, other health providers, 
hospitals) who agree to accept responsibility for costs and quality of all care for their 
population. They have been likened to a ‘medical neighbourhood’ for the medical home. 
ACOs are encouraged to improve care coordination and population health management along 
the lines of the PCMH model, and may also share savings made in reduced fee-for-service 
payments to the population through the Shared Medicare Savings Programs. The introduction 
of shared savings has accelerated the adoption of the PCMH model and has been seen as 
important in its success (Friedberg, Rosenthal, Werner, Volpp, & Schneider, 2015). 
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A key strength of the Israeli system is its investment in multi-disciplinary community-based 
clinics; emergency care centres; and clustered or co-located service providers. These 
collaborative models are characterised by greater breadth of primary care services and 
coordination between primary care providers. While the largest of the four health insurance 
funds owns and operates its clinics and hospitals (and directly employs staff), the remaining 
three funds contract with both practitioners and hospitals for the provision of services 
(OECD, 2012). Despite the level of structural integration, there is little evidence of strong 
coordination between the primary and secondary care sectors, an issue that will be addressed 
in greater detail in the second proposal.  
Role for the PHNs 
Drawing on the evidence set out above, including the workplace injury rehabilitation and 
ACCHO models, it is proposed that PHNs be given the role of budget holders to fund the 
management of care for vulnerable people with multiple chronic conditions. 
Given the size of the populations and, in many cases the geographic spread of the regions, 
PHNs may need to commission local agencies to be responsible for the delivery of long term 
care (and, as appropriate, rehabilitation) services to these patients. The governance structures 
of local level agencies should be developed to have the same incentive structure as the PHNs.  
The PHNs/local agencies would contract with preferred consortiums of providers (in effect, 
multi-disciplinary team coordinators) which included relevant health and social care 
professionals. The individual medical practitioners (not practices) and other health and social 
support providers who participated would be paid an incentive, and patients who met the 
criteria (being vulnerable, having the highest level of need and being able to be 
accommodated within the PHN budget) would have a coordinated care experience that 
attended to their multiple needs and enabled the development of trusted relationships with 
their key providers. 
To enable continuity of care from existing relationships between some patients and their 
health care providers, GPs who were not part of the preferred provider consortiums would be 
able to charge fees in the normal manner, but not receive the incentive bonus. Patients would 
be able to keep attending those GPs, but without access to the locally coordinated range of 
other services. This would provide an incentive for patients and providers to participate in the 
scheme, while retaining high levels of autonomy and choice. 
Well planned and inclusive implementation of change is essential to its cost-effectiveness and 
to its ultimate success. It also helps minimise any unnecessary loss of human and social 
capital. The experiences of changing from DGPs to MLs and now to PHNs, and the delivery 
of after-hours care in particular, reinforce this point. Accordingly, the reform should be 
gradually rolled out across a range of patients. While not every vulnerable person with a 
chronic condition could be included from the start, every GP could apply to be a preferred 
provider. For example, because GPs are used to the Service Incentive Payments (SIPs) and 
PIPs, asthma and diabetes might be the first chronic conditions to be funded in this way. The 
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preferred consortiums of providers would take over from GPs as the team co-ordinators and 
be held accountable for ensuring that each member of the team met their obligations and that 
treatment (and rehabilitation) goals were met.  
As a final point, the change must be accompanied by a sound evaluation plan. There should 
be a variety of forms of innovation, good baseline and operational data which is open and 
accessible, and analysis that is independent, repeatable and publicly reported. 
 
PROPOSAL 2: MANAGING THE COORDINATION OF HOSPITAL 
DISCHARGE AND COMMUNITY-BASED CARE  
 
The interface between acute care and primary care is often considered to be one of the more 
important but least managed transitions in the health system.  
The interactions and information flows between primary care and acute hospital care are 
crucial for safe and efficient patient care, particularly for those with complex conditions and 
complex care needs. Improved management of this transition has been identified as 
particularly important in improving patient care experiences and in reducing hospital 
expenditures arising from preventable readmissions. Resolution of the issue is complicated by 
the different jurisdictional ownership, funding and other underlying incentives, and even 
incompatible information systems. 
Patients face two directions of flow across this interface, each with their own issues.  
The first is inappropriate admissions to hospital. This is best exemplified in the aged care 
sector where there is evidence of hospitalisation of residents ahead of the time that clinical 
evidence would otherwise suggest. Indeed much hospitalisation in the later stages of life is 
also often contrary to the wishes of patients themselves. Research by Gomes et al (2013) 
found that hospitals are the least preferred places where people want to die, followed by 
residential aged care facilities, and yet 54 percent of people died in hospitals and 32 
percentdied in residential aged care facilities. 
The second patient flow, and the subject of this paper, is the transition from the hospital to 
post-discharge care within the community. The size of the hospital/community care transition 
is both large and growing. The AIHW reports that there were almost 9.4 million separations 
from Australian hospitals in 2012-13, of which 3.9 million followed at least one overnight 
stay (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2014b). 
There are real concerns about the effectiveness and efficiency of this transition. However, 
whereas much of the literature is focused on the adequacy of hospital discharge planning, of 
equal concern is the planning, funding and delivery of coordinated and comprehensive 
post-discharge care at the community level. A related concern is the presence of gaps in a 
 23 
 
 
region’s resources to be able to effectively deliver the full range of care required. PHNs can 
take on a much more active role in managing the quality of this transition. 
One of the significant pressures on community-based care is that patients are being 
discharged earlier. In Australia the data confirms the trend for shorter average lengths of stay. 
For overnight separations, the average length of stay in all hospitals combined fell from 6.0 
days to 5.6 days between 2008-09 and 2012-13. And this is not just an Australian 
phenomenon – the average length of stay excluding same-day separations is comparable with 
the length of stays reported for other member countries by the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development  (OECD, 2013a). 
A second concern is the health status of patients at the time of discharge. The profile of 
people being discharged from hospital is changing, and is adding pressure on 
community-based care. Many more patients are being discharged while suffering multiple 
chronic conditions. 
A third challenge is the increasing number, and proportion, of patients being discharged into 
the community who are over 65, many of whom live alone with little support from family or 
friends. A review of evidence by Bauer et al (2009) identified the range of care needs, and 
therefore of health professions, that need to be actively involved in the planning, funding and 
delivery of post-discharge community care for older patients: 
Because older patients often have complex care needs related not only to their 
medical condition, but also cognitive, functional and/or social deficits, discharge 
plans frequently fail to meet the patient’s requirements. (Bauer, 2009, p.2540) 
The evidentiary review highlighted that when there is effective discharge planning, the 
resultant benefits include a reduction in unplanned readmissions, a reduction in 
post-discharge complications and mortality, an increase in patient and caregiver satisfaction 
and a reduction in post-discharge anxiety. Where the discharge planning process fails to 
identify and/or address a patient’s care needs, not only is the risk of readmission higher, but 
the hospital length of stay is often longer (Hegney et al., 2002; Shyu, 2000). 
A 2013 report by Mabire et al. (2013) on the effectiveness of nursing discharge planning 
interventions for elderly in-patients drew attention to the convergence of the issues of an 
ageing population and the higher utilisation of health care by the elderly, and therefore the 
increased number of elderly patients being discharged from hospitals into community care.  
The authors noted that patients tend to be discharged "quicker and sicker" and this can result 
in adverse events during the immediate post-discharge period. The problems included 
medication prescribing errors, poor communication between hospital and primary care 
physicians and/or lack of coordination with community health care services.  
For those being discharged to their community providers in poor health, one reason is the 
quality of care received in the hospital.  In 2012–13, 5.5% of separations reported one or 
more adverse events. The proportion of same-day separations with an adverse event was low 
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at only 1.7% overall, compared to 10.7% for overnight separations (Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare, 2014c). A study by the Department of Health (2012) drew attention to 
the need for well-planned pathways for those patients who have a high risk of medicine 
misadventure within ten days of discharge. The authors called for an evidence based 
approach to identify ‘urgent’ patients, and for the community pharmacist to be involved. 
They argued that the new pathway must remain consistent with requirements of the existing 
Home Medicine Review (HMR) referrals and service provision. 
One of the issues regularly identified as a cause of the poor coordination of care across the 
hospital/community transition is the inadequacy of the medical records that are passed from 
the hospital to the community GP. A study by Belleli et al (2013) found numerous significant 
delays and content omissions in discharge summaries. The researchers suggested that junior 
hospital medical staff ‘could be better informed about critical handover information and 
better equipped to deliver it promptly to support safe patient transitions between hospital and 
community.’ (page 890). 
However, even when records are created and transmitted electronically, problems continue. A 
study by Chemali et al. (2015) found a high level of abbreviations used in electronic 
discharge letters were not well understood by the receiving GPs. No abbreviation was 
correctly interpreted by all GPs and six abbreviations were misinterpreted by more than a 
quarter of GPs. As the authors concluded, such an error rate clearly “has potential to affect 
patient care in the transition from hospital to community care” (Chemali et al., 2015, p. 147). 
International practice 
International experience demonstrates that Australia’s concerns about the adequacy of both 
hospital discharge planning and the capacity of the community-based care system to plan, 
fund and deliver appropriate post-discharge care are similar to those in other countries.  
In Denmark, which has a well-developed network of regional health care organisations, the 
regions have carriage of both the operation of hospitals and the contracting of GPs. And yet, 
notwithstanding this design advantage, a report from the European Observatory on Health 
Systems and Policies concluded that patient pathways in Denmark are poorly coherent, 
particularly between primary and secondary care, due to poor understanding and 
communications between providers (Olejaz et al., 2012).  
There is a range of reasons why integrated care remains a challenge in Denmark. For 
instance, the Danish National Indicator Programme, which provides specific standards and 
timeframes for quality of care measures for specific conditions, is focused on hospitals and 
does not align with the Danish General Practice Database (DAMD) framework (which does 
not specify standards or timeframes). Similarly, an accreditation program which is focused on 
minimum standards of provider quality and is designed to support a culture of continuous 
quality development, has been deployed in all hospitals, but not in the primary care sector. 
As noted earlier, an acknowledged strength of the health care system in Israel is its reliance 
on community-based health care facilities. The four competing insurance funds manage 
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hospital expenditures intensively, and offer a range of alternative services deemed to be the 
most effective and efficient for the situation, including community-based alternatives to 
hospital care. Despite the advantageous design, data collection in hospitals has been found to 
be relatively weak, and communication between the community care and hospital sectors is 
poor. The transfer of patient records, post-discharge planning and other information is 
limited. In one survey, around 42 percent of patients reported the absence of a coordinating 
physician (Bramli-Greenberg, Gross, Yair, & Akiva, 2011). 
New Zealand has also sought to better integrate hospitals and community care. The Primary 
Health Care Strategy of 2001 saw the introduction of 80 locally-defined Primary Health 
Organisations (PHOs), comprising multi-disciplinary teams focused on essential primary care 
services for their enrolled population (King, 2001) . These were funded by 21 District Health 
Boards (DHBs), which also oversee public hospitals in their region. Nonetheless, a 
Ministerial Review Group report in 2008 found that the system suffered from considerable 
duplication and bureaucracy, concerns about variation in service access and efficiency, and a 
lack of national coordination (Ministerial Review Group, 2009) . 
The United States faces similar challenges. As a result, they are developing incentives to 
coordinate care across all relevant services, reduce errors and complications in hospitals, 
improve the effectiveness of purchasing practices and manage post-discharge care more 
efficiently. In July 2015, the Centres for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a 
proposed rule for a new mandatory program covering Comprehensive Care for Joint 
Replacement. The program would establish bundled payments for hospitalisation, 
professional fees, and all clinically related services for 90 days after discharge such as skilled 
nursing care, home care and hospital readmissions. This follows findings that substantial 
savings may be achievable through coordinating care, use of home care where appropriate 
and higher quality, more efficient facilities when institutional care is required (Mechanic, 
2015).  
CMS are also proposing that hospitals would be exclusively responsible for the bundled 
payment program and would control any surpluses. However, recognising the benefits of 
coordination and the likely rise of new care alliances, the CMS program design will also 
permit gainsharing. Program pricing would be, initially, a blend of clinical and regional costs, 
moving to full regional pricing by year 5. Service quality measures would affect the prices 
paid to the hospitals. 
Role for the PHNs 
As the above evidence demonstrates, managing the transition from hospital to community-
based care has proved to be an intractable problem across the globe. The divergent payment 
incentives, fragmented organisational structures and processes, and unequal power and 
funding, are just some of the many reasons for this lack of coordination. Even in countries 
where hospitals and general practitioners are under the control of regional networks, poor 
communication and coordination remain major concerns. 
 26 
 
 
Nonetheless, for PHNs to be successful in improving this transition, the cooperation, indeed 
active involvement, of hospitals is essential. Such an approach is consistent with the PHN 
Grant Program Guidelines, which set out an expectation that PHNs are to develop 
collaborative working relationships with LHNs as well as the public and private hospitals, in 
part to “increase the PHN’s ability to purchase or commission medical and health care 
services” (Department of Health, 2014, p. 8). 
An incremental improvement in coordination would be for PHNs and their counterpart LHNs 
to set up local area committees to monitor and publicly report on the quality of the 
hospital/community care interface. The reports could include data on the adequacy and 
timeliness of discharge reports and distribution of those reports to all key providers of health 
and social services to the patient. The reports would identify inadequacies and propose 
solutions for the commissioning of services by PHNs under their budget for innovation 
funding. 
This paper argues, however, that a more significant change is warranted. It is proposed that 
PHNs be given the role of budget holder for those community-based health care services 
which deliver post-discharge care, for a period of 90 days from the date of discharge. Further, 
to ensure alignment of incentives, and reflecting the bundled payment initiatives in the US, 
PHNs would, where appropriate, contract with hospitals for the delivery of that care. In turn, 
the hospitals would contract preferred providers across the full range of community-based 
medical and health care services, and be responsible for the care outcomes of patients from 
the time of admission to the end of the post-discharge 90 day period. 
It is recognised that LHNs already deliver some community-based services including 
community nursing and allied health services. However, funding varies between LHNs, 
including for post-natal care, drug and alcohol services, sexual health services etc. These 
existing budgets would be integrated into the payments hospitals receive for their admitted 
patients and the PHN community-based health care payment. 
There may be local areas within regions where PHN-commissioning of hospitals directly 
would not produce the optimal outcome, at least in relation to discharge procedures and 
subsequent community-based care. Other possible commissioning models include contracting 
with large integrated health care providers and/or health insurers. PHNs should explore the 
range of possibilities appropriate to their local circumstances, to organisational structures and 
to the governance arrangements that have incentives aligned with those of the PHNs. Such 
options would not reflect a full bundled payment option, but, to be effective, the 
commissioned agents would need to have some say in the discharge procedures of hospitals.  
Again, well-planned and inclusive implementation is essential for the success of the 
initiatives. As in the US, a very limited number of hospital interventions and the associated 
post-discharge delivery of selected patient care needs should be identified and carefully 
monitored, evaluated and reported on. Priority would be directed to specific patient groups 
who are known to be poorly serviced and have poor long-term outcomes. 
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PROPOSAL 3: DRIVING THE UTILISATION OF E-HEALTH TO 
ACHIEVE GREATER EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY IN 
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY. 
 
E-health is a very broad term encompassing any electronic-, digital- or internet-facilitated 
means of exchanging information and/or enhancing communication about health and health 
care between and within consumers, providers and related organisations. Examples of 
e-health tools include electronic health records, health information websites, decision support 
programs and electronic prescribing software (Anikeeva & Bywood, 2011). 
E-health also encompasses consumer-directed applications ranging from the more general, 
such as internet and on-line support groups, to more specific applications such as 
electronic-based information and support designed to enhance patient self-management, 
decision aids as well as personally controlled electronic health records (PCEHRs). 
Such systems are considered central to current efforts to optimise primary care, generally by 
targeting three closely linked areas of need: improving the management of chronic care; 
encouraging broad-based general practice or multipurpose service delivery (i.e. team-based 
care); and better care co-ordination, including across the hospital/community care transition.  
For providers, improved access to health information may result in better care outcomes and 
reduced duplication of services. Access to shared clinical information by a multi-disciplinary 
team of providers is likely to support more comprehensive and coordinated team-based care 
across occupational and geographical boundaries and may lead to improved continuity of care 
relationships between patients and their key health professionals. Finally, electronic records 
increase the ability to use clinical data for quality improvement within and between practices 
(Anikeeva & Bywood, 2011). 
In Australia, the formation of DGPs in 1992 paved the way for funding to be provided to 
general practices for, amongst other improvements, IT systems which have the capacity to 
enhance integration of information and the monitoring of quality. The result is that the 
majority of GPs use electronic health records for patient management, including reminders, 
e-prescribing (in a limited way) and websites. Telehealth initiatives have been designed to 
support clinicians and patients in remote areas as well as clinical decision support systems 
including education via simulations and vignettes of easily accessible recommended 
treatments (Cornwall, 2014). 
The Government has invested significantly in the development of e-health capability through 
a number of incremental PIP e-health incentives targeted at increasing the capacity for 
general practices to function (and interact) electronically. To be eligible to receive the 
incentive, practices must meet a number of technical requirements (including accreditation), 
as well as work towards recording the majority of diagnoses for active patients electronically; 
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ensure the majority of their prescriptions are sent electronically to a Prescription Exchange 
Service (PES); and provide all GPs at the practice with access to the current editions of key 
electronic clinical resources. 
The PIP eHealth Incentive aims to encourage the adoption of new technology as it becomes 
available and to assist practices to improve administration processes and the quality of care 
provided to patients.  
Since 2012, the Government has also invested in the development of a system for a Patient 
Controlled Electronic Health Record (PCEHR)s – (Department of Health, 2015b) – a secure 
online summary of an individual’s health information. A Government commissioned review 
of the PCEHR in 2013 (Department of Health 2013) made a number of recommendations 
including: increasing usability through a secure messaging platform; integrating with 
pathology and diagnostic imaging; and identified a minimum composite of records required 
for clinician engagement including demographic information, medications and adverse 
events, discharge summaries and clinical measurements. The review also recommended the 
PCEHR transition to a revised My Health Record. This was announced in the 2015-16 
Budget. 
The roll-out of the PCEHR/My Health Record is proceeding relatively slowly (see Figure 1), 
as only about 10 percent of the population (2.3 million individuals) and around 8000 
healthcare provider organisations have registered, including a little over 5000 general 
practices. The uploading of prescribing and dispensing documents (2 million) significantly 
exceeds the uploading of clinical documents such as health summaries, specialist letters or 
e-referrals. However, uptake by the population is predicted to rise more rapidly with the 
move to an opt-out model to be trialled in 2015-16 - another recommendation of the 2013 
review.  
There are two main outcomes proposed to flow from the introduction of the fully developed 
PCEHR. First, it will allow the collection and amendment (by authorised users) of the 
information required in an individual’s medical record once only and in (close to) real time. 
Thus, personal and medical histories as well as test results, diagnoses and interventions are 
included and available for the patients and all authorised clinical personnel to view and 
amend. It also allows communications, such as discharge letters, treatment summaries and 
referrals to be delivered electronically. Thus, if the uptake is high (by both patients and 
healthcare professionals/organisations) and it is perceived to be functional, secure and 
user-friendly, it should contribute to an increased level of service integration.  
Second, the patient-controlled features should increase patients’ knowledge and 
understanding of their conditions and treatments, enhance their empowerment and 
self-management of conditions and improve communication and the quality of the 
relationship between consumers and their health care providers.  
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From the GP perspective, the static nature of the available information in the PCEHR, 
together with concerns about its ability to integrate with existing practice software, have been 
offered as reasons for its limited current utilisation. 
Apart from the PCEHR, there are other functions of a broader e-health system which also 
have important potential for enhancing quality of care (particularly for chronic conditions), 
for encouraging team-based care and for facilitating the coordination of care, as demonstrated 
by the experience of other countries.  
Figure 10. Uptake of Patient Controlled Electronic Health Record 
International practice 
In Denmark, similar to Australia, almost 100 percent of Danish GPs use electronic health 
records for some patient management purposes. In contrast to Australia, however, over 80% 
of communications with other service providers are electronic. Moreover, Danish GPs are 
required to code all activity relating to chronic disease management, and allied to this, a 
national chronic care model has emerged which features primary care in a central 
coordination role, as well as disease registers which risk-stratify patients and the assignment 
of case managers.  
Data capture is used to monitor the quality of care; including data on diagnoses, procedures, 
prescriptions and laboratory results used to monitor the quality of care. This data is captured 
automatically (reducing the burden on GPs) and held in the Danish General Practice Database 
(DAMD). Patients are also able to monitor their own data, thus supporting more active 
participation in their treatment and care (OECD, 2013b). 
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The DAMD represents a platform whereby GPs can access quality reports from their own 
practice over time, allowing them not only to identify patients who have been sub-optimally 
treated, but also to benchmark their practice against their peers at the municipal, regional and 
national levels. This represents a key incentive structure for service providers to improve 
their quality of care. There is some evidence showing that improved quality of primary care 
for diabetes has been associated with the use of the DAMD reporting tool (Schroll et al., 
2012). It is however still unclear whether the tool is being accessed and used effectively. 
There is some resistance to linking clinical performance, with the view that there may be 
unintended distortions in the priorities of practitioners (e.g. lower priority treatment of 
complex patients, or of non-incentivised conditions). 
Israel uses e-health to encourage team-based care as well as enhance the quality of care, 
although in contrast to Denmark, participation in the national program is voluntary. Each of 
the four health insurance funds operates a system of detailed electronic medical records 
which support the sharing of information throughout the community care setting. The data are 
collected in standardised form and audited regularly. Reports based on the data allow 
individual health funds to benchmark their performance against the national average, as well 
as against that of other health funds (OECD, 2012).  
Israel’s e-health system has facilitated sophisticated data collection and monitoring 
infrastructure, in the form of the voluntary National Programme for Quality Indicators in 
Community Healthcare (QICH). The programme captures 35 measures of quality care in the 
areas of primary prevention, disease management, and effectiveness of care in 
community-based clinics. In addition to the QICH, there are surveys of patient experience at 
both system and health fund levels. The results of the system-level survey are provided to key 
decision makers and the public. The Israeli system is an example of how the provision of 
regular, rich information can be used to drive positive change in a collaborative fashion. 
New Zealand established the National IT Health Board in 2009 in order to centralise IT 
purchasing and planning and support the development of data infrastructure. As at July 2014, 
the rollout of key priority projects was in progress (New Zealand Ministry of Health, 2014), 
including electronic consolidation of patient medication and prescription records, nationally 
standardised electronic registries of clinical information (including discharges and referrals), 
and integrated care plans which are accessible by the patient and primary, community and 
hospital health professionals.  
Role for the PHNs 
To underpin the success of new governance structures and improve service delivery models, 
it will be necessary to improve the underlying information systems. And while, on its own, 
the adoption of a robust e-health system will not improve the health of either individuals or 
the population, it is clear that the successful implementation of Proposals 1 and 2 will require 
“joined-up data”.  
The experience of Israel (and to a lesser extent Denmark) suggest that effective data 
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collection both at the patient and service provider level, including measuring activities in 
prevention and disease management, effectiveness of care, patient experience, and uptake of 
good practices, and the reporting of this data to PHNs – in a way which allows quality of care 
to be benchmarked against other PHNs, states and in aggregate nationally – could drive 
system-wide improvements.  
It is argued that the availability of this rich and timely data appeals to the inherent desire of 
service providers to improve care, by making known to all stakeholders how each PHN has 
performed. An alternative framework, such as the United Kingdom’s Quality Outcomes 
Framework, would involve the implementation of an incentive payment framework. While 
this may seem economically sound, the investment is considerable, and the thresholds and 
payment formulas would require substantial deliberation. The evidence from the UK and 
around the world on how these incentive payments have produced better outcomes (in health, 
cost-effectiveness or patient experience) is unclear and potentially weak (Health and Social 
Care Information Centre UK, 2014). 
A different model is proposed in this paper, based on the concept of patients having a regular 
GP. Although Australia’s primary health care system is structured such that patients may 
consult as many GPs as they wish, evidence shows that most people, particularly older people 
and those with chronic conditions, are able to identify a regular GP, that is, the GP they 
consult most frequently. The gate-keeping role of GPs in Australia reinforces this concept.  
Accordingly, this paper proposes that in order to provide more integrated care for these 
groups of patients, GPs need to perceive that they are responsible for the provision of care for 
a designated population. As such, they would be required to take responsibility for a range of 
health monitoring, screening and coordination services. 
One way of encouraging GPs to adopt this responsibility is for PHNs to implement a program 
of registration of individuals with the GP they identify as their regular GP. A one-off 
incentive could be provided to practices to set up a registration system and GPs could receive 
a one-off payment for being the patient’s regular GP. Limits on the minimum duration of 
registration may be needed to prevent patient churning and frequent payment of incentives, 
however, it would need to be balanced against the desirability of patients being free to change 
providers as desired.  
Another proposal, which could be implemented in conjunction with patient registration, 
would be for the practice accreditation standards to be progressively strengthened to include 
active use of e-health by the GPs. This could be defined in a variety of ways, and innovation 
should be encouraged, monitored and evaluated, and best-practice openly and actively 
disseminated. In addition, PHNs could mandate that if GPs and other health providers wish to 
be considered as part of a preferred consortium of providers to deliver either integrated care 
(Proposal 1) or post-discharge community-based care (Proposal 2), they would need to have 
in place an e-health system which achieves high standards for sharing information between 
all relevant providers in the consortium and with patients.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The introduction of Primary Health Networks offers a new opportunity to improve the 
effectiveness, efficiency, equity and sustainability of the primary health care system in 
Australia for the benefit of the patients, community and funders, as well as improve 
its interface with the acute care sector and broader social and community services. 
 Characteristics of a strong primary health care system include: accessibility; 
affordability; comprehensiveness; continuity; coordination and an effective and 
efficient system structure. 
 The PHN initiative is the third major reform aimed at improving regional-level 
primary health networks in Australia. This disruption has come at a cost, not only 
financial but also in terms of lost human and social capital. 
 A number of system-level challenges form an important context for identifying 
opportunities for the new PHNs to be a disruptive force for positive change. Those 
challenges include: the funding and functioning complexities of 
Commonwealth/State/Territory relations; fiscal pressures facing governments (the 
predominant funders of health care); incentives embedded in the payment 
arrangements for GPs and other health providers; entrenched occupational boundaries; 
inadequate e-health; a lack of a bipartisan reform agenda; the poorly defined role of 
private insurance; and the lack of policy and program coherence between physical 
health, mental health, disability and aged care. 
 The paper assumes that PHNs are motivated to fund a level of care to the greatest 
number of people in the greatest need with the least possible resources consistent with 
ensuring the safety and quality of that care. However, PHNs will be functioning in a 
system where the incentive structures faced by consumers, GPs, other health 
providers, administrators and funders are not aligned, either between themselves, or 
with the new PHNs. This will prove to be a major challenge for them. 
 This third attempt at establishing regional-level networks must enable the use of 
different levers if the new PHNs are not to be constrained by existing incentive 
structures. The new PHNs must be able to develop new ways of doing business with 
providers. 
 Proposal 1. PHNs should become budget holders to fund the management of care for 
vulnerable people with multiple chronic conditions. They would commission local 
level agencies to contract the delivery of long term coordinated care from consortiums 
of providers, provide aligned incentives and carefully plan the implementation to 
maximise the net benefits. 
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 Proposal 2. PHNs should become budget holders for those community-based health 
care services directly related to post-discharge care for 90 days following discharge. 
Where appropriate, and to leverage the alignment of incentives, PHNs should 
commission local hospitals to perform this role and be given bundled payments 
covering the total episode from admission to the end of the post-discharge 90 day 
period. Where commissioning local hospitals would not produce the optimal outcome, 
other agents could include large integrated health care providers and/or health 
insurers. Again, implementation planning is a key to success. 
 Proposal 3. PHNs could encourage a greater take up of e-health through initiatives 
such as patients registering with their regular GP for services including health 
monitoring, screening and care coordination, and general practice accreditation 
standards could be progressively strengthened. 
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APPENDIX: MAP OF PRIMARY HEALTH NETWORKS 
Source: Australian Government (2015a) 
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Executive Summary 
 This paper examines the issues associated with introducing bundled health care 
payments for primary care in Australia, including the predisposing conditions 
required for their successful implementation.  These are discussed in the 
context of the Commonwealth Government-initiated Reform of the Federation 
and Reform of Australia’s Tax System. 
 Like all health care systems, the Australian health care system is facing 
challenges. There have been calls for an urgent reform of the funding system to 
better support a well-functioning primary health care system that delivers 
better clinical outcomes, particularly for those with chronic conditions and for 
vulnerable populations, and is sustainable.  This requires incentivising care 
coordination and integration of care. 
 There are fundamentally three payment mechanisms, which are along a 
spectrum; fee-for-service, bundled payments and capitation.  Each has 
advantages and disadvantages and each has its place depending on the goals of 
the health system.  The payment methods can be blended with one another and 
with other strategies to either encourage desirable benefits or discourage 
undesirable consequences.  These strategies include pay for performance, 
benefit and risk sharing, and management strategies. 
 Bundled payments describe a method of payment where services, or different 
elements of care, are grouped together into one payment.  Evidence of benefit 
includes the ability to curb health care costs without decreasing quality and 
potentially even improving it.  The mechanisms of impact are variable and 
include reducing waste, redesigning more effective services, provision of 
appropriate care, greater team based working, improved data utilisation, better 
coordination and care integration.  However, there are significant 
implementation barriers, which include complexity in defining bundles of care, 
the payment method, implementing measurement, determining accountability 
and engaging providers.  These difficulties and some of the mechanisms were 
observed during a pseudo-simulation exercise at a workshop exploring the 
potential of bundled payments in the Australian context. 
 In considering the role of bundled payments for primary care in Australia, it 
needs to be recognised that payment systems cannot be the only policy lever to 
achieve the goals of the health system.  There will inevitably be trade-offs that 
need to be made between the objectives and the choice or blend of payment 
systems.  Moreover, the payment system will need to be flexible and adaptable. 
 The evidence for bundled payments (or any other payment system) is not 
complete with significant gaps in the data and research.  However, there is 
sufficient knowledge of risks and of strategies to circumvent those risks. 
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 There are a number of predisposing conditions in the Australian primary care 
context at present to support a transformational payment reform such as 
bundled payments.  These include: 
 A growing call for payment reform from policy makers, independent bodies 
and professional colleges 
 Prior experience demonstrating the ability to pool funds between different 
levels of government, with the review of federalism being undertaken by 
the current government offering a time-limited opportunity to identify who 
the custodians of any future pooled funds could be 
 Recent structural reforms aligning Primary Health Networks and Local 
Hospital Networks creates the platform for engaging with consumers and 
providers, as well as the change agents to support a transformation at a 
microsystem level. 
 There is an urgent need for quality data on outcomes and costs to support the 
transition towards a more fit for purpose payment system.  Once this final 
foundation is in place, the ground will be fertile for a payment reform.  The 
implementation of bundled payments for key primary care populations has the 
potential to be a bridge towards a future capitation model in a transition 
towards a value based primary health care system.
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Introduction 
Australian health care performance measures favourably when compared to other 
countries.  The Commonwealth Fund ranked Australia fourth amongst the eleven 
nations studied in a report incorporating patients’ and physicians’ survey results on 
care experiences and various dimensions of care(1).  It noted that every country 
had room for improvement and indeed Australia’s health care system faces its 
share of challenges and pressures, some of which are also experienced by other 
similar countries.  However, some are unique to Australia, particularly in the 
context of the roles and responsibilities of different levels of government. These 
are the focus of health reform debate and current review processes. 
 
The Australian Government has embarked upon a review of Federalism and has 
produced an issues paper on health that describes the challenges and poses a 
series of questions on accountability, subsidiarity, national interest, equity, 
efficiency, effectiveness, durability and fiscal sustainability(2).  The paper points 
out that in Australia, there is no overarching health system but a complex web of 
services, structures and providers with no single level of government having all the 
policy levers to ensure a cohesive health system.  This has particular implications 
for those with chronic and complex conditions who require integrated and 
coordinated care. 
 
The predominant mechanism for funding health care at present, including for 
those with chronic conditions in primary care, is a fee for service model (FFS).  
This model is thought to work less well for those with complex and chronic needs, 
and has been suggested as a factor contributing to fragmentation of care, leading 
to calls for an “urgent need to reform health funding”(3). The Australian 
Government has embarked on a ‘Healthier Medicare’ initiative including: 
 a taskforce charged with the responsibility of reviewing the Medicare Benefits 
Schedule (MBS) 
 the creation of a Primary Health Care Advisory Group (PHCAG) and 
 a review of Medicare compliance rules(4) 
 
A well-functioning primary health care system includes considerations of 
affordability, equity, effectiveness, safety and accessibility. The PHCAG has 
presented a consultation document on options to improve primary health care for 
people with chronic and complex conditions.  Presented within it is a theme on 
establishment of suitable payment systems with the aim of achieving “a primary 
health care system that is supported by suitable payment mechanisms to: drive 
safe, high quality care; support regional flexibility; and improved patient outcomes 
and value, not just volume of services”(5). 
 
A common thread across all of these discussions is a need for a more sustainable 
financing mechanism for health in Australia, which maintains or improves on all 
the dimensions of quality care and delivers improved value.  ‘Bundled payments’ in 
health care are a structured way of improving the processes of care and patient 
outcomes, handling a patient’s entire care episode and elements of care, rather 
than individually for every test and treatment they receive. It seeks to reach 
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across silos of health care services and to better coordinate care to improve 
patient outcomes and efficiency within the health care system.   
 
This paper examines the issues associated with introducing bundled health care 
payments for primary care in Australia, including the predisposing conditions 
required for their successful implementation.  These are discussed in the context 
of the Commonwealth Government initiated Reform of the Federation and Reform 
of Australia’s Tax System.
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Current Health Issues in Australia 
The Australian health care system performs well compared to those of other 
countries and was ranked fourth in a report comparing eleven nations.  It ranked 
higher in dimensions of quality care and chronic disease but particularly low in 
areas such as cost-related access problems and timeliness of care(1).  However, 
masked within the data of overall performance, are significant shortcomings of the 
health system.  This is particularly so for specific populations including(3): 
 
• Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people 
• culturally and linguistically diverse populations 
• the elderly 
• those with chronic illness 
• those with disabilities 
• those with mental illness 
• people living in rural and remote locations 
 
A pressing driver creating a sense of urgency for reform is the sustainability of 
health care spending.  The Intergenerational Report projects real health 
expenditure per person will more than double over the next forty years(6).  Of the 
total recent health care spends, the Australian Government provided around 41 
percent, state and local governments contributed 27 percent, and private 
contributions made up the remaining 32 percent (including out of pocket costs).  
The major health programs funded by the Australian Government are the Medicare 
Benefits Schedule (MBS) and Pharmaceutical Benefits Schedule (PBS).  The MBS 
includes most of the funding for general practice.  It was initially introduced as a 
scheme to provide the 'most equitable and efficient means of providing health 
insurance coverage for all Australians'(7). However, for the majority of general 
practice consultations, General Practitioners (GP) forego any fee on top of the 
government-determined reimbursement for the service and bill the government 
directly. For this reason, and because there is a mandatory contribution of 
1.5 percent of taxable income, many patients would not describe Medicare as a 
system of patient insurance, but rather as a means of funding health care 
directly(8). 
 
The growth in future spending in health is attributed to demographic and non-
demographic factors(2). Amongst the demographic factors are population ageing 
with the median age of the population projected to continue to rise.  This is 
associated with an increase in the prevalence of chronic diseases resulting in a rise 
in demand for health care.  However, non-demographic factors such as new 
technologies and treatments also play a role as health care utilisation is increasing 
across all age groups.  Accompanying this is increasing consumer expectation 
together with other non-demographic factors such as higher income, wage growth 
and technological change. 
 
A health system designed in an era where communicable diseases were more 
prevalent than chronic diseases is struggling to meet the changing health needs of 
the population.  The management of chronic conditions may involve multiple 
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providers across multiple settings. To be effective it requires care co-ordination 
and integration of care, particularly for those patients with multiple morbidities or 
greater complexity.  However, for a number of reasons, the experience of patients 
and providers alike is a fragmented system.  At a macro level, no single level of 
government has all the policy levers to create an integrated health system.  The 
information systems are not shared across multiple providers and transitions of 
care within and between organisations is suboptimal.  Moreover, the funding 
mechanisms, which are predominantly fee for service, are not aligned to the 
requirements for effective delivery of chronic care.  This has been increasingly 
implicated as an important contributor to the system-wide problems of fragmented 
and inappropriate care resulting in unnecessary costs(3).  This is consistent with 
international experience where a “fee for service system of provider payment is 
increasingly viewed as an obstacle to achieving effective, coordinated, and 
efficient care” because it “rewards the overuse of services, duplication of 
services, use of costly specialised services, and involvement of multiple physicians 
in the treatment of individual patients. It does not reward the prevention of 
hospitalisation or rehospitalisation, effective control of chronic conditions, or 
care coordination”(9). 
 
In a recent report, the George Institute called for immediate reform to meet the 
needs of those with complex chronic conditions and those who are significantly 
disadvantaged because of a lack of access and / or poor outcomes of care.  The 
report said there was an urgent need to reform health funding and called for a 
blended payment system(3).  A discussion paper produced by the PHCAG stated 
“our current health system is not set up to effectively manage long-term 
conditions” and suggested “stronger, more effective, and better integrated and 
coordinated primary care services are the best way to achieve better outcomes 
for patients and ensure a sustainable health system into the future”(5). The 
discussion paper has a section on possible options to establish a suitable payment 
mechanism to enable a better primary health care system but did not explicitly 
present ‘bundled payments’ as an option. 
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Funding options for health care 
One of the policy interventions to tackle the current fiscal issues in Australia is 
health payment reform.  There are a limited number of mechanisms used to fund 
health.  Quinn identified eight methods (Table 2) and suggests that they are on a 
continuum(10).  
 
Quinn’s framework  Miller’s framework 
Payment Method Commonly used terms  
Per dollar of amount 
charged by provider 
Percentage of charges 
 
Per dollar of cost Cost reimbursement  
Per service Fee for service 
Number of processes x 
cost of process 
Per day   
Per episode Bundled payment 
Number of services per 
episode 
Per recipient  
Number of episodes of 
care per condition 
Per beneficiary Capitation 
Number of conditions 
per person 
Per time period Salary  
Table 2:  Basic mechanisms to fund health care 
Miller presents an alternative framework (Table 2) that adds further definition(11), 
in particular for the key methods being considered internationally to address issues 
similar to those in Australia. Miller’s framework defines the basic unit as FFS, 
under which a predetermined amount is paid for each discrete service.  The 
service consists of processes and each process has a cost associated to it.  An 
episode consists of a series of services and payment can be for the whole episode.  
This is where the term ‘bundled payment’ originated as it covers the bundle of 
services.  However, its utility has been extended and many describe bundling of 
services that take various forms, with three typically described: 
 
 They may be used to describe payment for services, which are aggregated 
longitudinally.  For example, it might include the pre-hospital elements of an 
elective procedure, the elective procedure itself and the post-hospital care 
elements for that procedure such as rehabilitation. 
 The pooling of funds for disparate group of providers.  This, for example, will 
often include all the medical specialists required to deliver an episode of care. 
 The incorporation of a warranty e.g. includes the management of complications 
from a procedure. 
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Capitation is a broader concept using fixed payment per patient or member of 
population.  It is a payment made regardless of the type and amount of services 
i.e. it is per beneficiary rather than per recipient.  The UK has a long history of 
paying for primary care using a capitation-based model where currently a practice 
receives the majority of its income for a registered list of patients.  Capitation can 
take various forms.  For example, the capitation payment can be made to the 
individual provider of services, the practice (as in the UK) or a more regional 
organisation e.g. a primary health care organisation (as in New Zealand).  
Examples of approaches in the use of capitation based payment models for primary 
care in different countries is summarised in Table 3. 
 
Table 3:  Examples of Capitation Models 
Country Example of Model 
C
a
n
a
d
a
 
Health care in Canada is organised on a Provincial basis.  There has been 
experimentation with payment reform and in the Province of Ontario, 80 percent of 
family doctors have voluntarily moved into a predominantly capitation based model 
of funding.  
 
Family Health Organisations: capitation is the primary source of income but they 
also receive FFS payments (for non-capitated services to enrolled patients, for all 
services to non-enrolled patients), shadow-billing premiums, after-hours premiums, 
plus various pay-for-performance bonuses and incentives.  These family health 
organisations can be come part of a newer model of service delivery, Family Health 
Teams.  It is an inter-professional primary health care model with teams of core 
(i.e. physicians and nurses) and interdisciplinary (e.g. mental health, nutrition, 
social work) health care providers promoting comprehensive and interdisciplinary 
services such as chronic disease management, counselling, health education, and 
palliative care. 
N
e
w
 Z
e
a
la
n
d
 
New Zealand has a payment system that combines a universal capitated general 
medical subsidy, patient copayments, and targeted fee for service payments.  
Capitation-based payments are based on the number of patients enrolled to a 
primary health organisation (PHO) population and general practice services are 
provided by member practices. 
 
In addition, there are capitation adjustments based on rural ranking and additional 
payments: 
CarePlus:  Funding provided to general practices to improve chronic care 
management, reduce inequalities, improve primary health care teamwork and 
reduce the cost of services for high-need patients 
Health Promotion:  A capitation fee per patient enrolled to PHOs signed up for 
health promotion initiatives 
Services to improve access:  An additional capitation based payment to reduce 
inequalities among those populations that are known to have the worst health status 
Very Low Cost Access:  A voluntary scheme that provides extra funding in return for 
PHOs and general practices agreeing to maintain fees within the fees thresholds.  At 
least half of the enrolled population has to be high needs 
Zero fees for children under 13:  A subsidy to practice offering zero fees for those 
under the age of 13 
 
A General Medical Services Subsidy exists for treatment where a general practice or 
an after-hours treatment provider sees a child or adult who is not enrolled in a PHO 
or cannot access the practice they are enrolled with during business hours or after 
hours. 
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The country is implementing a National Enrolment Service (NES) to provide a ‘single 
source of truth’ for all national enrolment and identity data including a centralised 
register with real time patient enrolment status enabling more timely payment 
calculation for enrolled patients. 
U
n
it
e
d
 K
in
g
d
o
m
 
The majority of General Practices are paid on the basis of a national contract.  The 
contract has three components (i) Global sum (ii) Performance related pay (Quality 
and Outcomes Framework) and (iii) Payment for enhanced services (which may have 
elements of either FFS, bundled payments and/or performance related payments). 
 
The global sum makes up the largest proportion of the revenue and is capitation 
based per person.  The capitation payment is adjusted for age and sex of the 
patients, rurality, cost of employing staff, the rate of turnover of patients and 
morbidity. 
 
The role of capitated payment is being explored to pay a provider, or group of 
providers, to cover the majority (or all) of the care provided to a target population, 
such as patients with multiple long term conditions (LTCs), across different care 
settings. 
U
n
it
e
d
 S
ta
te
s 
The Patient Centered Medical Home (PCMH) is a care delivery concept that is 
intended to produce greater engagement between the physician practice and its 
patients, particularly around chronic diseases.  The payment models in the US are 
heterogeneous and varied for PCMHs.  Virtually all feature a blend of FFS payments 
with additional fees that support non-visit related work.  Commercial insurers, who 
pay an enhanced per-member, per-month payment to primary care physicians in 
addition to FFS, sponsor many PCMHs. Some also pay a care management fee per 
patient.  In addition, there is the potential for additional payments based on the 
quality of care achieved, shared savings, or both. 
 
Following the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 2010 and the introduction 
of ACOs the payment mechanisms have an opportunity to become more diverse.  
ACOs are groups of providers, with or without an affiliated hospital, who accept 
joint responsibility for the costs and quality of care for an assigned group of 
patients.  Typically most ACOs have continued under a FFS model, but with 
eligibility for shared savings calculated against a budget based on historical 
spending.  However, ACOs may move toward more robust risk sharing arrangements 
with payers, such as full global payments. 
 
PCMH are thought to be a foundational element for ACOs because of observed 
benefits from reduced secondary care utilisation. 
 
In between capitation and episode-based payment is a category that includes the 
number of episodes per condition. Miller refers to this as ‘condition adjusted 
capitation’ or ‘comprehensive care payment’. This is of importance because it is in 
this area that the definitions in the literature become blurred. In the literature, 
terms have been used in an inconsistent manner leading to confusion and lack of 
clarity, particularly with this interim category that is sometimes termed capitation 
and at other times, bundled payment. Individual funders have developed a range of 
contracting strategies and this leads to a plethora of terms and a lack of definitional 
precision. For example, episode-based payment, episode payment, episode-of-care 
payment, case rate, evidence-based case rate, global bundled payment and global 
payment are all used to describe bundled payment; however, some authors used 
these synonyms e.g. global payments to describe capitation. The literature search 
strategy (Appendix 3: Method – page 47) for this paper incorporated the broad 
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range of terms to be inclusive, and during the review process, the definitional focus 
was on the broader extended definition of bundled payments.  
 
There are theoretical advantages and disadvantages for each of these payment 
methods and they are illustrated in Figure 11 and summarised in Table 4.  These have 
been synthesised in a number of papers and are discussed later(12, 13). 
 
Figure 11:  Advantages and Disadvantages of Payment Modalities 
FFS has been an approach used in most health care systems. The advantages of FFS 
are: 
• Simplicity 
• Per item and easier to manage/administer 
• Provides incentives for accessibility 
However, it has particular disadvantages.  It is increasingly viewed as “an obstacle 
to achieving effective, coordinated, and efficient care”(9).  Davis and others 
argue that it rewards the overuse of services, duplication of services, use of more 
costly or lucrative services, underuse of less well reimbursed services, and 
involvement of multiple physicians in the treatment of individual patients. It does 
not reward preventative care, prevention of hospitalisation, and effective control 
of chronic conditions or care coordination.  It may encourage delivery of 
unnecessary care and it rewards errors with payment for correction of clinical 
mistakes. This leads to increased costs; even if cost containment strategies like 
fee reduction or freeze are contemplated, it may not reduce cost because 
spending may rise due to increased utilisation (provided that services remain 
profitable for the provider)(14).  
 
In order to achieve transformational changes in service delivery, such as the 
location of care or the way patients move around the system, a transformational 
change in the flow of money is necessary(15).  Hence many health systems around 
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the world are moving towards alternative payment mechanisms.  For example, the 
Dutch system has introduced a voluntary move towards a bundled payment system 
for certain chronic diseases to address difficulties encountered by smaller 
practices, and the delivery of comprehensive care and coordination required for 
those with chronic diseases(16). 
The perceived advantages of bundled payments are: 
• Removes incentives based on volume of services provided  
• Focuses on care coordination and improved outcomes  
• Helps to promote quality and efficiency  
• Supports patient choice and competition 
• Offers an incentive for elimination of unnecessary services and cost reduction  
• Offers an incentive for providers to work together 
However, there is a theoretical risk with bundled payments that more episodes of 
care may be provided than are necessary and that it does not act as an incentive 
to reduce inappropriate care. For example, in a bundled payment for a pathway of 
care for cataract surgery, the bundled payment incentivises making the pathway 
efficient and lean through improved coordination, reduction of volume of services 
within the pathway and improved outcomes.  However, it does not incentivise the 
volume of patients enrolled in the pathway and so may still lead to overtreatment. 
It can be difficult to calculate costs for episodes and the cost for each component, 
and this can lead to difficulties in appropriately allocating payments across 
providers.  There have been concerns that where bundling is condition specific, it 
may lead to fragmentation in disease specialties and cause difficulties where 
patients are experiencing multi-morbidity.  Therefore, some have argued that the 
bundling should occur per patient rather than per episode/condition nudging 
towards capitation as the payment mechanism.  There have also been concerns 
that it presents a financial risk to providers if the patient requires much more care 
than usual care assumed in the pricing of the bundle (further discussed below). 
Capitation provides further incentive for care coordination and flexibility.  
However, risks include under provision of services, and cherry picking of patients 
to avoid those more complex and at higher risk.  For example, providers may only 
choose to accept those patients who are less complex and straightforward because 
they only get paid a fixed amount.  If they choose a patient with a risk of being 
more ‘expensive’ then they are penalised financially. 
In order to mitigate against the risk presented by each of these methods, different 
strategies may be used. 
 Capping 
 For example, capping the number of services can prevent excess usage under 
the FFS. 
 Risk Management.  There are two types of risk that need to be managed:  
 Performance risk.  This relates to providers’ ability to manage their patients’ 
conditions in a high-quality and efficient manner. 
⁃ A common mechanism used to manage this is Pay for Performance (PfP).  It 
provides a reward for quality and efficiency, adherence to clinical 
guidelines, fosters competition amongst providers based on performance, 
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can further incentivise coordinated care and improve outcomes for those 
with long-term conditions.  However, it is susceptible to gaming, and often 
focuses more on process measures rather than outcome measures.  It has 
to be able to reward practitioners appropriately and proportionately more 
for patients with a greater degree of complexity, otherwise it becomes a 
disincentive to care for more complex patients.  The challenge is often the 
measurement system for PfP, particularly in those older patients with 
complexity and multi-morbidity, when there comes a time adherence to 
clinical guidelines may have detrimental effects(17). 
 Insurance or actuarial risk. This is either when a patient has an illness or other 
condition requiring care or when service utilisation for that care is much 
greater than anticipated 
⁃ Adjusting for case mix 
 In the more fixed methods of payments (and in PfP) the complexity of 
patients being looked after can be managed by providing an allowance for 
case mix.  For example, comprehensive care payments in the US adjust 
for the case mix as a strategy to mitigate against providers avoiding more 
complex patients.  Goroll has presented a model replacing “encounter-
based reimbursement with comprehensive payment for comprehensive 
care” for primary care practices establishing themselves as advanced 
medical homes(18).  In this model, payments would include a base 
payment, a performance-related payment and a transformation payment 
to work towards an advanced medical home.  Although presented as a 
theoretical model, others have performed modelling to support replacing 
fee for service payments in a medical home entirely with bundled care-
coordination payments and large bonuses(19, 20).  They have shown that 
existing data can support the risk-adjusted bundled payment calculations 
and performance assessments needed to encourage desired 
transformations in primary care. 
⁃ Outlier payment policy(21) 
 Under such a policy if the loss from providing care to a patient exceeds 
a specified threshold, the provider receives an extra payment. 
⁃ Gain and loss sharing(21) 
 In such a policy there is an agreement between the payer and provider 
to share any gains and losses.  For example, in setting a bundled 
payment target for providers the payer agrees to cover some portion of 
their spending in excess of this target. In return, providers would share 
with the payer any savings achieved if spending fell below the target.  
Such an approach requires a mature commissioning system. 
• Combining the primary payment method with another method. 
 Pay for Performance 
⁃ Combining a payment approach with PfP can mitigate against any inherent 
disincentives to compromise on quality (as discussed above). 
⁃ Blending with other methods 
 Blending the different methods into an overall payment model in the 
right proportions can offer synergies to optimise the benefits and 
minimise the disadvantages. 
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Table 4:  Advantages and Disadvantages of payment methods 
 Capitation Bundled Payments Fee-for-Service 
A
d
v
a
n
ta
g
e
s 
 Incentivises cost containment by 
providing funders with control over 
overall expenditure 
 Incentivises preventative activities 
 Promotes greater use of skills mix 
and team based care 
 Promotes care coordination 
 
 Reduces incentives based on volume 
of services 
 Helps promote quality and safety of 
care 
 For services within the care bundle 
incentivises for elimination of 
inappropriate care and promotes 
efficiency 
 Encourages team based care 
 Facilitates a focus on care 
coordination 
 Greater access to care 
 Simpler system leading to ease of 
data collection and payment 
 Supports geographical variation in 
health care use and spending 
 Encourages physician productivity 
D
is
a
d
v
a
n
ta
g
e
s 
 May prevent access for those with 
greatest need (cherry picking), 
particularly if the capitation 
payment is too low 
 Providers may withhold or restrict 
access to more expensive care 
 Introduces an additional financial 
risk for the providers (‘insurance’ 
risk) 
 Incentivises under-provision 
 Difficult to define and calculate 
costs 
 Difficult to allocate payment across 
providers appropriately 
 May encourage fragmentation by 
working in condition specific 
pathways 
 May prevent access for those with 
greatest need (cherry picking) 
 May introduce a financial risk for 
the provider, particularly in relation 
to performance 
 Data intensive 
 
 Incentivises volume of care 
increasing financial risk for payer 
(‘supplier-induced demand’) 
 Does not incentivise outcome 
(quality) over output 
 May lead to over-provision; 
inappropriate care 
 Does not incentivise prevention nor 
coordination 
 Encourages overuse of lucrative 
services and underuse of less well 
reimbursed services 
 Does not incentivise for patient 
safety 
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Literature review 
The key objective of the literature review was to address the following two 
questions: 
 
1. What is the evidence for impact of bundled payments, particularly in primary 
care? 
2. What are the enablers, barriers and lessons for implementation in Australian 
primary care from the experience of other countries? 
 
A summary of all the papers reviewed and their findings is available in Appendix 6: 
Summary list of papers reviewed 
 (page 54).  The following is a summary and synthesis from the key papers. 
The Australian Experience of Different Payment Models 
Over a number of years, the Australian health care system has been evolving its 
funding mechanisms.  Previous funding initiatives for general practice include 
Enhanced Primary Care (EPC), introduced in 1999-2000 offering incentives for GPs 
to improve the health and quality of life of older Australians, adult Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people and people of any age with a chronic or terminal 
condition(22).  Subsequent iterations introduced comprehensive medical 
assessments for vulnerable populations, multidisciplinary care plans, case 
conferencing, and home medicines review.  It also included funding via Divisions of 
General Practice to provide access to allied health care for patients with chronic 
conditions referred by a GP.  In 2005 multidisciplinary planning was replaced by 
MBS rebates for chronic disease management, which included rebates for access to 
allied health providers for patients with chronic and complex conditions referred 
by General Practitioners.  They have been on a FFS basis.  The government has also 
introduced other measures to create a more blended payment system 
incorporating PfP incentives.  There are two components to this: 
 
 Service Incentive Payments (SIP) - an additional payment for achieving a goal 
e.g. completion of a cycle of care for asthma or diabetes. 
 Practice Incentive Payments (PIP) - a practice-based payment for meeting 
specific, practice targets (e.g. providing after-hours care or having a quality 
computerised record system) 
 
The increasing health expenditure trend has led to experimentation with the aim 
of improving efficiencies and creating a more integrated system of health.  “In 
Australia’s fragmented system, this took the form of a series of trials, rather than 
a widespread process of health system reform as occurred in the UK and New 
Zealand (NZ)”(23). 
 
None of the trials identified in this review of financial levers used in Australia have 
used bundled payments.  However, the Coordinated Care Trials (CCT) are discussed 
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because pooled funds, a key element of the CCTs, are necessary to allow for more 
efficient reallocation of funding across the system. They also provided the 
opportunity to consider streamlining these funds through an alternative approach 
(which may include a bundled payment one)(15).  The Diabetes Care Project (DCP) 
is a more recent initiative(24).  It had one intervention group that was funded 
using a blended payment system; one of the components of this was similar to a 
bundled payment. 
Coordinated Care Trials 
The CCTs were initiated by the Commonwealth Government.  The first round, 
between 1997-1999, was a series of nine trials across six states and territories.  
Only one of the trials (SA HealthPlus) based participant inclusion on specific 
diagnoses, which included respiratory disease, diabetes, cardiovascular disease, 
stroke and somatisation.  There were four Aboriginal coordinated care trials.  The 
interventions varied by trial but all were testing whether coordination of care for 
people with multiple service needs, utilising individual care plans purchased 
through funds pooled from existing programs, resulted in improved health and 
wellbeing within existing resources.  In general, the trials did not demonstrate 
improved health and well-being of the participants. A significant reduction in 
hospital admissions in the intervention groups compared with the control group 
was seen in three of the trials, and for most trials an accrued operating deficit was 
found.  The SA Health Plus trial successfully implemented a generic model of 
coordinated care with improved health outcomes but it was not cost neutral.  
Authors reporting on it commented “organised care for chronic illness in Australia 
requires commitment from state and commonwealth governments to pool funds 
and information systems that provide population data and decision support. A 
change in the business processes of general practice will be required”(25).  The 
EPC items described above were introduced just prior to the final reporting of the 
CCT.  Commentators of the trials described a number of shortcomings of the design 
but a positive finding was that fundholding allowed the trials to fund strategies, 
such as quit smoking interventions, that otherwise would not have been 
possible(26). 
 
The element of relevance for this paper from the CCT trials is the experience of 
pooling of funds.  These could not be any larger in amount than would have been 
used by the end user if they were not in the trial and essentially provided a 
‘capped’ pool, unlike MBS and PBS.  The funds were drawn from: 
 
 Commonwealth Medicare Benefits Scheme (MBS) 
 Commonwealth Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) 
 Joint programs such as the Home and Community Care Program (HACC), and 
 State-Territory Hospital funds. 
 
Residential aged care programs were excluded as the funding could not be easily 
transferred into the pools. The challenge was in the calculation of the pool to 
ensure it met the needs of participants.  It was calculated using historical 
information over a six-month period prior to commencing care coordination.  It 
compared this with any other available utilisation data to adjust for case-mix and 
it compared utilisation with the control group on an ongoing basis during the trial.  
The trial received the funds for each client on a capitation basis and providers 
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then billed the trial.  It is not clear from the papers identified for this review 
whether different funding mechanisms were used at the provider level, and in 
particular for general practice.  In relation to the funding mechanism, and of 
relevance to the objectives of this review, it is useful to acknowledge that the trial 
demonstrated(27): 
 
 funds pooling between governments is possible, and that providers can 
cooperate at a local level to design and develop a radically new approach to 
health care in Australia 
 the Australian health care system can develop and implement world class 
information management and care planning systems, and 
 major cultural shifts away from the traditional antagonism and rivalry between 
different players and toward cooperation are possible. 
 
A second round of six CCT were undertaken between 2002-2005, three of which 
were in Aboriginal communities.  The pooled funding in this round was distributed 
based on a ‘risk-based capitation model’ created at the end of the first round of 
trials.  The approach for the three Indigenous trials was different to the three 
general trials because of the very different health and chronic disease profile of 
Indigenous populations.  The overall finding was that pooling funds facilitated 
flexible purchasing arrangements.  However, not all stakeholders were fully 
prepared to commit to pooled resources; the main reason being the uncertainty, 
and hence risk, surrounding their estimated funding compared to an unknown 
potential service utilisation (insurance risk).  This evaluation concluded a need for 
more research on the development of funding models using longitudinal utilisation 
and cost data at an individual level.  The high level of variability and uncertainty 
in health care utilisation, which “means that a one-off ‘cash-out’ or receipt of a 
health funding budget involves considerable risk to both the purchaser and 
provider; the management of this risk also requires further research and 
discussion”(28).  The insurance risk has been identified as a disadvantage and 
barrier in the implementation of bundled payments and capitation as outlined 
previously, although, since the CCTs there has been further experience 
internationally in strategies to circumvent this risk. 
Diabetes Care Project 
The DCP (24) was established in response to two of the recommendations 
published by the National Health and Hospital Reform Commission (NHHRC) in 
2009.  The first recommendation was that chronic disease should be managed in 
primary care settings through voluntary patient registration in ‘health care 
homes.’  The second recommendation was that the Commonwealth consider 
innovative funding models that include a quality component to manage population 
health.  It specifically suggested a mix of salary, fee for service, grants, payments 
for performance and quality, and payments for episodes of care. 
 
The DCP was a randomised cluster-controlled trial with a usual care group and two 
other groups(29): 
 
• Group 1:  an integrated information platform and continuous quality 
improvement processes within the current funding model. 
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• Group 2:  As for group 1 + flexible funding based on risk stratification + payments 
for quality + funding for care facilitation. 
 Flexible funding 
- General Practices received an annual payment per person with diabetes 
enrolled.  Practices could determine how to allocate this funding.  Each 
patient was risk stratified into one of five categories.  Practices were not 
entitled to claim additional chronic disease management items, but could 
claim for standard consultations and other items. 
- Allied health providers were paid directly on an activity basis with a cap.  
In addition to the usual types of consultation available under MBS, four 
other types of consultations with allied health were available.  The type of 
consultations was determined by the GP during the care planning process. 
 Quality Improvement Support Payments 
- General Practices were paid retrospectively for achieving improvements in 
clinical outcomes, processes of care and patient experience. 
 
Findings: 
The study showed that in those practices randomised to Group 2: 
 The quality of diabetes care improved as measured by intermediate clinical 
indicators, adherence to recommended clinical processes, and patient 
satisfaction.  The latter included patient perceptions of continuity of care 
 They were able to be more innovative and patient-centred in the way they 
delivered care 
 There were no statistically significant changes in affordability 
 The out of pockets costs for patients in the three groups were not statistically 
different but the authors recommended close monitoring 
 
The improvements in quality, particularly of information recording and 
intermediate clinical indicators, were attributed to the pay for performance 
component. 
 
The evaluation concluded that a wider rollout of the funding levels for Group 2 
interventions would not be cost effective and would need to be recalibrated.  The 
evaluation made three specific recommendations.  These include: 
1. A flexible funding model for chronic disease care targeting resources to achieve 
maximum value.  Components recommended include enrolment; a performance 
related element and funding for care facilitation 
2. Development of e-health and quality improvement processes 
3. Better integrate primary and secondary care and reduce avoidable hospital costs 
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The International Literature 
A technology assessment by the US Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
undertook a comprehensive review of the effects of bundled payments on spending 
and quality(30).  The assessment identified international and US papers, however 
none of the papers included in the final review incorporated primary care.  The 
only paper that did was excluded because a full evaluation was not available.  The 
assessment concluded that the introduction of bundled payment was associated 
with: 
 
1. Reductions in health care spending and utilisation, and 
2. Inconsistent and generally small effects on quality measures.  
 
These findings were across all the different bundled payment programs identified 
by the review.  The authors rated the quality of evidence as low, mainly due to 
concerns about bias and residual confounding effects. 
 
They identified a number of caveats for consideration by policymakers: 
 
1. Future bundled payment programs will be different to those reviewed in this 
study.  (80% of the bundled payment interventions studied were limited to 
payments to single institutional providers e.g. hospitals, skilled nursing 
facilities).  This limits the ability to extrapolate the findings to newer programs 
which include multiple providers. 
2. They noted that bundled payments have the potential to either adversely affect 
quality or be used as part of a quality improvement strategy. Hence future 
bundled payment programs need to have an integral and robust quality 
monitoring and improvement component. 
3. The quality of evaluations of programs was low and further policy change should 
be subject to more rigorous evaluation. 
 
The project that incorporated primary care, but was excluded from the Technology 
Assessment, described the implementation of a bundled payment across three sites 
and was designed to pay for all of the care required to treat a defined clinical 
episode, particularly those services recommended by clinical guidelines or 
experts(31).  It defined twenty-one medical conditions as part of the bundled 
payment program, including chronic diseases such as diabetes.  The sites 
experienced significant implementation challenges (discussed in the section on 
barriers).  Despite the challenges, some intermediate benefits were observed.  
These include: 
 participants (health systems and providers) finding it valuable to use as a 
measurement tool 
 enabled the initiation of new care coordination activities 
 improved communication amongst stakeholders 
 
Moreover, the authors concluded that their findings did not provide support for 
discarding bundled payment in favour of alternative payment methods. 
 
The RAND Institute reviewed the success of value based purchasing programs(32).  
The authors identified three papers in relation to bundled payments.  They had 
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applied inclusion criteria that limited them to an examination of bundled payment 
arrangements to those that included both cost and quality performance 
components to assess value.  The setting of the three studies included hospital, 
physicians and post-acute care.  They found: 
 
1. Clinical quality:  Only one of the three studies examined the effect of bundled 
payments on process measures.  The study found that adherence on 40 clinical 
process measures increased from 59 to 100 percent.  However, this was in a 
single integrated organisation and so the transferability to other settings may 
not be possible. 
2. Cost:  Two studies measured this and both found a cost reduction.  One was of 
the order of 5 percent whilst the other found a $USD2,000 reduction in the cost 
per case over the two-year period. 
3. Unintended consequences:  There were none identified, however, the expert 
panel overseeing the review recommended monitoring for potential unintended 
consequences.  These include the loss of revenue for providers caring for 
disadvantaged populations, the excessive exclusion of patients when that is an 
option in the program, access barriers and patient turnover from practices 
related to providers avoiding more difficult patients, and market concentration 
and price effects in the context of Accountable Care Organisations.  
 
The Netherlands has introduced bundle payment system for diabetes care, vascular 
risk management and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease(16). De Bakker et al’s 
paper is one of the few that provides insights into the use of bundled care within 
primary care.  In this model of care, the insurers pay a single fee covering all 
primary care elements for the specified conditions to a ‘care group’, which is the 
principal contracting entity.  The care groups consist of multiple health care 
providers (and are often owned by General Practitioners). 
 
The insurer negotiates the bundle payment level with the care group.  The care 
group can choose to provide the service or may subcontract it to other providers 
e.g. GPs, allied health.  In the latter case it would negotiate payments with the 
providers.  The services to be included in the bundle had been set nationally in 
disease specific health care standards. 
 
The positive outcomes observed were better collaboration, better process quality 
(adherence to protocols) and more transparency.  However, the effects on 
intermediate patient outcomes such as blood sugar levels and costs were unknown.  
A separate discussion paper has stated that there were no improvements(33). 
 
The negative consequences were dominance of the care groups by General 
Practitioners, large price variations, and the administrative burden.  The large 
price variations were partially explained by three factors(33): 
• variation in actual differences in care provided 
• lack of experience of purchasers and providers on price setting in the initial 
period 
• varying interpretations of national standards 
 
The insurers perceived the bundled payment as a black box, not knowing what was 
happening at the patient level.  One of the insurers expressed concerns about the 
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lack of clarity and not knowing what services were being paid for, hence concerns 
about double dipping.  However, there was criticism in another publication on the 
lack of direction from the payer(34). The authors point to other research showing 
large variations among care groups with regard to price as well as to reported 
performance information. They expressed concerns about additional 
administration in the contracts between insurers and care groups, in addition to 
concerns about the lack of competition. 
 
The care groups reported perspectives were generally positive, particularly the 
ability to influence care process, to supply health care providers with feedback 
about their performance relative to the average care group performance and to 
give insurers information about performance.  They were concerned about the 
administration (e.g. negotiating and managing multiple contracts with different 
insurers) and the dominant position of the insurers.  They experienced challenges 
in assigning correct payments to providers particularly when the patient had 
multi-morbidities, and the lack of their ability to shift savings from speciality care 
to reinvest in primary care.  Despite this, a separate analysis showed no 
differences in quality of care received by those with co-morbidities(35). 
 
The subcontractor perspective was positive with recognition that it improved 
coordination of care. A separate review of the perspectives of dieticians confirmed 
their perceptions of an increase in multidisciplinary collaboration, improved 
efficiency, and greater transparency(36).  However, subcontractors had concerns 
about the dominant position of the care groups and their ability to remodel the 
care to be provided by different providers.  There were concerns about conflicts of 
interest with high levels of care group ownership amongst GPs.  GPs also raised 
concerns about fragmentation with disease based funding.  In addition, the 
dieticians were concerned about the increased administrative burden, lack of 
payment for patients with co-morbidity and a risk that dietetic care may be 
substituted with care provided by other disciplines(36). 
 
A consistent emerging theme from the Netherlands experience relates to the flow 
of information and administrative burden, suggesting the necessity of effective 
information systems. 
 
Further implementation of bundled payments for other chronic diseases was being 
considered in the Netherlands.  However, this would make the problem of how to 
deal with patients with multiple diseases even more complex.  The authors 
speculated that the introduction of bundled payments might turn out to be a 
useful step in the direction of risk adjusted integrated capitation payment for 
multidisciplinary provider groups offering primary and specialist care for a defined 
group of patients. 
 
Appleby et al conducted a review of the international literature whilst exploring 
how payment systems might help to deliver better care in the English National 
Health Service (NHS).  They noted that many countries are dissatisfied with the 
limitations of activity-based payments for patients with long-term conditions and 
complex ongoing needs.  They cite the following examples of bundled care 
initiatives: 
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1. Netherlands - a large-scale initiative to contract doctor-led groups for a year of 
care for selected chronic conditions (described above). 
2. US - pilots of bundled care payments on ‘episode treatment groups’ that bundle 
physician, acute hospital, post-acute and ambulatory care costs from referral or 
admission to recovery for an extended episode of care. 
3. Sweden - piloting of extended episode payment for joint replacement, 
combined with patient choice and provider competition. 
 
They urge caution in the use of bundled payments, and identify defining episodes 
of care, payment rates, and distribution of incentives across providers as 
challenging.  In their critical analysis of the application of bundled payments to 
the English NHS they conclude: 
1. Uncertainty about its place in the NHS, which has a different context 
2. The division in the commissioning structure of primary care and acute care 
would make it difficult to translate 
 
They comment that bundled payments have stimulated better coordination, 
improved the quality of data, improved clinical engagement, and improved 
relationships between payers and providers. 
 
The American Medical Association commissioned an assessment of the effects of 
implementing new payment models on physicians’ practices(37). The alternative 
funding models included pay of performance, capitation and bundled payments.   
 
The findings included: 
• change in organisation structure through merger with other practices or bigger 
organisations was required to enable them to respond to the structural changes 
required from different payment models e.g. investment in information 
technology 
• the development of team approaches to care management was encouraged, 
featuring prominent roles for allied health professionals 
• a serious tension could also arise when practices participated in a mix of both 
FFS and risk-based contracts resulting in conflicting incentives to increase 
volume under the FFS contract, while reducing costs under the risk-based 
contract 
• there were expanded options for patient access 
• investment in data management capabilities is necessary 
• there were negligible effects on the aggregate income of individual physicians 
• those, particularly in non-leadership positions, perceived the changes with less 
enthusiasm.  They experienced much non-clinical work and felt pressure to 
practice at the top of their licence 
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Impact of bundled payments 
The greatest evidence for impact of bundled care payments is in relation to cost 
and efficiency.  This is demonstrated in the studies described above as well as 
others.  For example, a review of cardiovascular services (mostly specialist) 
concluded bundled payment initiatives have demonstrated modest potential to 
curb health care costs without decreasing quality and potentially even improving 
it(38).  Some studies have suggested substantial health care savings by moving 
from a FFS model to bundled payments for episodes of care, whether in a stand-
alone program or as a component of an overall global-payment model.  Other 
studies have tried to quantify the savings and found them to be in the region of 
approximately 5 to 10 percent relative to FFS arrangements(32, 39).  Some authors 
have speculated that the savings may be greater with widespread use of bundled 
payments than studies of individual plans suggest(14). The systematic review 
suggested it was promising strategy for reducing health care related costs(30). 
However, less positively, large price variations were also found in one study that 
were not fully explained by differences in the amount of care provided and at a 
significant administrative cost(40).  Other studies have been able to articulate the 
reasons for variations in different interpretations of the bundle, differences in care 
provided and the learning curve amongst payers and providers as new payment 
mechanisms are implemented(33). 
 
Conceptually, authors have postulated that under a FFS payment structure, if 
providers use all the services that could benefit the patient, then a reduction in 
the use of services could result in a reduction in quality when the payment system 
changes to a bundled payment.  On the other hand, if FFS leads to excessive use of 
services, or the failure to compensate for the time for appropriately coordinating 
care, or the failure to offer effective services that are not billable, then bundling 
might improve the quality of care(30).  An empirical analysis of hospitals in Italy 
concluded “our results should reassure policy makers about the possibility of 
adopting PPS to improve the efficiency of health systems without eroding quality 
of care”(39) (Prospective Payment System (PPS) is a type of bundled payment). 
The primary care study of bundled payments in the Netherlands found improved 
adherence to processes of care(16).  The DCP in Australia, in the intervention 
group with a reformed payment mechanism, did observe an improvement in 
outcome measures but attributed it to the pay for performance component(24).  
Similarly, Damberg et al found a significant improvement in process measures in 
one of the three studies they reviewed but their inclusion criteria required the 
value based designed elements to include a cost and quality component(32). 
 
Very few of the papers identified directly measure the effect of bundled payments 
on improving access, equity of care or patient experience.  The DCP observed an 
improvement in patient satisfaction and continuity of care(24).  One study 
commented that alternative payment models that incentivised containment of 
total costs of care also increased the importance of offering expanded options for 
patients to access care from physician practices(37) and the DCP in the 
intervention group offered additional types of services with allied health(24). 
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If bundled payments are designed and define the right population then they may 
potentially improve equity of care.  However, there is also concern that they may 
reduce equity of care as providers may not be willing to look after those with more 
complex needs and hence this could be an unintended consequence (cherry-
picking).  It was not observed in the review by Damberg et al, although the expert 
advisory panel for the review recommended bundled care programs should monitor 
for “the excessive exclusion of patients when that is an option in the program, 
access barriers and patient turnover from practices related to providers avoiding 
more difficult patients”(32). 
Unintended consequences 
The potential for unintended consequences include an impact on equity of care 
which has been discussed above.  The Netherlands study reported a number of 
negative perspectives rather than unintended consequences.  Insurers in the 
initiative felt uncomfortable because they did not have patient level data but 
rather aggregated data about the episodes of care and therefore saw the initiative 
as a ‘black box’ with resulting concerns about the possibility of double dipping(16).  
There were additional administrative costs and some actors felt uncomfortable 
about the dominance of general practitioners in the care group with potential for 
conflicts of interest. 
Mechanisms of Impact 
The impacts include an improvement in quality and cost savings.  There appears to 
be various mechanisms by which this was achieved.  The mechanisms include: 
 Adherence to protocols (32, 41) 
 A shift to team based care(37) 
 A greater degree of care coordination(16, 40, 41) 
 Reduced waste and errors 
 Development of organisation capability - for example a survey commissioned by 
the American Medical Association sought views of physicians about the 
alternative payment models.  Physicians reported that they were changing the 
organisations structures of their practices to better equip themselves to respond 
to the challenges of the payment reforms(37) 
 Development and better utilisation of data systems(37) and more transparency 
and accountability(16) 
 Service redesign.  For example, Eapen found that using bundled payments for 
patients admitted with heart failure would lead to a redesign of the program to 
introduce elements of case management and reduce readmissions(42) 
Enablers 
The success of any payment reform will ultimately only work if providers respond 
to the change.  This means that any incentive or disincentive caused by a payment 
reform has to filter down to the provider level; it also means that any risk from the 
payment reform has to be carefully managed and minimised at the provider level if 
reform is firstly going to be accepted, and secondly translate into the change in 
behaviour it is trying to achieve. 
An editorial discussed a number of factors that were important enablers(14): 
1. The size of the provider group:  The optimal size of the provider group is 
unknown.  It needs to strike balance between being sufficiently small so that 
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financial benefits when they flow through to an individual provider level are 
sufficient.  However, it has to be sufficiently large to ensure the group has the 
capacity and capability to deliver against the specification of the bundled 
payment.  The review on bundled care described enabling factors as including 
the capabilities and goals of participating organisations and the degree to which 
these organisations are integrated, as well as staff and patient 
characteristics(30).  In response to the introduction of bundled payments in the 
US, providers have responded by changes in their organisation structure through 
mergers with other practices(37). 
2. Distribution of incentives:  The contracting for bundled payments may occur 
with an entity which then subcontracts with the providers e.g. as in the 
Netherlands example.  The incentivisation occurs at the level of the group but 
as mentioned above it needs to filter down to the provider.  The authors in this 
editorial cite the complex interaction between group level and individual level 
incentives and identify a need to understand the impact as an important topic 
for future research. 
3. The fair and equitable management of risk is a critical enabler.  The strategies 
for this have been discussed above in the section entitled Funding options 
for health care. 
4. The determination of future payment for the bundled service determines how 
providers respond.  The evidence suggests bundled payments have a potential to 
result in savings.  If as a result of those savings, future payments are reduced or 
not increased, then there is a risk that providers’ motivation to redesign 
services may be discouraged.  A fair and transparent mechanism that creates a 
win-win scenario needs to be instigated as an enabler and to avoid this potential 
perverse incentive. 
Barriers 
A bundled care initiative in the US, which included chronic disease management 
bundles, encountered significant delays and challenges in implementation to the 
extent that after three years of preparation to support a bundled payment model, 
pilot participants still had not executed new payment contracts(31).  The 
experience of that initiative provides a useful construct to explore the barriers. 
 
The challenges faced included: 
1. Defining bundles: There needs to be a shared understanding of what is and isn’t 
included in a bundle before it can be operationalised. The technical challenges of 
defining care bundles and agreeing with clinicians what care should be included 
and which care costs are potentially avoidable, can take a long time(43). 
2. Defining the payment method:  There is no one approach to paying for a bundle.  
The payment will depend on the bundle definition but also whether the risks lie 
on the side of the payer or purchaser.  In this particular initiative the ‘technical 
risk’ associated with care provision was to be on the provider side and the 
‘probability’ risk or insurance risk on the side of the payer.  In addition, the risk 
management requires adjustment for case-mix.  In order to define a price, 
payers use existing claims data to calculate bundled care payments.  The main 
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problem is that the actual primary care activity level, or the money spent on 
providing comprehensive services, cannot be observed directly. This is because 
existing billing data reflects the state that the reform is seeking to redress: 
many services that the bundled payment is intended to encourage are often not 
done, or even if done, are either under compensated or not billable(20).  
Whellan et al undertook a financial modelling exercise for bundled payment of a 
heart failure management service(44).  They identified in this exercise that the 
insurers benefited but overall there was net loss on the delivery/provider side. 
3. Implementing quality measurement: Administrative and data costs and 
complexity is higher and requires upfront investment of time and resource(43).  
In some health systems the existing data systems with appropriate linkages were 
capable of supporting the analysis required but the challenge was in 
implementation(45). 
4. Determining accountability:  Bundled payments will bring together a number of 
providers potentially across multiple settings.  Firstly, the provider organisation 
needs to know a bundled care payment has been initiated, secondly the 
clinicians have to collaborate and work together to deliver the care and thirdly, 
the provider organisation that received the bundled payment has to have a 
mechanism to remunerate each of the care providers.  A useful strategy here 
may be ‘virtual bundling’ as a transitional step(11).  In this strategy, the 
payment is still made separately by the payer to the individual providers but the 
overall pricing is a ‘bundled payment’ contract. 
5. Engaging providers:  Providers have to firstly agree to the change in payment 
structure and then have to engage in working together on a service redesign and 
new way of working.  Successful engagement with clinician stakeholder groups 
requires their leading role in decision-making; they need to be involved in 
defining the bundle, in managing care, and in defining the responsibility of each 
provider involved(46).  For example, in the Australian DCP the initial concept 
required modification to respond to concerns expressed by the Australian 
Medical Association and Royal Australian College of General Practitioners(24).  
As Miller identified, providers will need to change their internal processes, 
methods of coordination and even organisational structures to actually create 
better care, which takes time(11).  A co-design approach can facilitate and 
prevent problems with engagement as demonstrated by the experience of an 
orthopaedic practice in the US(47).  This case study demonstrated the value of 
co-design in all the process steps including defining the bundle, selecting 
patient populations, specifying outcomes, ensuring patient engagement and 
estimating costs and price settings. 
6. Care design:  This has been described as a ‘chicken and egg problem’ in driving 
effective service redesign.  Payment bundling without organisational and 
managerial integration created service delivery and financial risks; but without 
payment bundling, providers lack the incentive to redesign care(43). 
 
Appleby et al in their assessment and applicability of bundled payments for the 
English NHS were very uncertain about their utility for single disease or conditions.  
They cited a number of barriers to its implementation in the English context and 
suggested that bundled payments would need to operate alongside other payment 
models.
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Workshop Findings 
A workshop was hosted by AHHA in September 2015 to facilitate discussion on the 
scope of bundled payments in Australian primary care.  Participants were provided 
with a draft of the literature review prior to the workshop.  The workshop agenda 
and format are detailed in Appendix 3: Method (Workshop) and Appendix 
5:  Workshop Case Study.  The workshop invited participants to: 
1. Consider the current funding streams of a patient with a newly diagnosed 
chronic illness and his subsequent health care journey 
2. Explore a balanced perspective of the role of bundled payments in Australian 
primary care 
Current Funding Streams 
Participants were invited to participate in an exercise on mapping current funding 
streams for a patient.  The patient’s history and journey are described in detail in 
Appendix 5:  Workshop Case Study.  Some participants were asked to 
explore opportunities for bundling in this patient journey. 
 
Participants attempted to map the funding streams.  The feedback from this 
process included the following. 
 There were multiple potential funding streams for the same patient.  These 
included: 
 MBS 
 PBS 
 Chronic disease management items numbers within MBS 
 Private Health Insurance 
 Public Hospital Funding (block funding or activity based funding) 
 Patient co-payments or self funding 
 Service Incentive payments for general practices e.g. diabetes cycle of care 
 Practice Incentive payments for general practices  
 Better Access initiative 
 Access to Allied Psychological Services (ATAPS) 
 In addition, for some population groups there were additional/different funding 
sources 
 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander e.g. Closing the Gap 
 DVA Gold Card  
- GP Co-ordinated care veterans program (CVC) 
 Populations in rural areas 
 Jurisdictional variation 
 Participants raised a number of other issues relevant to quality care and 
integration.  These included: 
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 A lack of incentives to bring services to patients building on the medical 
home concept; instead patients are being referred onto multiple providers 
leading to fragmentation 
- ‘some of the hidden costs here are repetition of pathology and imaging 
that may have already occurred, might even be on the national or eHealth 
system, the specialist might or might not choose to have access, …. they 
might not even indeed have the capability to’ 
- ‘a cost that we may not see, which is the cost of the communication gap. 
And people being unnecessarily readmitted to hospital at thousands and 
thousands of dollars of expense that could have been saved by integrated 
care earlier on in the piece’ 
 ‘Well and good to be discharged home, but if the discharge summary 
doesn’t make it to the general practitioner within a reasonable time 
frame we can have an example of what we saw in Queensland in recent 
months: where a patient was commenced with warfarin, they got sent 
home, the GP received the discharge letter to be careful about 
polypharmacy with all the medications, but unfortunately that 
discharge letter was received by the GP four days after the patient had 
already died from complications of their medication’ 
 The system currently has perverse incentives for cost shifting or regulations 
that create waste or additional costs 
- ‘potential shift of cost to other payers…. in the public system you can get 
an outpatient clinic or you can come to my clinic down the road and I can 
see you next week and not in the next three months’ 
- ‘What does strike you though is there is a push back in our complexity 
between the funders e.g. whether our private funders is pushing back to 
use the BC items first’ 
- ‘a classic example in terms of funding drives behavior and certainly not 
patient focused is tertiary hospitals around the country; when there is an 
outpatient occasion of service delivered investigations in cardiology and 
radiology can't be charged to the Commonwealth on the same day. So the 
patients, you know, hundreds as they are forced to come back on a 
different day for the test’ 
 The process of mapping current funding streams is complex 
- ‘is just the complexity of when you came over and mentioned that don’t 
forget this patient might be Aboriginal or might be DVA. I think trying to 
figure out, you know, what options are available, what payment systems 
are available for different sections of the population is quite complex’ 
- In talking about allied health care ‘we really came out with the multiple, 
multiplicity of options for funding and providing these types of services. 
There was a variety of potential co-pays, there is bulk billing, there is 
private, there is community health, private insurance, coaching even 
primary health networks providing some of these type of services. And the 
choice from the patient's perspective is often impacted by conditions like 
the expected waiting times the cost and the affordability for them. Their 
previous experience or relationships with the systems and also by their 
own clinicians, their GP and their relationship and their views’;‘another 
dependency is how well the GP knows the system itself’ 
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 Care pathways are currently not patient centred and lack a wider outlook 
beyond their immediate health need.  Participants questioned how the 
pathway would be different ‘if there was a patient controlled budget; what 
would they choose to go to and how would that improve the access and 
service utilisation?’ 
 The complexity of the current system carries a significant administrative 
resource burden 
- ‘what the cost is of administering this and a number of transactions that 
take place and a number of different parties that are involved in actual 
transactional cost that is unrelated to the actual delivery of care’ 
 
Three groups of participants were invited to review the patient journey and 
explore which components of that journey had the potential for bundling.  The 
responses are described below: 
 Participants experienced difficulty in identifying which services should or 
could be bundled – ‘we spent 99% of our time having a debate on how on 
earth we could bundle this . .  . it was quite a challenge we decided to go 
with the chronic disease and give everything a red dot that’s got something 
to do with the chronic disease, but boy it was a challenge.’  The ambitious 
bundling actually extended beyond primary care components and included 
specialists and allied health components.  In doing so they provide an 
illustration of how bundling brings together the possibility of vertical and 
horizontal integration.  Other groups were more conservative with options for 
bundling.  Their scope for bundling was limited to primary care elements 
related to the chronic condition, hence focusing more on horizontal 
integration.  However, interestingly this group had the ambition that ‘we 
would like primary healthcare to be purchasing all of the healthcare from 
the whole system ultimately but that’s a bit of a way off.’ 
 Some groups started to redesign the pathway.  For example, one group 
commented that this process was linear and ‘it shouldn’t be a linear process, 
it should be a circular holistic process with the person in the center and the 
care available to them in the right place at the right time’.  A care 
coordinator should be utilised early on in the journey – ‘care coordination at 
the front is the answer’.  A much greater emphasis on patient education also 
needs to be placed at the beginning. 
 Participants described that a greater challenge would be effective change 
management should an alternative payment mechanism be introduced.  There 
would be some providers who benefit and others who do not (‘the harder bit 
would be the fact that some people might lose money out of this and some 
people might actually be more in control of money…. some would capture 
the commissioning element of it ahead of other specialists or ahead of other 
parts of the system’).  
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In conducting this exercise the participants experienced a pseudo-simulation of the 
process steps (Figure 12) required in order to progress towards bundled payments 
(48).  They were required to explore current costs in providing care, define the 
process steps and consider areas for bundling.  In doing so, they also started to 
consider redesign of care; one of the mechanisms by which bundled care improves 
quality and reduces cost.  Participants also began to articulate elements of what 
health care may look like if funding reform options (page 37) are implemented, 
particularly options 3 and 4. 
 
Figure 12:  Process steps for implementing bundled payment 
Bundled payments in Australia – a balanced perspective 
Participants were then asked to participate in an exercise using De Bono’s thinking 
hats.  Groups were assigned one of four ‘hats’ and asked to consider the issues 
related to ‘bundled payments’ in Australian Primary Care from the perspective of 
their given ‘hat’.  The feedback from this exercise is summarised in Table 5. 
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Table 5:  Bundled payments in Australia – a balanced perspective 
‘Hat’ Descriptor of 
Hat 
Feedback 
The 
Yellow 
Hat 
The Yellow Hat 
symbolizes 
brightness and 
optimism. 
 Commonwealth as a large funder has the structure to bundle 
streams.  Private health insurance could similarly bundle streams. 
 The independent pricing authorities are undertaking an exercise 
of activity based funding for non-inpatient care.  That process 
could inform the process of bundling.  A similar exercise is being 
conducted for mental health. 
 Pathways of care for a number of conditions or episodes of care 
have already been mapped 
 Providers include large aggregate service providers e.g. state 
funded community care or corporate general practices which 
often also provide ancillary services  
 The introduction of PHNs provides an opportunity to be 
fundholders and commissioners that pay for care using bundled 
options 
 Consumers would benefit from clarity of providers, improved 
integrations and pathways and improved self support 
 Potential savings can be reinvested and the financial flows follow 
patient centred care 
The 
Black 
Hat 
The Black Hat is 
judgment -- the 
devil's advocate 
or why 
something may 
not work 
 Bundling needs to focus on preventions and health promotion 
otherwise the potential benefits are not optimised 
 The quality of data is low and not sufficient to calculate the 
denominator in the value equation 
 It requires significant knowledge and capacity building both for 
providers and purchasers 
 There are risks with respect to cherry picking 
 There is a balance between bundling to optimise care for the 
individual or for the population 
 Removes or reduces choice for consumers 
 Resistance to change 
 The change will take time and will require political will if it is to 
survive political cycles 
The 
Green 
Hat 
The Green Hat 
focuses on 
creativity: the 
possibilities, 
alternatives and 
new ideas. 
 There are opportunities to join up the system using a wide area 
network connectivity 
 Bundling care around social determinants of health; hence 
broadening the scope to deal with the root causes 
 Opportunities to bundle MBS and PBS is an area that has not been 
discussed in detail 
 There are potential opportunities in improving access and so 
bundled payments could explore costs of transport; tele-health 
and use of technology 
 Maximise the potential of coterminous PHN and LHD boundaries 
 Don’t bundle inefficiency e.g. routine script renewals 
The 
Red Hat 
The Red Hat 
signifies 
feelings, 
hunches and 
intuition 
 That bundled payments presents an opportunity to improve 
coordination and team work 
 A longitudinal bundling model would offer the best fit 
 There were complexities in bundling given the plurality of funders 
and idiosyncrasies in the system 
 There needs to be clarity around the utilisation of any savings 
 Rather than trying to design a perfect model we should pilot, 
refine and implement 
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Implications for Australia 
The Federal Government’s issues paper on the ‘Reform of the Federation’ presents 
a number of questions.  They include questions on the efficiency, effectiveness 
and equity of service delivery and fiscal sustainability (Figure 13) as well as others. 
 
How could shared responsibility for health care be better managed to reduce 
duplication and overlap? 
What is the best way to ensure improved coordination of different parts of our 
health care arrangements? 
What are the appropriate incentives for governments to reduce or eliminate 
cost-shifting? 
What is the best way to ensure policy decisions in one area consider the health 
system as a whole? 
How could technical efficiency (achieving more ‘outputs’ with less ‘inputs’) of 
the health sector be improved?  How could allocative efficiency (ensuring 
resources are invested where they are most needed) be improved? 
How could changes to roles and responsibilities for health improve outcomes for 
Indigenous Australians? 
Figure 13:  Questions on efficiency, effectiveness and equity in service delivery and fiscal sustainability 
A separate draft discussion paper suggested a “better health system would 
improve incentives for health care providers to focus on prevention and early 
intervention, assisting people to manage their health effectively. Payments based 
on improvements in people’s health provide clear incentives to reduce costs 
associated with waste, mistakes and inappropriate care settings. This would 
include managing chronic conditions before they worsen and require further 
treatment. More health services would be provided in the community rather than 
in hospitals” (49).  Specifically, it listed the requirements of the health system 
(Figure 14) and described five reform options for consideration, drawing on 
discussions at the stakeholder roundtables and consultation with the States and 
Territories and the Prime Minister’s Expert Advisory Panel: 
 
1. The States and Territories be fully responsible for public hospitals 
2. The Commonwealth establishes a hospital benefit 
3. The Commonwealth and the States and Territories be jointly responsible for 
funding individualised care packages for patients with, or at risk of developing, 
chronic or complex conditions 
4. The Commonwealth, States and Territories share responsibility for all health 
care through Regional Purchasing Agencies 
5. The Commonwealth establishes a health purchasing agency 
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 centred on the patient’s health and well-being;  
 that is safe, provides the right care, in the right setting, at the right time, 
and supports prevention and early intervention;  
 where consumers are empowered to manage their health and health risks, 
and to make health care decisions; 
 that is fair and supports disadvantaged and vulnerable people and 
communities; 
 that operates effectively, delivers value for money, and eliminates waste; 
 with flexibility for innovation, adaptable to meet local circumstances, and 
encourages continuous improvements in services; 
 anticipates and responds to the needs of an ageing population; 
 that measures success and aligns incentives with people’s health and 
wellbeing; and  
 supported by clear roles and responsibilities so the public can hold 
governments to account.  
Figure 14:  Requirements of a health system 
The context is unique to Australia, but all developed countries around the world 
are striving for a health system that meets these requirements (Figure 14), at the 
lowest possible cost.  This objective has been encapsulated as achieving ‘value’ in 
health care, where value is defined “as the health outcomes achieved per dollar 
spent”(50). With respect to primary care, Porter et al argues that most primary 
care practices attempt to meet the disparate needs of heterogeneous patients 
with a single “one size fits all” organisational approach.  Instead, he recommends 
that primary care is deconstructed and then reorganised by firstly identifying 
groups of patients with similar needs, challenges, and ways to best access care.  
He recommends that this division is not done by segmenting them into condition-
specific groups but instead based on similarities in the types of care needed, which 
reflect patients’ conditions and the severity of those conditions.  He suggested 
those needs are met by integrated delivery care teams and suggests that “a 
payment system designed around time-based bundled payments, or payment for a 
total package of services for a defined primary care patient subgroup during a 
specified period of time, is the approach most aligned with value for 
patients”(51). 
 
The limited evidence from the utilisation of bundled care payments in primary 
care from the Netherlands, US and elements of the Diabetes Care Project in 
Australia provide evidence that a bundled payment approach can improve quality 
of care and reduce cost.  Those studies did not define the populations as suggested 
by Porter, however, researchers have suggested that a bundled payment system in 
primary care can act as a bridge from the current fragmented system to a future 
scenario of a risk-adjusted capitated payment model and the clinical 
accountability for the continuum of care for a defined population(16).  In the 
evolution of medical homes in the US the payment structures have had to evolve to 
support the organisational development necessary to become a fully functional 
  
  
39 
medical home.  The author suggests that a ‘multicomponent bundled payment’ 
offers the flexibility required through the different phases of development towards 
a medical home(52). 
 
A King’s Fund paper on making integrated care happen states that there is no best 
way to make it happen, but does also point to the need to pool resources and be 
innovative in the use of payment mechanisms(12).  Others have stated the need 
for the payment mechanism to be aligned across the system to achieve health 
goals(15).  Designing the most appropriate payment system requires an 
understanding of the goals and then the right choice or blend of the different 
payment methods.  Prospective elements can be used to incentivise providers to 
exercise appropriate economy in the supply of care, while retaining a 
retrospective element can enable payers to incentivise specified interventions and 
mitigate against risks of patient selection, which may arise if the epidemiological 
risk falls on the provider.  To maximise overall cost-effectiveness at a system level 
requires complementary management and contracting levers.  Pay for performance 
can be used to incentivise quality.  A risk assessment may be conducted to identify 
probability of any unintended consequences so mitigating strategies can be put in 
place.  This is consistent with recommendations from Canada suggesting that the 
best remuneration method for physicians depends on the goals of the health care 
system, and on external contextual factors.(53) 
 
The key lessons articulated in the English NHS experience of payment by results 
need to be considered in thinking about the next steps in Australia.  Although 
related to hospital funding, the same principles apply in thinking about the role of 
bundled payments within the primary care in Australia.  These are: 
 
• Payment systems cannot do everything 
• One size does not fit all 
• Payment systems need to be flexible 
• Trade-offs between objectives are inevitable 
• Data and research for payment systems must be strengthened 
 
The evidence for bundled payments is not complete, but what there is shows 
benefits for costs and quality and whilst there are risks, there are also strategies 
for mitigating those risks.  There are a number of predisposing conditions or 
foundations required to support a payment reform such as bundled payments.  
These are: 
 
1. There is a growing call and will for payment reform.  Discussion papers have 
been circulated by a number of stakeholders including the recent report from 
the George Institute(3), PHCAG (5) and the Royal Australian College of General 
Practitioners (RACGP)(54).  RACGP’s consultation paper calls for a funding 
model to support a high performing primary health system and introduces 
concepts of case mix or ‘complexity loading’.   
2. Bundled payments require funds to be pooled from their current custodians.  A 
constant theme relates to the complexity of Commonwealth and State funding 
and cost shifting.  The Coordinated Care Trials demonstrate that pooling of 
funds is possible in Australia, although there are risks associated with this.  The 
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review of federalism offers a time-limited opportunity to identify who the 
custodian(s) of those pooled funds should be.  The pooling of funds can become 
an enabler to vertical and horizontal integration by creating “bundles’ or 
pathways of care across the health system.  This provides an opportunity to 
reduce duplication and overlap, and facilitates improved co-ordination of 
different parts of the health system.  It by definition eliminates cost shifting, as 
there is only one entity. 
3. The recent structural reforms with the formation of Primary Health Networks, 
aligned with Local Hospital Networks, provides the meso level facilitators for 
those conversations around pathways of care.  Utilising their structures, e.g. 
Clinical Councils/Senates and Community Advisory Groups, and their 
engagement processes, they can facilitate the engagement of clinicians and 
consumers into a co-design process.  The evidence has identified engagement as 
being critical in the implementation of bundled payments.  This group can be 
responsible for determining the numerator in the value equation for the 
different population groups in their health economy. 
4. High quality data systems that can measure the cost of activity are required for 
the denominator calculations in the value equation.  They also are a necessity 
to measure clinical and patient centred outcomes on the numerator side of the 
value equation.  This is a critical success factor and needs to be addressed with 
urgency and priority in the Australian health system, if the required granularity 
of data is to be available for a payment reform. 
 
Once these foundations are in place, the international experience has offered 
some key lessons and steps in the implementation of bundled payments(48).  
However, the first step towards any reform is to embed the foundations described 
above.  These foundations are implementation of ‘bundled payments’ and this in 
turn is a bridge towards a future capitation model in a transition towards a value 
based primary health care system. 
 
Australia is not unique in its need to consider payment reform of the health care 
system.  Other countries have already embarked on the journey.  In Australia, 
there are a number of reforms on the agenda at a number of levels and a unique 
opportunity to introduce a transformational payment reform presents itself.  The 
workshop discussions and outputs provided insights for implementation of bundled 
payments in the Australian context. As others have pointed out, a payment reform 
alone will not be sufficient to address the multiple challenges of fiscal 
sustainability, affordability, accessibility and equity, but it is necessary if the 
questions and issues raised in the ‘Reform of the Federation’ Health Issues paper 
are to be addressed.
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Appendix 1: Definitions 
 
Payment method Definition 
Bundle payment 
(also known as episode-based payment, 
episode payment, episode-of-care payment, 
case rate, evidence-based case rate, global 
bundled payment, global payment, package 
pricing, or packaged pricing) 
A single payment covering multiple elements 
of a patient’s treatment.  It is often for an 
episode of care, or for a specific condition 
over a period of time. 
Capitation Lump sum or a fixed regular payment per 
patient/member of population served by a 
provider for comprehensive services or 
particular categories of service regardless of 
treatment  
Fee for Service Payment for an individual medical service, 
for example, discrete hospital visits or 
consultant attendances. 
Pay for performance A financial incentive based on measures of 
quality. Providers are rewarded for meeting 
pre-established targets on quality and 
efficiency. Providers are at risk as payment 
is dependent on their achievement against 
targets. This form of payment can be 
combined with other payment strategies to 
enhance quality. 
Practice Incentive Payment A practice-based payment for meeting 
specific, practice targets 
Primary Care Activity Level (PCAL) The expected primary care cost for each 
patient or population (used in US) 
Service Incentive Payment An additional payment for achieving a goal 
e.g. completion of a cycle of care for asthma 
or diabetes. 
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Appendix 2: Abbreviations 
 
Abbreviation  
ACO Accountable Care Organisations 
APRM Alternative Provider Remuneration Methods 
CCT Coordinated Care Trials 
DCP Diabetes Care Project 
EPC Enhanced Primary Care 
FFS Fee for service 
MBS Medicare Benefits Schedule 
NHHRC National Health and Hospital Reform Commission  
PBS Pharmaceutical Benefits Schedule 
PCAL Primary Care Activity Level  
PCMH Person centred medical home 
PIP Practice Incentive Payment 
PPS Prospective Payment System 
PRM Physician Remuneration Methods 
RACGP Royal Australian College of General Practitioners  
SIP Service Incentive Payments  
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Appendix 3: Method 
This discussion paper has been produced in two stages: 
1.  A review of the literature 
2.  A workshop to discuss the findings and themes, with a particular focus on the 
meaning within the Australian context. 
 
The final version will be a synthesis of the findings from the literature review and 
the workshop. 
Literature Review 
A literature search was conducted using PubMed, Cochrane and Google Scholar.  
The search strategy used for PubMed and Cochrane is detailed in the table below. 
 
Search Engine Search Strategy 
PubMed (796*) (((((((((bundl*[Title/Abstract]) OR episode[Title/Abstract]) 
OR prospective payment[Title/Abstract]) OR 
warranti*[Title/Abstract]) OR global[Title/Abstract]) AND 
payment[Title/Abstract]) OR fees[Title/Abstract]) OR 
incentive*[Title/Abstract]) OR reimburse*[Title/Abstract]) 
OR fees[Title/Abstract] 
Cochrane (4) (bundl*:ti,ab,kw or "prospective":ti,ab,kw or 
"global":ti,ab,kw or "episode":ti,ab,kw or 
"warranty":ti,ab,kw (Word variations have been searched)) 
AND 
(payment*:ti,ab,kw and incentive* and fees and reimburse* 
and finance* (Word variations have been searched)) 
Google Scholar Each of the combined terms used in the PubMed search 
strategy was used in the Google Scholar search engine, with 
limitations as per those within the PubMed search where 
the search engine has the facility to enable those limits. 
Table 6:  Search Strategy 
*The following limits were applied 
 
English Language  
Studies in last 15 years  
Studies from Like 
Nations 
(((((united kingdom[MeSH Terms]) OR australia[MeSH 
Terms]) OR new zealand[MeSH Terms]) OR 
canada[MeSH Terms]) OR united states[MeSH Terms]) 
OR europe[MeSH Terms] 
Items with abstracts  
Table 7:  Limits applied to search strategy 
The titles of papers from the literature search were reviewed.  The study was 
included based on the relevance of the title.  Where there was uncertainty from 
the title, the abstract was reviewed. Sixty-one papers from the PubMed search 
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were selected for a full paper review.  Additional papers were identified as 
follows: 
(i) Use of snowballing techniques 
(ii) Author searches.  Where the same author featured in more than one 
publication identified through the search strategy, then a further search was 
conducted in the databases using that author’s name.  
(iii) A number of policy orientated research organisations have websites that either 
provide independent reports and publications or host a repository of 
literatures.  The websites of the organisations listed in the table below were 
perused for appropriate reports and papers. 
 
Organisation Name and Website Description 
RAND Corporation 
http://www.rand.org/topics/bundled
-payment-for-health-services.html  
http://www.rand.org/health/key-
topics/paying-for-care.html  
The RAND corporation website has two 
collections which are relevant to this 
piece of research.  The first collection is 
a series of papers on bundled payment 
for health services and the second is on 
paying for care. 
The National Academies Press 
http://www.nap.edu  
The National Academies Press (NAP) was 
created by the National Academy of 
Sciences to publish the reports of the 
National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering and Medicine, operating 
under a charter granted by the Congress 
of the United States.  
The King’s Fund 
http://www.kingsfund.org.uk  
The King's Fund is an independent 
charity working to improve health and 
health care in England with a vision to 
make best possible care is available to 
all.  One of the mechanisms it uses to 
do this is by shaping policy and practice 
through research and analysis. 
Nuffield Trust 
http://www.nuffieldtrust.org.ukhttp:
//www.nuffieldtrust.org.uk 
 
The Nuffield Trust is an independent 
source of evidence-based research and 
policy analysis for improving health care 
in the UK. 
The Health Foundation 
http://www.health.org.uk  
The Health Foundation is an 
independent UK charity that conducts 
research and in-depth policy analysis, 
run improvement programmes to put 
ideas into practice in the NHS, support 
  
  
49 
and develop leaders and share evidence 
to encourage wider change. 
George Institute 
http://www.georgeinstitute.org  
 The George Institute’s mission is to 
improve the health of millions of people 
worldwide which includes provision of 
best evidence to guide critical health 
decisions, targeting global epidemics 
and focusing on vulnerable populations. 
Grattan Institute 
http://grattan.edu.au/home/health/  
The Grattan Institute is an independent 
think tank offering rigorous and 
practical Australian public policy 
thought leadership across seven public 
policy programs including health. 
The Sax Institute 
https://www.saxinstitute.org.au  
The Sax Institute is an Australian not-
for-profit organisation that promotes 
the use of research evidence in health 
policy. 
Table 8:  List of organisations whose websites were perused 
A total of one hundred and sixty-five (165) references were reviewed, of which 
thirty-one (31) were relevant to the research questions this review paper is seeking 
to answer. 
 
The research questions are: 
 
1. What is the evidence of impact of bundled payments, particularly in primary 
care? 
2. What are the enablers, barriers and lessons for implementation in Australia 
primary care from the experience of other countries? 
 
NVivo software was used to analyse and synthesise the findings based on these two 
questions.  
  
  
50 
Workshop 
The findings from the literature review were circulated to participants of a Forum 
on Bundled Care Options for Primary Health, held on 16th September 2015 and 
hosted by AHHA.  The agenda workshop is shown below: 
 
9:00 Introduction 
9:15 What’s working and what isn’t ? – Australia’s current state 
9:25 The Reform Agenda 
9:45 The ‘value’ goal 
10:00 Ways of funding health ? 
10:10 A patient perspective – exploring a patient journey. 
10:20 Morning Break 
10:45 Funding streams along a patient journey and exploring the 
opportunities for alternatives 
11:05 Feedback 
11:25 What does the evidence on bundled payments tell us? 
11:40 Bundled payments in Australia – a balanced exploration 
11:55 Feedback 
12:15 Summary, Closing Remarks 
 
Key findings from the workshop were presented, including a background 
presentation on value in health care and the type of funding mechanisms for 
health care.  Participants (Appendix 4:  List of Forum Participants (page 51)) were 
invited to work through a patient case study (Appendix 5:  Workshop Case Study) 
to identify current funding streams for each component of care and which 
components of that patient’s care had the potential to be bundled.  Participants 
were asked to consider bundled payments in Australia using De Bono’s Six Thinking 
Hats as a tool to seek a balanced perspective (of which only four were used). 
 
The Yellow Hat The Yellow Hat symbolizes brightness and optimism. 
The Black Hat The Black Hat is judgment -- the devil's advocate or why 
something may not work 
The Green Hat The Green Hat focuses on creativity: the possibilities, 
alternatives and new ideas. 
The Red Hat The Red Hat signifies feelings, hunches and intuition 
 
The outputs from the forum were recorded and the discussions audiotaped.  The 
audiotape was transcribed and the transcript incorporated into the synthesis of 
this document and analysed for themes. 
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Appendix 4:  List of Forum Participants 
Aleksandric Vlad Capital Health Network 
Anderson Abbe Brisbane North Primary Health Network 
Ball Jacqui  NSW Ministry of Health 
Bates Paul Bupa 
Beange Jennifer Western NSW Primary Health Network 
Breadsell Denise Queensland Nurses Union 
Byron Jenny Department of Health 
Campbell Magda Sydney North Health Network 
Coffey Pauline  Brisbane North Primary Health Network 
Cole Deborah Dental Health Services Victoria 
Croker Amanda Amanda Croker Consulting 
Davidson Jill Shine SA 
Dawda Paresh  
De Angelis  Tracey  Brisbane South PHN formerly Medicare Local  
Eales Sandra Queensland Nurses Union 
Eggert Marlene Australian College of Nursing 
Feidgeon Nigel Merri Community Health Services Limited 
Ferrier Denise Department of Health & Human Services, Vic 
Hale - Robertson Karen CheckUP 
Hales Lynelle Sydney North Health Network 
Hassed Vivienne Dept of Health - Queensland 
Healy Caz CoHealth 
Hobbs Aiden CheckUP 
Holden Libby Abt JTA 
Hosking Kim Country SA PHN 
James Simon  Brisbane South PHN  
Jones Cristal Department of Health 
Killion Susan Australian Healthcare & Hospitals Association 
Kleinhans Shelley  Brisbane North Primary Health Network 
Kmet Walter WentWest Limited 
Kruys Edwin RACGP 
Lee Deb Adelaide PHN 
Leigh Ben LaTrobe Community Health Serivce 
Liedvogel Martin Capital Health Network 
Lyndon Katie  Exercise & Sports Science Australia 
Martland Susan  
McCallum Jacqueline Dental Health Services Victoria 
McGowan Russell Australian Health Care Reform Alliance 
McKeown Emma Medtronic Australasia Pty Ltd 
Nankervis Richard Central Coast NSW Medicare Local 
Nix George Queensland Health 
Panzera Annette Catholic Health Australia 
Parekh Sanjoti Abt JTA 
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Partel Krister Australian Healthcare & Hospitals Association 
Reay Lizz Wentworth Healthcare Limited 
Rohde Sarah SA Health 
Saberi Vahid North Coast Primary Health Network 
Schmiede Annette Bupa 
Schwager Jane HNECC PHN 
Scown Paul Consultant 
Stewart Stephen Dept of Health - Queensland 
Sweenet Sharon Abt JTA 
Thilo Ayela  Bupa 
Thurecht Linc Australian Healthcare & Hospitals Association 
Todhunter Liz Queensland Nurses Union 
Trethowan Jason Western Victoria Primary Health Network 
Veach Kate  Queensland Nurses Union 
Verhoeven Alison Australian Healthcare & Hospitals Association 
Vlachoulis Nick  
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Appendix 5:  Workshop Case Study 
Participants were presented a case study with the patient’s journey mapped out.  
The case study was of a 60-year-old gentleman called, Wayne.  He develops 
diabetes and is initially treated with diet and exercise in primary care.  He also is 
found to be hypertensive.  He eventually requires medication but when his 
diabetes remains uncontrolled he is referred to an endocrinologist.  He receives 
further lifestyle interventions, but has to be referred to a cardiologist for chest 
discomfort.  He requires intervention for this and cardiac rehabilitation.  He during 
the course of his journey develops mild-moderate depression and his referred for 
psychological input and also received smoking cessation treatment. 
 
The map of his journey is available for viewing at http://bit.ly/bp_patientjourney. 
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Appendix 6: Summary list of papers reviewed 
 
The following is a list of papers that were identified in the literature search, reviewed and used in the final draft of the paper. 
 
 
Reference 
Number 
SUMMARY  COUNTRY 
(12) This paper identifies the different methods of payment in the NHS together with their advantages and 
disadvantages.  It discusses factors that need to be considered in the design of a payment system and the 
objectives of a reformed payment system for England. 
 
Review UK 
(14) This editorial concludes that bundled payments will likely be an important feature of the health care 
system in the future.  The author identifies five key areas: 
1. The size of the provider group 
2. The distribution of payments to providers and the mechanism used for that. 
3. The management of risk and how it is accounted for. 
4. The rate at which the payer increases future rates of payment of bundles. 
5. In bundled payments if incentives are for the provider to receive a proportion of the savings.  How any 
potential savings are distributed will have any impact. 
 
Editorial US 
(16) This paper reports the experience from the Netherlands of introducing a bundle payment system for 
diabetes care, vascular risk management and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.  The insurers pays a 
single fee covering all primary care elements of the specified conditions to a ‘care group’, which is the 
principal contracting entity.  The care group consists of multiple health care providers (and often owned 
by General Practitioners). 
By way of background the authors describe three weakness of the Dutch system: 
• Primary care has been provided in small practices without the capability to deliver comprehensive 
care required for those with chronic diseases 
• A fragmented funding formula paying GPs using a blend of capitation and FFS and allied health with 
FFS. 
• The division between generalist and specialist care impedes integrated care, with the problem being 
compounded by the different payment mechanisms. 
 Netherlands 
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The insurer negotiates the bundle payment level with the care group.  The care group can choose to 
provide the service or subcontract to other providers e.g. GPs, allied health.  In the latter case the care 
group would negotiate payments with the providers.  The services included in the bundle had been set 
nationally in disease specific health care standards. 
 
The positive consequences were better collaboration, better process quality (adherence to protocols), 
and more transparency.  The effects of implementing bundled payment on patient outcomes such as 
blood sugar levels and costs were unknown. 
 
The negative consequences were dominance of the care groups by general practitioners, large price 
variations that were only partially explained by differences in the provision of care, and an administrative 
burden. 
 
The insurers perceived the bundled payment as a black box, not knowing what was happening at the 
patient level.  One of the insurers expressed concerns about the lack of clarity and did not know what 
services were being paid for, and hence had concerns about double dipping.  The authors point to other 
research showing large variations among care groups with regard to price as well as to reported 
performance information. They expressed concerns about additional administration in the contracts 
between them and care groups and concerns about the lack of competition. 
 
The care groups reported perspectives were generally positive and in particular the ability to influence 
care process, to supply health care providers with feedback about their performance relative to the 
average care group performance and to give insurers information about performance.  They were 
concerned about the administration and the dominant position of the insurers.  They experienced 
challenges in assigning correct payments to providers particular when the patient had multi morbidity, 
and the lack of their ability to shift savings from specialty care to reinvest in primary care. 
 
The subcontractor perspective was positive with recognition that it improved coordination of care. 
However, they had concerns about the dominant position of the care groups and their ability to remodel 
the care to be provided by different providers.  There were concerns about conflicts of interest with high 
levels of care group ownership amongst GPs.  GPs also raised concerns about fragmentation with disease 
based funding. 
 
Further implementation of bundled payments for other chronic diseases were being considered in the 
Netherlands. However, this would make the problem of how to deal with patients with multiple diseases 
even more complex.  The authors speculated that the introduction of bundled payment might turn out to 
be a useful step in the direction of risk adjusted integrated capitation payment for multidisciplinary 
provider groups offering primary and specialist care for a defined group of patients. 
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(17) The authors’ objective was to evaluate the applicability of clinical practice guidelines to the care of 
older individuals with several co-morbid diseases and highlight implications of pay for performance.  The 
review suggested that basing standards for quality of care and pay for performance on existing clinical 
practice guidelines for the population studies may lead to inappropriate judgment of the care provided to 
older individuals with complex co-morbidities.  This may potentially create a perverse incentives leading 
to the wrong aspects of care for this population and diminish the quality of their care. 
 
Review N/A 
(18) This paper presents a framework for payment of primary care practices replacing encounter-based 
reimbursement with a comprehensive payment for comprehensive care. 
 
The model suggests additional investment for additional responsibilities.  Payments are directed to 
practices to include support for the modern systems and teams essential to the delivery of 
comprehensive, coordinated care. The payment is needs/risk-adjusted and performance-based to ensure 
optimal allocation of resources and reward desired outcomes.  It recommends pilots of the model. 
 
Discussion US 
(19) The author makes the case for a RiskBased Comprehensive Payment (RBCP) model for PCMH.  It is 
partially capitated, in that the PCMH receives a bundled global payment intended to cover primary care 
services only; non-primary care services continue to be separately reimbursed. 
 
They argue for three payments: 
• Base payment 
• Bonus incentive payment 
• Transformation support payment 
 
The base payment is risk adjusted to cover the Primary Care Activity Level.  The bonus payment is also 
risk adjusted. 
 
Discussion US 
(20) A paper describing the development and evaluation of a risk-adjusted Primary Care Activity Level base 
payment and performance measures using empirical criteria to estimate essentially all the resources 
needed for care and to determine what constitutes good performance. 
 
Calculating a bundled payment for only a particularly relevant subset of spending for primary care, this 
paper suggest avoids the problem of full capitation imposing unreasonable financial risk on typical 
primary care practices.  The modelling was designed to support replacing fee for service payments in a 
medical home entirely with bundled care-coordination payments and large bonuses.  The modelling was 
done on claims-based data on 17.4 million commercially insured lives to model bundled payment to 
support expected primary care activity levels and 9 patient outcomes for performance assessment. 
  
Risk based US 
 57 
 
The authors found that the predicted and apparent costs of providing comprehensive primary care vary 
more than 100-fold across patients and showed that sophisticated risk adjustment is required to 
adequately distinguish across such huge differences. 
 
They demonstrated the utility of claims-based risk adjustment across diverse provider specialties, health 
plan types, payers, age, sex, and various outcomes and in distinct datasets. 
 
The authors strongly recommend that any measure should be risk adjusted unless it is shown that patient 
factors cannot predict it.  
 
The authors concluded that existing data can support the risk-adjusted bundled payment calculations and 
performance assessments need to encourage desired transformations in primary care. 
 
(21) This paper provides an analysis and recommendations on hospital based bundled payment models 
designed to bundle pre, inpatient, and post care.  It identifies advantages and disadvantages: 
 
Advantages: 
• Payment bundling has the potential to reduce costs without compromising outcomes 
• The entity has to provide the service delivery costs e.g. coordination, medication reconciliation  It 
received the cost net of the treatment cost and so can in effect commission the most cost effective 
provider 
 
Disadvantages: 
• Incentives to skimp on care are inherent in any fixed-episode payment system because there is no 
payment for additional services 
• Increase in financial risk (but this can be mitigated against) 
 Insurance against outliers 
 Gain or loss sharing 
 Combining with pay for performance 
• Limitation in choice of provider (if the entity being paid the bundled payment is commissioning 
services from its providers than it’s likely to limit the number and this may limit the choice) 
 
Implementation challenges: 
• Choosing conditions:  The authors suggest two key considerations. 
⁃ Financial risk 
⁃ Potential to reduce cost with compromising outcomes 
• Length of an episode of care 
 
 US 
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(24)  This is an evaluation report of Diabetes Care Project (DCP), a randomised cluster-controlled trial with a 
usual care group and two other groups: 
 
Group 1:  an integrated information platform and continuous quality improvement processes within the 
current funding model. 
 
Group 2:  As for group 1 + flexible funding based on risk stratification + payments for quality + funding for 
care facilitation. 
 
Findings: 
The study showed that those practices within Group 2 had: 
• Improved the quality of diabetes care as measured by intermediate clinical indicators, adherence to 
recommended clinical processes and patient satisfaction.  The latter included patient perceptions of 
continuity of care. 
• Were able to be more innovative and patient-centred in the way they delivered care 
• No statistically significant changes in affordability 
 
The improvements in quality, particularly of information recording and intermediate clinical indicators 
were attributed to the pay for performance component. 
 
The evaluation concluded that a wider rollout of the funding mechanism for Group 2 interventions would 
not be cost effective. 
 
Research 
Paper 
Australia 
(25) This paper reported on the CCT in Australia conducted by SA HealthPlus.  The summary of the paper 
reports the following four items: 
• Barriers to coordinated care for chronic illness in Australia include multiple sources of funding, and 
general practice that focuses on acute care, with doctors working individually, not in teams 
• Definitions of managed care, coordinated care, and disease management models have not been agreed 
• SA HealthPlus successfully implemented a generic model of coordinated care with improved health 
outcomes but savings that were not sufficient to pay for all coordination costs 
• Self-management capacity is a necessary component of assessment in determining allocation to 
coordinated care for chronic conditions 
 
Research 
Paper 
Australia 
(30) This technology assessment was a comprehensive review of the effects of bundled payments on spending 
and quality. 
 
 
 
Technology 
Assessment/
Review 
US 
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The assessment search identified international and US papers, however, none of the papers included in 
the final review incorporated primary care.  The only one paper that did was excluded because full 
evaluation results were not available. 
 
The assessment concluded that the introduction of bundled payment was associated with (1) reductions 
in health care spending and utilisation, and (2) inconsistent and generally small effects on quality 
measures.  
 
These findings were across all the variations of bundled payment programs identified by the review, but 
the authors rated the quality of evidence as low due mainly to concerns about bias and residual 
confounding. 
 
They identified a number of caveats for consideration by policymakers: 
 
1. Future bundled payment programs will be different to those reviewed in this study (80% of the 
bundled payment interventions studied were limited to payments to single institutional providers 
(e.g., hospitals, skilled nursing facilities).  This limited the ability to extrapolate to newer programs 
that include multiple providers) 
2. They note that bundled payment have the potential to either adversely affect quality or be used as 
part of a quality improvement strategy. Hence future bundled payment programs need to have an 
integral and robust quality monitoring and improvement component. 
3. The quality of evaluation was low and that further policy change should be subject to rigours 
evaluation. 
 
(31) PROMETHEUS was designed to pay for all of the care required to treat a defined clinical episode, 
particularly those services recommended by clinical guidelines or experts.  It defined 21 medical 
conditions to be included including chronic diseases such as diabetes.  The sites experienced significant 
implementation challenges.  Despite the challenges some intermediate benefits were observed.  These 
include participants finding it valuable to use a measurement tool, initiation of new care coordination 
activities and improved communication amongst stakeholder. 
 
Review US 
(32) This was a paper from the RAND Institute that reviewed the success of value based purchasing programs.  
In the review the authors had identified three papers in relation to bundled payments.  They had applied 
inclusion criteria that limited them to an examination of bundled payment arrangements to those that 
included both cost and quality performance components to assess value.  The setting of the three studies 
included Hospital/physicians/post-acute care.  They found: 
 
 
Review US 
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1. Clinical quality:  Only one of the three studies examined the effect of bundled payments on process 
measures. The study found that adherence on 40 clinical process measures increased.  However, this 
was in a single integrated organisation and so the transferability to other settings may not be possible. 
2. Cost:  Two studies measured this and both found a cost reduction.  One was of the order of 5 percent 
whilst the other found a $USD2000 reduction in the cost per case over the two-year period. 
3. Unintended consequences:  There were none identified. However, the expert panel overseeing the 
review recommended monitoring of potential unintended consequences.  These potentially include the 
loss of revenue for providers caring for disadvantaged populations, the excessive exclusion of patients 
when that is an option in the program, access barriers and patient turnover from practices related to 
providers avoiding more difficult patients, and market concentration and price effects in the context 
of Accountable Care Organisations. 
 
(33) This paper discussed the implications of the Netherlands experience in the US contexts identifying five 
key lessons: 
• Reimbursement of care groups varied widely 
⁃ Partially explained by variation in actual differences in care provided 
⁃ Partially explained by inexperience of care providers and payers in bundled payment design 
⁃ Partially explained by varying interpretation of national standards 
• Unanimous reporting of improvement in care processes 
• Improvement in transparency of care (but requires ongoing information in technology as an enabler) 
• Too early to conclude on quality or cost 
⁃ No improvement in intermediate outcome measures e.g. HbA1c but high starting point 
• Care groups in a powerful position and with a preferred provider network limited choice for patients. 
 
Discussion 
paper 
Netherlands 
(34) This paper reviewed the Dutch experience with bundle payments in chronic care.  The full paper could 
not be sourced, however, given the relevance of the Dutch experience to this project the abstract was 
maintained in the literature search.  It report small but largely variable effect on quality of care of 
patients with diabetes.  This included lower proportion of patients treated in hospital, but with no 
corresponding decrease in hospital costs, however there was an additional investment cost for primary 
care.  The transparency system did not function well, with lack of steering on double payments, and a 
concerns about the monopolistic position of care groups.  Patients were unaware of their involvement 
and very little difference was observed in individual care plans.  The authors concluded that it was too 
early for a final assessment but commented care groups needed to fulfil higher requirements with respect 
to preconditions and patient involvement. 
 
Research 
paper 
Netherlands 
(35) This study evaluated quality of care for diabetes patients with and without co-morbidity enrolled in 
diabetes disease management programmes provided by care groups.  They found no differences in quality 
of care in diabetic patients with or without co-morbidities. 
Research 
paper 
Netherlands 
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(36) This paper presented the perspective of dietician in the Netherlands bundled care experience of patients 
with diabetes. 
 
The findings showed the advantages and disadvantages: 
Advantages: 
• increase in multidisciplinary collaboration (65%) 
• more efficiency in primary health care (41%) and 
• greater transparency of health care quality (24%) 
Disadvantages: 
• increase in administrative tasks (60%) 
• lack of payment for patients with co- or multi-morbidity (41%), and  
• that dietetic care was substituted by other disciplines (32%) 
 
Research 
paper 
Netherlands 
(37) This survey reports findings from research on physicians’ attitude to alternative payment models 
including bundled payments.  Interviewees reported: 
• change in organisation structure through merger with other practices or bigger organisations to enable 
them to respond to the structural changes required from different payment models e.g. Investment in 
information technology 
• encouraged the development of team approaches to care management, featuring prominent roles for 
allied health professionals 
• a serious tension could also arise when practices participated in a mix of both FFS and risk-based 
contracts resulting in conflicting incentives—to increase volume under the FFS contract while reducing 
costs under the risk-based contract 
• Expanded options for patient access 
• Investment in data management capabilities 
• negligible effects on the aggregate income of individual physicians 
• Those particularly in non-leadership positions perceived the changes with less enthusiasm.  They 
experience great non-clinical work and felt pressure to pressure to practice at the top of their 
licence.   
 
The authors recommended that: 
• Practices need support and guidance 
• Addressing concerns about operational details could improve their effectiveness 
• Practices need data and resource to manage and analyse that data 
• Aligning key aspect of different payment models would allow practices to respond constructively 
 
 
Research US 
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(38) The authors reviewed the impact of bundled care for cardiovascular services (mostly specialist services).  
They conclude bundled payment initiatives thus far have demonstrated modest potential to curb health 
care costs without decreasing health care quality and potentially even improving it.  They cite the 
recurring theme around challenges in program implementation.  
 
 US 
(39) This paper reports an empirical analysis of hospitals in Italy and concludes that those in regions where 
PPS are used more widely correlate with higher quality of care. 
 
Research 
paper 
Italy 
(40) This paper from the Nuffield Trust provides a snapshot of policy focus in Europe to reform payment 
systems for health in order to improve efficiency and quality. 
 
Payment by case-mix adjusted bundle payments is well established in hospital care.  It has had impact 
with increasing activity and reducing length of stay but not for co-ordination of care beyond hospital 
settings or control of overall cost.  The payment mechanism is being combined with pay for performance 
or caps are being introduced limit total costs. 
 
The payment system for doctors outside of hospitals is a blend of fee for service and capitation.  The 
authors comment on findings from other research that an over reliance on fee for service is likely to 
increase activity or that capitation will reduce efficiency.  They suggest the need for a balanced blend of 
payment systems. 
  
They comment on the health system striving to achieve better value and the development of episode-
based payment to cover a pathway of care for patients (together with a pay for performance element) 
being a promising element towards value-based contracting.  However, they note that such payment 
systems can only develop if there is good quality data on activity, cost and outcomes: in most countries in 
Europe such data are weakest for some of the ambulatory and primary care based interventions, which 
are key components of the effective management of patients with chronic disease.  To achieve greater 
value in health care requires dealing with a complex interaction of a number of factors: professional and 
public culture, regulatory systems, legislation and governance. 
 
They note that while payment mechanisms can help to overcome some of these challenges, they are only 
a part of wider change needed. Establishing DRG-style case-mix groupings for ambulatory and primary 
care-based interventions would be an important next step, as would the development of a robust set of 
measures of outcomes, and greater challenge of variations. 
 
Research 
Report 
Europe 
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(42) This paper researched whether bundled payments for heart failure for patients hospitalised reduced 
readmissions.  The found that proposed bundled payments would provide a sufficient incentive to 
implement disease management programs that would reduce the risk of readmission and hence improve 
quality and cost. 
Research US 
(43) A paper on payment by results in the English NHS.  It identifies some key lessons regarding payment 
system.  These key lessons include: 
 
• Payment systems cannot do everything 
• One size does not fit all 
• Payment systems need to be flexible 
• Trade-offs between objectives are inevitable 
• Data and research for payment systems must be strengthened 
 
The paper also reviewed the international experience of paying for health care.  It notes that many 
countries are dissatisfied with the limitations of activity-based payments for patients with long term 
conditions and complex ongoing needs.  It cites the following examples of bundled care initiatives: 
1. Netherlands - a large-scale initiative to contract doctor led groups for a year of care for selected 
chronic conditions. 
2. US - pilots of bundled care payments on ‘episode treatment groups’ that bundle physician, acute 
hospital, post-acute and ambulatory care costs from referral or admission to recovery for an extended 
episode of care. 
3. Sweden - piloting of extended episode payment for joint replacement, combined with patient choice 
and provider competition. 
 
They express the exercise of caution as defining episodes of care, and payment rates, and distribution of 
incentives across providers is challenging. 
 
The paper conducts a critical analysis of the application of bundled payments to the English NHS and 
concludes: 
1. It is uncertain about its place in the NHS which has a different context 
2. The structure of commissioning primary care and acute is care is divided which would make it difficult 
to translate 
 
They comment that bundled payments have stimulated better co-ordination, improved the quality of 
data, improved clinical engagement, and relationships between payers and providers. 
 
Review UK 
(44) This study undertook financial modelling to understand the impact on insurers, delivery systems and 
providers of introduced a heart failure management service.  The findings demonstrated that there would 
Research 
paper 
US 
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be a benefit for insurers, and that monies would shift to different components of the system, resulting it 
greater loss to one component with gains in other components.  Overall, it showed net loss to the 
delivery/provider side.  It provides indirect evidence to illustrate the complexity of costing a service or 
bundle of care. 
(45) This paper presented the author’s exercise in linking existing data sets in Ontario to explore the 
feasibility of implementing bundled payments in that system.  The author demonstrated it was possible 
hip and knee replacements but implementation issues are significant. 
 
Research and 
discussion 
paper 
Canada 
(47) The paper presented a successful process to co-design a bundled payment approach between orthopaedic 
providers and payers in US.  They defined process steps as: 
• Defining the bundle 
• Selecting the patient population including taking into account risk adjustment based on case mix 
• Specifying evidence based outcomes and guarantees 
• Ensuring patient engagement 
• Estimating costs 
• Setting the price 
The output from this case study description has yet to be implemented.  
 
Case Study US 
(53) The article argues that the optimal choice of PRM depends on the goals of the health care system, and on 
external contextual factors. Fee for service payments are best when the goals are quantity of care and 
risk acceptance. Capitation is best when the goals are collaboration between providers and delivery of 
preventive services and health promotion. Salaries are best when population density is low, and the goal 
is to recruit physicians to rural and remote areas. Blended payment models are recommended for the 
achievement of multiple goals. 
 
 Canada 
(55) The authors of this paper conducted an analysis to estimate cost savings for episodes of care that were 
bundled.  They looked at an elderly population across 306 hospital referral regions and a total of 245 
different types of episodes.  They compared estimated cost saving with episode-based to patient-based 
bundled payments (capitation).  The conclusion was that it is possible to achieve very substantial health 
care savings by moving from a fee for service model to bundled payments for episodes of care, whether 
in a stand-alone program or as a component of an overall global-payment model. 
Research US 
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(56) This survey of 153 intermediary entities in California traced the cascade of financial incentives from 
health plans through physician organizations to primary care physicians. Although the physician 
organizations received the vast majority (84 percent) of their revenues through capitation contracts, most 
of the financial risk related to utilisation and costs was retained at the group level. Capitation of primary 
care physicians was common in independent practice associations (IPAs), but payments typically were 
restricted to primary care services. Thirteen percent of medical groups and 19 percent of IPAs provided 
bonuses or withholds based on utilization or cost performance, which averaged 10 percent of base 
compensation. With a single exception, all respondents indicated that individual physicians rather than 
subgroups or “risk pools” were the basis of bonus or withhold calculations. Depending on the way 
physician organisations predominantly paid primary care providers an average of 9–21 percent. 
 US 
(57) The authors review the history of bundled payments, the current demonstration sites, and the opinions of 
those radiologists involved and attempt to outline a plan for hospital-based practices to prepare for this 
possible scenario. 
 
Discussion 
Paper 
US 
(58) This paper reported on qualitative interviews from 27 stakeholders in the Canadian Health System on 
reasons for, expectations of, as well as achievement of APRM for family doctors in Canada.  The main 
reasons identified included: 
• Recruitment and retention in rural and remote areas 
• Desire to increase collaboration, care continuity, prevention and health promotion. 
 
Blended payments were described as having a positive effect on the collaboration, care continuity, 
prevention and health promotion.  A salaried structure helped recruitment and retention but raised 
concerns about reduced physician productivity. 
Research Canada 
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